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National and state-sanctioned museums are authoritative public sites for 
exposition on subjects deemed important in national identity-building. Far from being 
neutral spaces of learning where visitors arrive at their own conclusions after viewing 
the exhibitions, museums are social institutions that selectively use objects and 
narratives to influence their visitors into behaving and responding to exhibitions in 
manners deemed desirable. Such socializing imperatives affect the shaping of any 
museum‟s galleries. In Southeast Asian countries with significant Muslim 
populations, several national and private museums grapple to create authentic 
representations of Islam within the discourse of “national culture”. Such attempts 
often reveal tensions between the museum‟s representations and the reality of the 
modern and often ethnically and religiously plural societies. My thesis examines how 
the Bayt Al-Qur‟an & Istiqlal Museum Indonesia (BQMI) and the Islamic Arts 
Museum Malaysia (IAMM) attempt to define the role that Islam plays in the creation 
of their respective national identities. 
 
The BQMI and IAMM can be seen as public institutions which emerged from 
a national landscape of increasingly religion-directed cultural policies that was 
influenced by what appeared to be a worldwide revival of Islamic values since the 
1970s. Seminal events in the larger Muslim world, including the Palestinian conflict, 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan, occurred against an 
international backdrop of Cold War politics. The rhetoric of international diplomacy 
during this period was resoundingly ideological as it pitted the Soviet communist bloc 
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against the liberal democracies of Western economies. Islam seemed to provide an 
alternative rubric to the two secular political ideologies and many countries 
experienced a resurgence of “Islam-consciousness” amongst their Muslim 
communities.  
 
The political leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia have, at different points of 
their countries‟ histories, restricted and encouraged expressions of Islam in their 
respective public spheres.  Between the late 1980s and 1990s, then-Indonesian 
President Suharto and his Malaysian counterpart, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, 
supported policies that increasingly led to the Islamization of the two countries, both 
in terms of the “greening” of state bureaucratic and military apparatus as well as the 
implementation of Islamic practices in the respective public realms.     
 
Nonetheless, the terms “Islamic culture” and “Islamic art” are problematic and 
begs the question of whether they can be used as universalistic terms that can describe 
the myriad Muslim communities through history. Especially, when one considers the 
ancient Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of Southeast Asia and the continued presence of 
pre-Islamic traditions and practices in Southeast Asian societies, the re-imagination of 
Indonesia and Malaysia as “pristine” Muslim communities becomes fraught with 
tensions. The religious fault line is compounded by ethnic plurality and the 
complexities of majority-minority politics. The Javanese-Muslims of Indonesia and 
the Malay-Muslims of Malaysia exercise political and cultural hegemony over the 
religious and ethnic minorities in their countries. Often times, under the pretext of 
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national unity or other higher national interests, the political and civil liberties of 
ethnic and religious minorities are curtailed.  Hence, state-sanctioned representations 
of the imagined national community are highly controlled images that include some 
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3.13 Model sculptures inspired by various Qur‟anic verses  
3.14 Model sculptures inspired by various Qur‟anic verses  
3.15 Model sculptures inspired by various Qur‟anic verses  
3.16 Model sculptures inspired by various Qur‟anic verses  
3.17 Text panels showing deteriorating prints of Masjid Bayan, est.16th C  
3.18 Text panels showing deteriorating prints of Masjid Bayan, est.16th C  
3.19 Model of Masjid Agung Demak, Java, est. 1506  
3.20 Prints of Masjid Sultan Ternate, est. 1606  
3.21 Print of Masjid Agung Yogyakarta  
3.22 Print of Masjid Panyegat, Tanjung Pinang, est. 1832  
3.23 Print of Masjid Baiturrahman, Aceh, est. 1614, rebuilt 1877  
3.24 Print of Masjid Al-Mashun, Medan, est. 1906  
3.25 Model of Masjid Istiqlal, est. 1978  
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According to a definition provided by the International Council of Museums 
(ICOM), a museum is,  
 
a non-profit making, permanent institutions in the service of society and of its 
development, and open to the public, which acquires, conserves, 
communicates, and exhibits, for purposes of study, education and enjoyments, 




An earlier definition by Douglas Allan states that a museum “in its simplest 
form” was a building “to house collections of objects for inspection, study and 
enjoyment”.2 Museums come in all shapes and sizes and the earliest public museums 
emerged from the stately collections of royal houses in Europe in the 18th Century as 
well as the private collections of wealthy (and sometimes eccentric) individuals who 
assembled cabinets of curios and art works out of a sense of antiquity, scientific 
enquiry or outright exotica.
3
  My thesis examines a certain type of museum – the 
“specialized” museum that deals in depth with a specific subject matter, such as 
archaeology or religion or the political history of a country. In particular, I am 
examining the specialized “Islamic museum” which was either established or 
supported by state authorities and the role it plays in the transmission of certain values 
and knowledge to shape a sense of national culture and identity. 
 
                                                          
1
 International Council of Museums, Article 3, 2007. http://icom.museum/who-we-are/the-
organisation/icom-statutes/3-definition-of-terms.html#sommairecontent. Accessed 12 June 2011.  
2
 Douglas A. Allan, “The Museum and its Functions”, The Organization of Museums, Practical 
Advice” (Paris: Unesco, 1958), p. 13. 
3
 See Joseph Alsop, The Rare Art Traditions: The History of Art Collecting and Its Linked Phenomena 




The Influence of Museums on Nation-building Efforts    
 
National and state-sanctioned museums as we know them today are public 
sites for the exposition on subjects deemed historically important in national identity-
building. Through their collections, displays and even their very buildings, museums 
have the ability to confer knowledge and mediate many of society's basic 
understanding of the world around it, including how it views itself.
4
 Far from being 
neutral spaces of learning where visitors “draw their own conclusions” after viewing 
the numerous artefacts on display, museums are social institutions that selectively use 
objects and narratives to influence their visitors and socialize them into behaving and 
responding to the exhibitions in manners deemed desirable.
5
 At the same time, 
museums themselves are shaped by some agenda or other and more often than not, 
must adhere to and disseminate whatever values that are considered important that its 
local communities (or foreign visitors) should learn about its history or the larger 
world.   
 
These concerns affect the shaping of any museum‟s galleries especially when 
they aim to represent something as ephemeral yet loaded with meaning as “national 
culture”. In Southeast Asia where polyglots of ethnic communities co-exist within 
arbitrary state boundaries , a number of national and private museums (especially in 
countries with significant Muslim populations) grapple to create what can be accepted 
as “authentic” representations of Islam within the discourse of “national culture”.  
 
                                                          
4
 Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-2. 
5
 Ivan Karp and Steven D. Lavine, (eds.) Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum 
Display (Washington: Smithsonian Institute, 1991), pp. 7-8. 
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My thesis is centred on how museums are employed in the nation-building 
campaign through the objectification and exhibition of what can be termed as 
“expressions of a national culture”. The collection of objects that are seen to represent 
the nation‟s collective culture, or “tangible heritage” even, is consumed by the public 
in the belief that they will internalize the experience as part of a citizen‟s national 
identity.
6
 In particular, I examine how two specific museums in Indonesia and 
Malaysia define and manage the role that Islam plays in the creation of their 
respective national identities through their collections and museum activities.  
 
This staging of Islam in the two museums is for both domestic and foreign 
consumption. Despite claims to the universality of the Islamic faith, the curatorial 
approaches of the Bayt al-Qur‟an and Museum Istiqlal (BQMI) and the Islamic Arts 
Museum Malaysia (IAMM) lead me to believe that there is a strong desire in both 
national governments to define an Islam which is to some degree unique to the 
Southeast Asian region and autonomous from the traditions of the Semitic-Persian 
“heartlands” of the Nile and Oxus regions.7 At the same time, there is much care taken 




                                                          
6
Flora E. S. Kaplan, (ed.) Museums and the Making of "Ourselves”: The Role of Objects in National 
Identity (London and New York: Leicester University Press, 1994), p. 16. 
7
 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 4. Hodgson insists on using precise terminology to 
differentiate between the study of “Islam” (the religion) and “Muslims” (the community of the 
faithful). He further argues that the term “Islamic” to describe civilizational aspects of Muslim societies 
is especially problematic. Instead, Hodgson suggests the term “Islamicate” to accommodate the 
different “Islamic cultures” that flourished across the Darul Islam. An extended discussion of 
Hodgson‟s ideas on Islamicate civilisations will follow below. Despite some resistance to the term as 
being too idiosyncratic, whenever possible, I adopt his terminology in my essay to highlight the 
variegated nature of Muslim societies globally and the resulting myriad cultures of Islam. 
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The Selective Nature of Museums and Museum Collections 
 
Given the state-building preoccupations of nationalist governments, it is 
necessary for us to look beyond the objects to examine the narratives that accompany 
the museums‟ collection/exhibitions even as the objects serve as corroborative 
elements in the very narrative. There are always inherent difficulties that curatorial 
teams face in visually recreating any kind of narrative, especially one that pertains to 
describing something as complex as a “civilization” given material constraints and 
competing intellectual and ideological or political paradigms. Hooper-Greenhill 
speaks of “objects as ideas”8 and Stone discusses the ways in which archaeology has 
helped present the past as “public heritage” whilst preserving the physicality of said 
heritage.
9
 Nonetheless, objects do not contain any essential meaning inherently and 
are subject to the context of its use and surroundings
10
. Hence one must always be 
wary when artefacts are removed from their original historical, social and 
epistemological contexts, and then displayed in museums to support a coherent 
“national narrative” that state authorities (or their champions) prefer.  
 
In that regard, I will be addressing how the museums have organized their 
collections in order to, as Stephen Bann puts it, “view the past” and the impact these 
objects have on museum visitors when visual representations and narrative modes 
intersect at various points. “Viewing the past” can never be a truly objective activity, 
Bann argues, as the viewer‟s eyes are inevitably influenced by his or her culture‟s 
                                                          
8
 Hooper-Greenhill, Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge, p. 4. 
9Peter Stone, “Presenting the Past” in Gerard Corsane, Heritage, Museums and Galleries: An 
Introductory Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 215-224. 
10





 Such cultural attitudes about the past also affect how one 
values the objects left behind (or discovered) from that past. In my two case studies, I 
examine how the objects exhibited are used to stretch the concepts of “Islam” as a 
socio-cultural phenomenon, and a dynamically-evolving world religion, as well as to 
expand the geographical and cultural borders of “Islamic civilization” to include 
Southeast Asia, traditionally considered as at the peripheries of the Muslim world.  
 
As the political, intellectual and artistic protagonists in Indonesia and 
Malaysia are engaged in exercises of ordering the past in response to present 
circumstances, I argue that the popularity of the BQMI (in its time) and the IAMM 
are, on the one hand, a reflection of the increasing awareness of Islam and pride of 
Muslims in the historical achievements of Islamicate civilization. This appreciation 
for Islam‟s “golden age” accompanied a worldwide Islamic resurgence that began in 
the 1970s. On the other hand, the establishment of the BQMI in Jakarta in 1997 and 
the IAMM in Kuala Lumpur in 1999 could be considered part of larger institutional 
responses to the increasing Islamization of Malaysian/Indonesian society that gained 
momentum in the 1980s and was well institutionalized by the late 1990s.  
 
Museums as an Extension of Indonesian and Malaysian National Policy 
 
I will further argue that the two museums not only manifest the cultural 
hegemony of the state elites as the dominant and jealous producer of national and 
“Islamic culture”, they also reflect the international aspirations of the respective 
                                                          
11
 Stephen Bann, The Inventions of History: Essays on the Representation of the Past (New York: St 
Martin‟s Press, 1990), p. 34. 
14 
 
Suharto and Mahathir governments to augment the profile of their country in the 
larger “Islamic world”. In this respect, the cultural and other institutional expressions 
of Islam in these two countries make up part of Indonesia and Malaysia‟s foreign 
policy since the 1990s, especially in their interactions with other Muslim countries. 
Moreover, the collection and activities of the IAMM are not only in tandem with a 
larger process of Islamization of Malaysian society, they also reflect an attempt to 
expand the discourse on Islamicate civilization and Islamicate culture in these 
countries, which are traditionally perceived as peripheral to the Islamicate heartlands 
of the Arabian Peninsula due to Islam‟s relatively recent arrival in Southeast Asia 




Arguably, despite the IAMM being a private museum, part of its mission is 
also to serve as an institution of Islamicate knowledge and cultural production. The 
IAMM‟s establishment was also strongly supported by then-Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamed and is generally seen as a testament to  his aim to project present-day 
Malaysia – and  its Muslim majority – as  a worthy modern successor to a global 
Islamicate civilization as well as an authoritative definer of Islamicate culture.  
 
In Indonesia‟s case, despite the similarities it shares with Malaysia in terms of 
a dominant Malay ethnic group and a largely Sunni-Islam religious culture, the formal 
role that Islam plays in state-building in Indonesia is much more ambiguous. For 
instance, even though Indonesia is home to the world‟s largest population of Muslims 
and despite there being a historically influential Islamic intellectual bloc operating 
                                                          
12
 Anthony Reid, The Making of an Islamic Political Discourse in Southeast Asia (Melbourne: Monash 
University, 1993), p. 3. 
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within its relatively more liberal democratic system, “political Islam” was not a 
conspicuous force during Sukarno‟s administration even though he accommodated 
some Islamic elements in the constitution. Further, Islam was forcibly de-politicized 
and steered into the realm of “culture” in the New Order period by Suharto so that the 
secular nationalist ideology of Pancasila would be preserved. The state encouraged 
pursuits of cultural expressions of Islam as culture was deemed to be a safer outlet for 
Islamic expression and these expressions reinforced the nationalist philosophy of 
“unity in diversity”. In practice, Suharto‟s regime accommodated a spectrum of 




However, Suharto‟s attitude towards Islam changed in the late 1980s and he 
became more closely associated with Islamists groups and Muslim public 
intellectuals. The BQMI was a cultural project overseen by Suharto‟s wife, Siti 
Hartinah (better known to Indonesians as Ibu Tien Suharto), during the Suhartos‟ very 
public return to observing the Islamic faith in the 1990s. That the BQMI stands out as 
a giant monument in the miniaturized environs of Taman Mini Indonesia Indah 
(TMII) implies the centrality of the Quran as the unifying force in Indonesian Islam. 
At the same time, the distinctly nationalist context of the 1991 Festival Istiqlal (which 
originated the idea for the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal) and the deliberate process of 
creating an elaborately illuminated reproduction of a “national” Qur‟an, attest to the 
conviction of Indonesian leaders that “Islamic civilization” is diverse and able to 
accommodate myriad identities beyond those formed in the Arabian heartlands of 
Islam.  
                                                          
13
 Kenneth M. George, “Designs on Indonesia‟s Muslim Communities”, The Journal of Asian Studies, 
vol. 57, No. 3 (Aug.1998), pp. 693-713. 
16 
 
Ironically, the BQMI‟s presentation of Islam as the paramount religious 
element in Indonesian national identity mutes the various indigenous responses 
towards Islam over the history of Indonesia as the new faith steadily spread across the 
main islands of Sumatra and Java and further eastwards from the 12th Century. 
Ricklefs‟ insightful analysis of the divergent responses of different sectors of 19th 
Century Javanese society to Islam reveal that its influence in determining Javanese 




Some anti-colonialists were able to harness Islam as a rallying symbol against 
Dutch rule. However, the majority of Muslim Javanese, including its prijayi elites, 
rejected the totalitarian nature of 19th Century reformist Islam in favour of 
maintaining the “mystic synthesis” between Islamic commitment and Javanese 
character that was prevalent from the 14th to 18th century.
15
 In contrast to the deep-
rooted Islamic past that the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal alluded to, a return to earlier 
classical Javanese-Hindu-Buddhist beliefs and even Christianity emerged as viable 
alternatives for the religious component of Javanese identity during that turbulent 
period.
16
     
 
The Complexities of Putting Islam on Display 
 
As museums position themselves as not only surveyors, but also purveyors of 
the past, I will examine the narratives that each museum has chosen to foreground the 
objects in their collections in the museums‟ respective interpretation of “Islamic 
                                                          
14
 M.C. Ricklefs, Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c.1830 -1930) (Singapore: 
NUS Press, 2007), pp. 214-250. 
15
 Ibid., p. 251. 
16
 Ibid., pp. 103-125. 
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civilization” – itself a contested term.17   That the museums are able to construct their 
desired narratives in the first instance, demonstrates that things do not possess any 
inherent essential meanings but rather are made meaningful through specific contexts 
at specific points in time. These contexts are in turn, as Foucault argues, affected by 
power relations in society as well as the privileged episteme, or structures of 
knowledge, of the time.
18
 Hence the past becomes objectified and the „reality‟ of the 
past is experienced by present visitors through the tangible materiality of objects.  
 
Through the acquisitions, displays, exhibitions, programmes and publications 
of the BQMI and the IAMM, the history of an “Islamic civilization” is recreated (to 
various success) as a glorious and continuous spectacle of fine craftsmanship across 
space and time. These artefacts are presented as a common pusaka – preserved and 
displayed for the benefit of the nation.
19
 At the same time, the objects that pertain to 
Malay/ Malay Archipelago-Islamicate art or material culture, are situated as part of a 
larger corpus of a global Islamicate material culture and artistic sensibilities. Such an 
ordering of indigenous Islamicate objects implies that there are common principles 
and an aesthetic that underpin the creation of Islamicate material culture and art. I will 
shortly discuss some of the problems that such an assumption creates. I will also 
elaborate on how scholars in the study of Islamicate civilization such as Marshall 
Hodgson and Bernard Lewis have found strategies to discuss the diversity of “Islamic 
                                                          
17
 As mentioned earlier, I favour Marshall Hodgson‟s terminology of “Islamicate” rather than simply 
“Islamic” even though there are criticisms of the term being idiosyncratic. Simply because “Islamicate” 
avoids the conflation of the religion of Islam and Muslims with the conditions of a complex plural 
society living under Islamic government and/or norms. The term also better describes the discrete 
Muslim societies that have existed through history.     
18
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Tavistock Publications 1970), p. 191-192. 
19
 See Christina Kreps‟s discussion on the indigenous conservation of pusaka or heirloom objects in 
Southeast Asia as an alternative to Western-style museological strategies to preserve cultural heritage. 
“The Idea of „Pusaka‟ as an Indigenous Form of Cultural Heritage Preservation” in Fiona Kerlogue, 
Performing Objects: Museums, Material Culture and Performance in Southeast Asia, (London: 
Horniman Museum, 2004), pp. 1-15. 
18 
 
civilization” while Islamicate art experts the likes of Oleg Grabar, David Bloom and 
Sheila Blair, discuss the elusiveness of defining “Islamic art” in absolute terms.  
 
 
“Islamic Culture”, “Islamicate” Material Cultures and “Islamic Art”:  
Issues of Terminology 
Verily, Allah is beautiful and He loves beauty.
20
 
There are several complexities involved when objects in the two museums‟ 
collections are used to represent both the artistic genius and the religious piety of the 
nation. Before we can even discuss the aesthetics that underpin the practice of 
“Islamic art”, the most immediate problem we face is defining what is “Islamic” or 
Marshall Hodgson‟s term, “Islamicate” culture. Especially in a museum, objects that 
represent Islam as both a “living” religion and historical phenomenon are far removed 
from their original contexts. Such a setting necessitates a discussion on what is meant 
by “Islamicate material culture” and “Islamicate art” such that these displayed objects 
are authentic examples of them.  
 
There is also a need to establish the extent to which museums and heritage 
institutions can comfortably use objects made by Muslims or which are culturally or 
aesthetically informed by Islam as a metonymy for particular contemporary visions in 
“Islam” or in the recreation of Islam‟s history.  Other than the complications of 
cultural and historical “authenticity”, the issue of “inclusivity” and “who belongs” are 
raised in defining the historical civilization of Muslims. 
                                                          
20
 M. A. J. Beg, Wisdom of Islamic Civilisation, (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1980), p. 
48. The statement is from a hadith of the Prophet Muhammad which has presumably informed a sense 
of Muslim aesthetics. 
19 
 
The Complexities of Defining an “Islamic Civilization” 
 
Hodgson argues that the two terms “Islamic civilization” and “Islamic art” are 
problematic. This is because, whether or not one realises it, Western-centric 
conceptualisations of “civilisation” and “art” are applied to the historical development 
of Islam as a world religion. Examining historical Islamicate societies as a 
“civilization” raises several important methodological concerns. For instance, 
Chakrabarty argues that social-science terms and frameworks such as “socialism”, 
“democracy”, “class” and even “religion” which have been used to examine non-
Western societies, are not neutral ontological categories but are shaped by 
occurrences in European history and were society-specific in its analysis.
21
 A term 
like “civilization” is itself a Western-centric construct that emerged in the 19th 
Century from the analyses of classical Europe.  
 
More significantly, in the name of the universal social sciences, these 
categories of rationality and scientific study of both history and society, continue to be 
propagated by institutions such as universities, public libraries and museums – 
institutions that are very much rooted in Western epistemological traditions. 
Chakrabarty argues that these traditional social science categories might even be 
inadequate frameworks to study non-Western societies.
22
 Given that Islam was 
conceptualized as a religion with principles, laws, symbols and rituals which were 
particular to the experiences of the Prophet Muhammad and the Quraysh and Medinan 
                                                          
21
See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 29-42. 
22
 Ibid. p. 88. 
20 
 
societies of 7th Century Arabia, it raises issues of how to conduct a comprehensive 
study of the development of a religious community which was not organised along 
more-familiar modern Western sociological norms and political frameworks.  
 
Furthermore, Islamic governance is traditionally not confined to the private 
sphere. While it is also true of liberal Christian governments to influence public order 
through policies that reflect their interpretation of biblical literature, arguably, the 
individual experience of the faith is never meant to dominate the communal 
experience of Islam. Rather it is “the community of the faithful” – the spiritual ummah 
who is able to recite the Quran in one common language, observe the obligations of 
fasting and charity as exemplified by Prophet Muhammad, and ultimately, a 
community of believers who face the same direction of the Ka‟bah in prayer, 
observing a unified set of ritual poses and recitations. In this set of seemingly 
unchanging practices and rituals, a universal Islamic tradition is established and 
perpetuated across time and space.  
 
Despite the obvious variations in the practice of Islam, the objects in BQMI 
and IAMM relating to these practices convey familiarity to the Muslim visitor as they 
resonate with at least some of his or her experiences of Islam. “Heritage objects” 
(benda kuno or benda tradisi) such as prayer mats, Qur‟ans, white uncut ihram cloths 
for the hajj, pieces of the black velvet-gold embroidered covering of the Ka‟bah, a 
recreated prayer hall in a mosque with the mihrab and minbar, all speak to different 
memories of the Muslim visitor, regardless of his or her ethnic or national 
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background. Thus, the heterogeneity of Islam need not mean an absence of shared 
traditions because there is arguably “an underlying unity that informs all of these 
Islams”.23 
 
Hence, a discussion of what constitutes an Islamicate “nation” or “civilization” 
would have to separate the development of Islam‟s history on the Arabian Peninsula 
and that of its diverse Muslim communities using terms that are specific to their 
experiences. A study of the history, politics, experience and practice of Islam by 
Muslims globally should not, for the sake of convenience of understanding or 
theoretical models, uncritically employ categories such as “civilization” as a universal 
socio-scientific category. Such a framework might unwittingly subject Islam, as both 
a historical and sociological phenomenon, to a hidden narrative of “modernity” which 
the chronology of European history adheres to. One would then be tempted to view 
the material culture produced by the various Islamicate societies as the “development” 
of an artistic “tradition” that has Islamic themes as its organising compass, rather than 
local responses to a global religious phenomenon.  
 
Given that the term “Islamic art” is of recent coinage, there would also be a 
tendency to compare examples of Islamicate art, architecture, calligraphy and 
decorative arts to similarly named religious art such as “Christian” or “Buddhist” art, 
which are conventionally understood as referring specifically to forms of religious 
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 This is not the same as saying that Islamicate art is „more special‟ 
compared to other kinds of religious art. Rather a direct comparison is not the best 
approach to describe Islamicate (or other forms of religious) material culture and its 
products because Islamicate art, just like other types of religious art, is “the fruit of 
constant dialog between the new belief system and pre-existing indigenous 
traditions.”25   
 
To clarify, I am not suggesting that one abandons all conventional theoretical 
frameworks of approaching Islam as a civilization. As Chakrabarty argues, these 
frameworks have become “indispensible” to the study of societies.26 Rather, I am 
saying that Islamicate societies should also be analysed from the perspective of their 
own historians and contemporary intellectuals. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 A. D.) coined 
the term “umran” in his book Al-Muqaddimah li-Kitab al-„ibar in the 14th century to 
describe what we conventionally call “civilization”.27 He argued that a “civilized 
society” possessed a number of characteristics:  
[It] has a Higher form of Religion, a well-organised State, a system 
of law, City-life, a developed system of writing (Script), and 




While Ibn Khaldun‟s conceptualization bears some similarities with later 
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European anthropological theories, what is more significant is that we have to frame 
Ibn Khaldun‟s writings against his medieval environment when Islam had established 
itself as a religion on the Arabian Peninsula and Mamluk Egypt, and the Turks had 
built an Islamicate empire that reached the southern ends of the Mediterranean and 
captured Constantinople in 1453.
29
  
Among the Muslim scholars of the 20th Century, Shaykh Muhammad „Abduh 
expressed his view on civilisations in the Tafsir of al-Qur‟an that all civilisations 
(madaniyyat) were established on the foundation of religion.
30
 Following Ibn 
Khaldun‟s criteria, „Abduh argued that the ancient Greeks, Chaldeans, and Egyptians 
all based their civilisations on religious foundations.
31
 Yet another Muslim scholar, 
Muhammad Asad described Islamicate civilisation as an “ideological civilisation” 
which has the Qur‟an as its source as well as its “only justification”.32 He argued that 
Islamicate civilisation was “essentially intellectual” in its driving force and that it 
grew out of the broad, circumscribed code of individual and social behaviour, of the 
Shari‟ah”.33 Islam had “nothing to do with the concepts of race or nation, and so lacks 
the cement of racial consciousness which was the cardinal factor in all other 
civilisations”.34  
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 These Islamic scholars, respectively were a North African intellectual writing 
in the 14th Century; a 19th Century Egyptian Muslim reformist; and an Austrian Jew 
journalist who converted to Islam in the early 20th century; and they wrote prolifically 
on the natural sciences, Qur‟anic exegeses as well as issues facing the Muslim 
societies of their times. While They later influenced the thinking of contemporary 
Muslim intellectuals such as Pakistani Fazlur Rahman, who in turn, taught the likes of 
prominent Indonesian scholar Nurcholish Madjid who challenged the feasibility of an 
Islamic state of Indonesia and was a peer to Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, whose 
“Islamization of knowledge” campaign became the intellectual force driving the 
student dakwah movement in Malaysia in the 1990s.   
 
These Islamic intellectuals all had different and sometimes opposing ideas on 
what political Islam and Islamic society meant and the role of Islam in the modern and 
increasingly interconnected world.  These ideas reflect the depth of debate on Islam 
and the breadth of Muslim experiences, as well as the ongoing exchange of ideas 
amongst global Muslim communities. Hence, the concept of a global ummah or 
community of believers, which is supposed to transcend racial and cultural 
boundaries, is an important perception of how Muslims all over the world are 
connected to one another, even when there are real differences and oftentimes, 
contradictions in the manner in which these Islams are lived.  These various factors to 
delineate what Muslims thinkers considered were fundamental criteria in establishing 
a civilisation would also inform an assessment of the traditions associated with an 
Islamic aesthetic. In relation to Islamicate art, it is the “universalist” approach that 
sees all the arts produced by Muslims everywhere as “reflecting the universal verities 
25 
 
of Islam, just as God‟s ineffable unity encompasses the infinite diversity of His 
creation”.35 
 
  “Islamic” versus “Islamicate” 
The need for precise terminology and parameters with which to examine Islam 
is demonstrated with great earnest in Hodgson‟s voluminous writings and he calls for 
a rigorous theoretical framework in which to understand Islam as a world religion.
36
 
However, even as it spread across the globe, Islam is very much associated with Arab 
culture.  Hodgson asserted that 19th Century Western scholarship was obsessed over 
the “Mediterranean (and hence largely Arab) Islamdom, as nearest to Europe and 
most involved in its history”.37  
 
Hodgson also cautioned that there is an incommensurability of meanings that 
emerges if scholars identify “Islamic culture” as a “culture appearing in the Arabic 
language” because it results in the treatment of all pre-Islamic Arabian elements (i.e. 
those found on the Arabian Peninsula) as “native to Islamic culture” while Syriac, 
Persian or Greek cultural elements appear as “foreign imports into Muslim Arab 
life”.38 Moreover, he claims that the terms “Islam” and “Islamic” have been used “too 
casually” in modern scholarship with regard to “religion and for the overall society 
and culture associated historically with the religion” as the “society and culture called 
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„Islamic‟ in the second sense are not necessarily „Islamic‟ in the first”. Hence 
Hodgson warns against using the terms interchangeably to refer to Islam‟s various 
social institutions as a means to connect disparate practices specific to a particular 




Hodgson‟s exhortations to render the ethnography of Islam more transparent 
when one examines Islam as a faith, is important to understanding how a tradition of 
“Islamic aesthetics” could have been invented and how historians and those concerned 
with “art” ethnographically, can begin to distinguish between elements of faith and 
those that have been mediated by culture, though it would be an understandably 
complex enterprise to undertake.  Hodgson sees some merit in Bernard Lewis‟ 
suggestion that the adjective “Islamic” be used in the “cultural sense” and the 
adjective “Muslim” in the “religious sense”. Hodgson further offered new terms to 
describe Islam as a historical and sociological phenomenon. “Islamdom”, for instance, 
would denote not just an area of Islamic rule per se but also a “complex of social 
relations” (Hodgson‟s emphases) and is a better term than “Muslim lands” as 
“Islamdom” would be “clearly collective” and analogous to “Christendom”.  
 
Moreover, as Hodgson saw culture as a kind of tangent which moved further 
and further away from religion proper, he proposed the term “Islamicate” to refer to 
the cultural traditions of successive Islamicate dynasties – a culture that has “centred 
around a lettered tradition”.40 With such terminology in place, “Islamicate cultural 
                                                          
39
 Ibid., p. 57. 
40
 Ibid. p. 58. 
27 
 
traditions” (and not “Islamic culture” per se) are more accurately historicised. Though 
Hodgson‟s terminology is considered to be idiosyncratic by most other scholars of 
Islam in world history, the discussion above demonstrates that the study of Islam as a 
“civilization” is not only complicated by the conflation of religion with history, but 
has to also take into account the different experiences of culturally-diverse Muslims 
as they melded their religious identity with pre-existing cultural systems in their 
environments.  
 
The Elusive Nature of “Islamic Art” 
As both the BQMI and IAMM use Islamicate art as an approach to discussing 
Islamicate culture and civilization, the issue then becomes how one makes sense of 
“art” in Islamicate culture and how far can the term “Islamic art” be expanded to 
include all the material culture produced by different Muslim communities across 
time and space. The problem is compounded by the use of “Islamic art” as a collective 
term referring to various forms of material culture produced in Muslim-populated 
countries. This is because the term was coined in 19th Century Europe rather than by 
the Muslim societies that produced the material culture.  
 
There is extensive literature on “Orientalism” and “oriental art” and Europe‟s 
fascination with the arts of Islamicate lands heightened during the period of European 
colonialism. The British Museum and British Library had amassed a “superb and 
encyclopaedic collection of Islamic art by the end of the nineteenth century”.41 The 
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modern study of “Islamic art” brought together several European intellectual 
traditions, including the history of (European) art, ancient Near Eastern languages and 
antiquities as well as Orientalism.
42
 Such a tendency to view much of Islamicate 
material culture indiscriminately as a monolithic tradition again raises the suspicion 
that there might be a universalising aesthetic informed by Western traditions that not 
only elevates an object from mere functionality to that which gives pleasure in its 
viewing, but which might also assume a developmental linearity in the chronology of 
Islamicate art when it might not be true in all cases.  
 
In this regard, Oleg Grabar acknowledges that “early Islamic art” raises a 
number of “abstract questions about the nature of artistic creativity and aesthetic 
sensibility which transcend the exact time and place of its growth”.43 Perhaps more 
radically than Hodgson, Grabar argues that “Islamic” does not refer to the art of a 
particular religion because apparently “a vast proportion of the monuments have little 
if anything to do with the faith of Islam”.44 He notes the “very uncertainty and 
incompleteness” of Islamicate art is because they do not always fit neatly in 
conventional aesthetic categories that are understood by Western traditions.  
 
While Grabar agrees to some extent with George Marcais‟ claim that there 
was a certain “personality of Islamic art” which differentiated the objects of 
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Islamicate art from masterpieces of other artistic traditions “almost automatically”,45 
Grabar argues that,  
even if [Islamic art] exists at all”, the “most important point is that „Islamic‟  
in the expression „Islamic art‟ is not comparable to Christian‟ or „Buddhist in  
„Christian art‟ or „Buddhist art‟.  
 
 
Rather, he asserts that the term “Islamic” would be more comparable to 
“Gothic” or “Baroque” and would suggest a “more or less successful cultural moment 
in a long history of native traditions”. “Islamic” in this usage would be “like a special 
overlay” which acted like “a deforming or refracting prism which transformed, at 
times temporarily and imperfectly, at other times permanently, some local energies or 
traditions”.46 That the expert on “Islamic art” could argue that there might not be such 
universal category of Islamicate art but rather a series of indigenous traditions 
interacting with Islam, complicates the concept of a corpus of Islamicate art in the 
BQMI and IAMM.  
 
On the other hand, Blair and Bloom argue that because of the density of 
artistic objects produced in Muslim communities throughout history, Islamicate art 
could either only be painted in broad strokes, so that the universalism of Islam is 
highlighted, or a narrower definition of Islamicate art must be created instead. This 
tighter definition would be to specify the categories of regions, dynasties, patrons, 
media and cross-cultural pollination to better classify and make sense of all the 
objects produced in or for Muslim communities.
47
 In either case, what is highlighted 
                                                          
45
 Ibid., p. 1. 
46
 Ibid., p. 2 
47
 Blair and Bloom, “The Mirage of Islamic Art”, pp. 158-171. 
30 
 
is the search for links and arguments to connect disparate Islamicate societies across 
time and space through their material cultures. In  Chapters III and IV, it will become 
clear that the two museums have preferred Blair and Bloom‟s definition of “broad 
strokes” of Islamicate art in the curation of their respective collections while 
displaying the long histories of various indigenous material culture production.    
 
 Hence, the distinction between what constitutes “Muslim themes” in an 
artistic production during an Islamic period of rule is more complex than what is 
usually displayed in the Islamicate art and material collections of various museums. It 
is especially the case with the IAMM collection. The curators of the museum have 
included the art of “the Malay world” as part of the larger body of Islamicate art 
ostensibly because of shared characteristics inherent in the objects that tied them to 
those that had been produced in earlier Islamicate dynastic periods.  
 
While the argument is valid for artefacts such as mushaf Qur‟ans and 
calligraphic art, it is harder to justify the silverware and metalwork of Malay royalty 
as coming from the same tradition as bronzeware from Seljuk Persia, or gold threaded 
songket textiles to Ottoman-period carpet weave. Nonetheless, if Islam acted like the 
refractive prism that Grabar mentions, it could then be argued that as long as these 
objects were produced by Muslims for Muslims, traded or exchanged between 
Muslims, or found in Muslim homes and mosques, then there is an inherent quality 
about the object that can make it “Islamic art”, or at least, “Islamicate” material 
culture. As the curator of a successful exhibition of Islamicate art in Indonesia argued 
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when he included a gold-inlaid ritual spear with a blade in the form of a Hindu-
Buddhist Naga with an Islamic charm text at its base, 
Islamic art is everywhere, including in Egypt, Iraq, Iran, the Iberian Penisula, 
and in India, is the fruit of constant dialog between the new belief system and 
pre-existing indigenous traditions. Southeast Asia is therefore no different in 
that, Islam engaged existing art traditions, which were then rearticulated in the 




Grabar also takes on the issue of the span of Islamicate art, specifically the 
start and end periods of the perceived tradition. Given that one can only seriously 
begin talking about Islamicate art and material culture after the Prophet Muhammad 
established the first Muslim community in Madina in A. D. 622, the “absolute time”49 
to mark the beginning seems obvious. However, Grabar argues that this post quem 
date is “not a very meaningful one for the arts”. Instead, a more appropriate absolute 
date would be that of the conquest of a given region by Islam, which in turn would 
result in “in a curiously curved date which would begin in 634 when the first Syrian 
villages were taken over by Muslim Arabs and would end in the early sixteenth 
century when the Mughal emperors consolidated into one entity the many sultanates 
of India.”50 However, based on this argument, the material culture and art of Muslim 
Southeast Asia has no place in the traditional corpus of Islamicate art. In order to 
transform both pre-Islamic Malay art and Islamicate-Malay art from the 13th Century 
onwards into part of an older tradition of “Islamic art”, the curators have had to rely 
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on Western formulations of art and art history.  
 
Despite Grabar‟s differentiating the historical and spatial contexts in the study 
of Islamicate art, he unfortunately draws a boundary that excludes a discussion of the 
material culture that is produced by Muslim Southeast Asia.  Even when he entertains 
the possibility of extending the timeline of Islamicate art into the 19
th
 Century, it is 
only with reference to certain parts of Africa.
51
 The chronology  of Islamicate art that 
begins during the age of the Caliphate on the Arabian Peninsula (c. 632 A.D.) as the 
“early Islamic period”, and spans North Africa, Central Asia, Southern Spain and 
usually ends in Mughal India in the “late Islamic period”, has become the accepted 




Such a “genealogy” of Islamicate art has resulted in a conflation of 
geographical distance, cultures and the compressing of time in favour of a narrative of 
continuity of Islamicate “traditions” limited to the region between the Oxus and Nile 
rivers. This is a shortcoming in Grabar‟s heuristics because the geographical boundary 
has historically left out the period of material culture and art production in Southeast 
Asian communities which have been influenced by Islam as a faith when Islam 
arrived in the Indonesian Archipelago with the Muslim merchants from India and 
Yemen from as early as since about the 11th century.
53
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Given this tendency to exclude or marginalise the material culture of Muslim 
Southeast Asia in global discussions and presentations of Islamicate art, I argue that at 
the primary level, the objects related to Islamic art and material culture have been 
appropriated by BQMI and IAMM to “reveal” the respective Indonesian Muslim 
nation and Malaysian Muslim nation that lies as a cultural bedrock beneath the surface 
of a secular and culturally plural society. This narrative about the nature of the nation 
is conveyed by the privileging of some objects over others and thus unequal 
representation of its different constituent groups. The BQMI and IAMM hence act as 
state-endorsed repositories of the images and heritage objects of the nation.  
 
At a secondary, but no less important level, these museums also seek to 
expand the traditional geographic and artistic boundaries of the Darul Islam by 
positioning Southeast Asia as part of an enlarged “Islamdom” of art-producing 
Muslims, using the evidence of the region‟s rich material culture and archeological 
objects that pertain to indigenous practices of Islam. The BQMI and IAMM in this 
case are assertions of the “Islamic” over other elements of defining the Indonesian and 
Malaysian nations as well as embodiments of the countries‟ attempts in the last thirty 
years to expand their influence in the creation of a “global” Islamicate culture. 
 
Thus by  examining the considerations behind the narratives that each museum 
has chosen to foreground their collections and activities, one will hopefully gain 
insight into the ways in which national governments (or intellectual and cultural 
elites) fashion their desired imagined communities.  That the museums have the 
ability to construct their desired narratives in the first instance, demonstrates 
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conclusively that, regardless of their origins and materiality, things do not possess any 
inherent essential meanings but rather are made meaningful through specific contexts 
at specific points in time. These contexts are in turn, as Foucault argues, affected by 
power relations in society as well as the privileged episteme, or structures of 
knowledge, of the time.
54
 Hence the past becomes objectified and the “reality” of the 
past becomes “within reach” as it can be experienced by present visitors through the 
tangible materiality of objects.  
 
Through the acquisitions, displays, exhibitions, activities and publications of 
the BQMI and the IAMM, the history of the nation is re-imagined as an “Islamicate 
nation”. Additionally, the Malaysian-Muslim and Indonesian-Muslim nation each 
contributes to a glorious and continuous tradition of fine and valuable objects. The 
history of Islamicate material culture the aesthetic philosophy of “Islamic art”, and 
ultimately, the national cultural heritage then become fixed in, as suggested by 
Hooper-Greenhill, an “ethos of obviousness”55. Significantly, the authority of the 
museums as respective guardians of Islamicate “heritage” is also legitimized.  
 
Nonetheless, even as these museums seek to legitimize their authority as 
respective guardians of indigenous and/or global Islamicate “heritage”, the museum 
visitor should be aware that the objects and representations are selected and edited 
excerpts from the past. The creative hand (and political objectives) of the curator 
determines what one sees in the galleries and also heavily influences how one 
interprets the displayed objects.  
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Contesting the Representations in Museums 
 
Indeed, the museums‟ curatorial approaches do not go unchallenged. Just as 
sectors of traditionalist Javanese Muslims disagreed with the Islamic reformist 
movements that emerged from Wahabi-ruled Makkah of the 19th Century, Islamicate 
culture experts and Muslim public intellectuals who are at odds with state-sponsored 
definitions of Islam are critical of the intellectual-artistic discourse presented in state-
sanctioned museums. This group is also wary of the power politics behind the actions 
and policies of the respective Suharto and UMNO regimes. Further, given the ethnic 
and cultural plurality in the two countries‟ societies, the Islamicate heritage displayed 
in the BQMI and IAMM as the national culture and heritage of the people, alienates 
non-Muslims, non-Malays, non-Javanese citizens alike, as their cultures and religions 
are marginalized by the dominant religio-cultural ideology.  
 
Ultimately, what I am investigating is the museum as a contested site of 
cultural and aesthetic expressions of Islam and the potential of museums in advancing 
the educational and cultural aspect of inclusive nation building. In this regard, the 
BQMI and IAMM are important cultural institutions due to the educating mission that 
they profess as well as the different forms of “capital” that their visitors can accrue 
from successive visits.
56
 The tendency of the “museum gaze” to render contextualised 
artefacts as objective truth is likely to reinforce the dominant group‟s cultural 
hegemony over the country‟s minority constituents. Arguably, the marginalization of 
non-Muslims in the re-imagination of an Islamicate-Indonesian and Islamicate-
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Malaysian past results in the absence of non-Muslim material culture within the 
museum. These voids are apparently justified by the narrow definitions of Islamicate 
material culture and “art” that the museums have adopted. Neither the BQMI nor the 
IAMM make any reference to the presence of non-Muslims extant in the societies that 
produced what is accepted today as “Islamic art”.  
 
The internalisation of the knowledge that the two museums produce, is likely 
to shape (even if indirectly) public culture in Indonesia and Malaysia in the long term. 
In the mind‟s eye of both the majority and minority groups, the political, socio-
economic and cultural norms of Islam become an organising principle in public life. 
Compounded by other domestic economic, political and social policies that 
discriminate against non-Muslims/non-Malays/non-Javanese citizens, the sum effect 
is that minority religious and/or cultural groups are excluded from, or at best 
marginalised, in the public representation of the state‟s cultural identity. Such an 
exclusion of a significant portion of the citizenry (55% of 238 million in Indonesia 
and 35% of 28 million in Malaysia)
57
 in a multiracial society where religion is tightly 
entwined with race, adds yet another fault line in the already fissure-riddled 
foundations of majority-minority relations in these two countries. 
 
 
Naysayers would argue that the BQMI and IAMM are specialized museums 
that cater to a specific audience and it is to the “national” museums that one should 
look to fairly assess some of the cultural representations pursued by the Indonesian 
and Malaysian states respectively. This is because the majority of national museums 
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usually address representations of “the nation” overtly and it is arguably possible to 
discern the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion in the conceptualization of the 
specific nation. However, given the closer associations these national museums have 
with Indonesia‟s and Malaysia‟s erstwhile colonial rulers, the Museum Nasional 
Indonesia and Muzium Negara  raise  more problematic relationships between 
representations of the nation based on western secular traditions and local Islamicate 
ones.  
 
The national museums of both Indonesia and Malaysia were first established 
by the Dutch and British colonialists respectively as ethnographic collections – a way 
of gathering information on the colonies and peoples they ruled. Hence, this initial 
rendering of the respective peoples, flora and fauna living in the environs of the 
Netherlands East Indies and Malay Protectorates were drawn (in some cases literally) 
through the eyes of colonial administrators and foreign adventurers. The 
Enlightenment philosophy that lay behind the collections was based on the superiority 
of Western science and technology. Hence the collections were mostly ethnographic 
to „fix‟ the then unknown colonies in the colonial imagination.  
 
Though these ethnographic collections were later transformed into objects of 
national historical significance with independence from colonial rule, in effect, the 
Indonesian and Malaysian “nation” as respectively exhibited in the permanent 
exhibitions of Museum Nasional and Muzium Negara, are generally curated as ones 
which evolved from idyllic primitive, even pre-historic pasts, into modern nations of 
reflective and progress-driven peoples. The curation of the “national” museums of the 
two countries do not provide adequate, if any, representational space for Islam 
38 
 
because their respective collections were now focused on narrating the arduous road 
towards achieving national independence set against an overarching ideology of 
secular nationalism.   
 
Comparing the Socio-cultural Politics Surrounding the BQMI and IAMM 
 
In that respect, it makes good sense to compare the BQMI and IAMM with 
each other, as they provide an alternative image of the Indonesian and Malaysian 
nations from the ones that were fashioned by their erstwhile colonial masters. Indeed, 
the respective collections of the BQMI and IAMM can be seen as indigenously-
produced knowledge about Islam and local Islamicate culture. The objects on display 
in each museum celebrate the ingenuity and craftsmanship of indigenously-produced 
material culture, informed in its creation by the Islamic faith – even when some of 




   Ultimately, one must not forget that this contemporary re-imagination of an 
Indonesian-Muslim and Malaysian-Muslim nation is an ongoing enterprise which is 
self-conscious, dynamic, and open to contestations from all sides. The recasting of the 
two countries‟ national images as Muslim (if not formally Islamic) entities, are also  
built on earlier debates on the nature of the “Indonesian” and “Malay” nation and the 
role which Islam plays in each society. In the case of Indonesia, the need to define 
Islam‟s role in Indonesian society grew urgent in the 1950s and 1960s as Muslim 
intellectuals and Islamist political parties called for the restitution of the state‟s 
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commitment to developing an Islamic state of Indonesia to the National Constitution 
which Soekarno had earlier promised the Islamist resistance fighters after World War 
II.
59
 Later, after the bloody coup of 1965-66, Suharto‟s sustained suppression of local 
Islamist political parties ensured that any Islamist aspirations were expressed in state-
sanctioned terms. Hence, in that period and up to the mid 1980s, Islam found more 
freedom in cultural expressions such as the literary, visual and performance arts.
60
 
The BQMI emerged from the successful run of the Festival Istiqlal held in Jakarta in 
1991, an international festival that showcased Indonesian art and cultural 
performances that were “inspired by Islam” (seni Indonesia yang bernafaskan Islam).  
 
In Malaysia on the other hand, the paramount status of Islam and Malay 
sovereignty were protected by the British during their colonial administration and 
continued in the successor state of the Federation of Malaya (and later, Malaysia). 
Nonetheless, “Islamization” of the Malaysian bureaucracy and the bureaucratization 
of Islam into various executive, legislative and advisory bodies increased throughout 
the 1980s and into the 1990s under Mahathir‟s Wawasan 2020 campaign. Hence, 
besides an educational institution that aims to discuss and define Islamicate material 
culture and Islamicate arts for public consumption, the IAMM, it could also be 
argued, reflects Malay-Muslim cultural hegemony of Malaysia‟s multi-cultural 
society.   The IAMM and BQMI are also good examples to examine the development 
of Islamic modernity by comparing how Islamic intellectual thought has responded to 
threats from an authoritarian state which also has assimilated Islamic thought into its 
national policies and fashions itself as a champion of Muslim values.  
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Museums, as part of the heritage and tourism industries, are also able to speak 
to both domestic and international audiences and shape their attitudes towards the 
subject matter on display. As their primary mission is to enlighten visitors on the 
subject of a religion – an important marker of personal and social identity in Indonesia 
and Malaysia – the BQMI and the IAMM are important players in shaping the 
collective cultural norms of their citizens. Beyond the personal experience, the BQMI 
and IAMM have the capacity to influence how Indonesians and Malaysians view the 
past of their country as an Islamicate region and their people as a united Muslim 
ummah. It can also colour their imagination of the countries‟ future trajectories – 
including as part of a global Islamicate network of Muslim countries interacting with 
non-Muslim countries that have historical links to them.  
 
Last, but not in the least, formulations of “a modern Muslim democracy”, 
which both Indonesia and Malaysia claim to be, are also much-influenced by 
intellectual and artistic discourses within and outside the Muslim world. Such 
formulations, despite their claims to a “new epistemology” or a theologically 
informed governance, still include much of historically Western conceptualizations of 
the nation, political governance, archeology and art. Chakrabarty has argued that such 
framings of sociological and anthropological knowledge are “inevitable” because they 
have become institutionalized as academic disciplines and entrenched as analytical 
tools for examining human societies, despite their Eurocentric orientation.
61
 Thus, one 
of the tensions that arises, especially given the ethnic, religious and cultural diversity 
of the two countries, is whether the Indonesian-Muslim or the Malaysian-Muslim 
nation – the ummah  –  in Islamic terminology, is a viable socio-political construct 
                                                          
61
 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, pp. 29-42. 
41 
 
which can serve as a real alternative to Western, predominantly secular 
conceptualizations of the nation-state.  
 
An approach that combines museology with history, anthropology, material 
culture studies and technology in the study of museum and heritage institutions is still 
more a novelty than the norm in academia despite the advocates of “total history” the 
likes of the Annales school historians such as Fernand Braudel, Pierre Goubert and 
Roger Chartier. There is a need to sustain a multi-disciplinary approach in examining 
museum collections as these institutions inevitably create selective representations by 
what objects they choose to display as artefacts and the narrative modes that 
accompany them. It is especially so with state-sanctioned museums such as the BQMI 
and IAMM, where the narratives are more politically-charged. The challenge lies in 
whether the countries‟ definitions of the Muslim nation are sufficiently legitimate to 
appease those who desire an Islamist “tone” of government, yet flexible and creative 




Due to the space constraints of the M.A. thesis, I have chosen to discuss only 
the permanent galleries of the BQMI and the IAMM and only briefly mention 
temporary exhibitions that are immediately relevant to discussing the idea of an 
“Islamic nation”. There is scope for deeper and multi-disciplinary examinations of the 
impact that the museum and heritage industry have on shaping a collective cultural 
identity. Hence, I hope that my study will contribute in some small way to 
understanding the potency of museums as a social institution and to be aware of its 
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shortcomings as an authoritative space for creating (or re-creating) representations of 





Public Piety:  
Increased Islamization of Indonesia and Malaysia’s Public Spheres  
 
The BQMI and IAMM could be seen as cultural productions that emerged 
within a national landscape of increasingly religion-directed cultural policies. Some of 
these policies were partly influenced by what was seemingly a worldwide revival of 
Islamic values since the late 1960s, through the 1970s and appeared to reach its peak 
by the late 1980s. By the mid-1970s, no doubt helped by key global events in 
Muslim-majority countries, Islamic revivalism found widespread resonance in 
Indonesian and Malaysian Muslim societies. Muslims in these countries, just as those 
in the Middle East were experiencing a heightened consciousness of their Muslim 
identity in an increasingly globalized and secularized world. Islam appeared to be a 
viable alternative to the superpower politics of the Cold War as well as an antidote to 
the abortive promises of secular ethnic nationalism. Nonetheless, while Islamic 
practices became increasingly entrenched in the public spheres of Indonesia during 
Suharto‟s New Order rule and Mahathir‟s Malaysia in the 1980s, different 
motivations lied at the heart of the change in the cultural politics and cultural policies 
of the two countries. 
 
Stauth‟s analysis of the process of Islamization in the respective societies of 
Indonesia and Malaysia in the post-colonial period is particularly informative. Rather 
than the usual discussion of a group‟s search for self identity through religion, he 
views Islamization in Southeast Asia as “both fact and event” – on the one hand, a 
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historical religious phenomenon that started with Muslim traders in the 13th Century, 
and on the other hand, an unfinished project of cultural transformation of Muslim 
Southeast Asia.
62
 In the latter case, Stauth argues that the Islamic resurgence 
occurring in Muslim communities globally since the 1970s was no less than an 
attempt at civilizational change.  
 
In contrast, Liow argues that even though external influences weighed heavily 
in the reconfiguration of Islam‟s role in Indonesia and Malaysia, key domestic 
developments that unfolded during the 1970s and 1980s also shaped the process of 
Islamization of their respective public spheres.
63
 In Indonesia, Suharto‟s 
determination to cling on to his waning power saw him courting Islamist elements to 
check the military‟s traditional political influence and Suharto gave in to several 
Islamist demands for a bigger role for Islam in Indonesian society. The challenge 
from opposition Islamist party Parti Agama Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) saw the 
incumbent UMNO government alternately using co-opting and coercive measures to 
counter the former‟s appeal. Simply put, both the Indonesian and Malaysian 
governments began to adopt “an Islamic facade” during this period of Islamic 
revivalism.
64
   
 
In the case of Muslim Southeast Asia, I would like to suggest that it is less 
important to determine whether external or domestic factors were the more crucial 
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element in this second wave of global Islamic resurgence. Rather, the different views 
show that the movement of ideas and information, especially in the age of around-the-
clock and aggressive media news network coverage, were moving in multi-directional 
flows. Not only was Muslim Southeast Asia informed by intellectual developments 
and political events in the Middle Eastern heartlands of Islamdom, the intellectual 
debates going on in Indonesia as the world‟s largest Muslim population and 
Malaysia‟s good standing in international diplomacy as well as its economic 
prosperity, gave these two Southeast Asian countries considerable clout in global 
Muslim affairs.    
 
One needs to bear in mind the history of Islamic intellectual discourse in 
Southeast Asia to understand the inspirations behind Islam as a tool to effect societal 
change. Contemporary Islamic intellectuals, including the likes of Fazlur Rahman, 
Ismail Raji al-Faruqi and Syed Naquib Muhammad al-Attas, have all, in their turn, 
argued the logic as well as the urgency to “Islamize” modernity. In such an enterprise, 
Islam is located within the discourse of modernity, in contrast to the conventionally 
antithetical position Islam plays to Western modernization and Western intellectual 
frameworks of societal development. “Islamic sociology” and even “Islamic 
anthropology” could hence be understood as a “holistic” outlook that revolves around 
social cohesion and scriptural accommodation, compared to the modern Western 
tradition of creating dichotomies of analysis based on social differentiation.
65
 Hence 
Islamic modernity goes beyond reforming Islamic philosophy and jurisprudence to 
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also encompass epistemologies of scientific and technological knowledge so that 





Islamic Resurgence in Indonesia  
 
 In Indonesia, the Islamic “resurgence” in Indonesian public life since the mid-
1980s was arguably a rerouting of political expressions of Islam which the New Order 
regime had suppressed, to “cultural” expressions of Islam which were deemed less 
threatening to the regime. In the late 1980s, Suharto himself appeared to have become 
more Islamized. He took on a personal religious instructor and started to learn how to 
read the Qur‟an and memorized key verses to show his scriptural literacy. He also 
cultivated closer associations with the Islamists in his government and publicly 
supported the establishment of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals 
(ICMI).
67
   The most evocative image of a pious Suharto was his performance of the 
hajj with his family in 1990 and the adoption of his new status of piety as Haji 
Muhammad Suharto.  
 
On the surface, it appeared as if Suharto was finally acknowledging and 
reflecting the Islamized sentiments of the Indonesian public. The BQMI, a state 
project overseen by Ibu Tien Suharto, emerged out of the overwhelming popularity of 
the Istiqlal cultural festivals and the commissioning of the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal 
(which the BQMI now houses). Towering over the miniaturised environs of Taman 
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Mini Indonesia Indah (TMII), the BQMI is supposed to reflect a grand narrative of the 
richness of Indonesian material culture that was “inspired by Islam” (seni bernafaskan 
Islam) and propagate not just an “Islamic aesthetic” but also the idea that the 
Indonesian public is an art-producing people.
68
 Islam was also now framed by the 
Indonesian government as a rhetorical medium for modernization.
69
  In that sense, the 
Mushaf Istiqlal and the BQMI can be seen as part of respective nation-building 
cultural projects that attempt to accommodate the religious aspirations of the Muslim-




Globalization, the Emerging Muslim Middle Class and the 
“Commodification” of Islam 
 
The resounding success of Festival Istiqlal I (1991) and II (1995) and the 
initial popularity of BQMI with Indonesians can also be seen as part of a national 
Muslim community‟s response to the modernization and economic prosperity of the 
country. Fealy discusses the emergence of an increasingly affluent Muslim middle-
class in Indonesia (as well as Malaysia) that has the inclination and material resources 
to express their Muslim identity. The “marketization” of Indonesian Islam is driven 
by an upwardly mobile urban middle-class who seeks answers and direction in 
religion under the relentless pressures and anxieties of modern urban living. Hence 
many of the products and services emphasise personal convenience, accessibility and 
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 SMS services like celebrity preacher Yusuf Mansur‟s Kun Fayaakun 
(“Be! And It is.”) that provides reassuring Qur‟anic verse and romantic advice for 
marital bliss by Arifin Ilham meets the very modernist demands of Muslims who have 
become entrenched in a capitalist mode of consumption. The dominance of pluralist 
patterns of Islamic consumption in Indonesia accords with trends in other rapidly 
modernizing and Islamizing societies.  
 
This new Muslim identity is „modern‟, multicultural and pluralist.71 Fealy‟s 
analysis of the socio-economic, political and cultural factors that are driving the 
commodification of Islam puts a very post-modern spin to the concept of creating 
one‟s religious identity. Set against a background of globalization and modernization 
pressures, religious identities have become destabilised and have resulted in the 
search for moral certainty among urban middle-class Muslims, not just in Indonesia 
but also in other Muslim societies across the world. The appeal of traditionalism, 
manifested as a set of enduring Muslim “values” had become greater as an ethical or 
moral compass to navigate the fast currents of an increasingly competitive and rapidly 
modernizing global economy.
72
 Much of the new Islamic consumption is focused on 
the individual as active consumer rather than on the traditional institutional channels 
for religious learning, guidance and identity formation.  
 
Fealy further argues that this commodification is producing a spectrum of 
Islamic expressions that is more variegated and segmented but also more subject to 
                                                          
70
 Greg Fealy, “Consuming Islam” in Greg Fealy and Sally White, Expressing Islam: Religious Life 
and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), p. 29. 
71
 Ibid., pp. 32-36. 
72





 This selective consumption of „Islamic products‟ by Muslims of 
different stripes from an expanding spiritual marketplace is a paradigmatic change 
from the settled patterns of behaviour of their parents and grandparents.
74
 The Islamic 
products run the gamut from banking, insurance, share-trading and pawn-broking to 
medical treatments, mobile phone services, tourism and hospitality, multi-level 
marketing, pilgrimages and self-development courses. All these products and services 
(as well as their service providers) are keen to get a slice of the „holy‟ pie to meet the 
demands of a more self-consciously Muslim consumer.  
 
Meulemann, on the other hand, credits the more confident tone in the 
articulation of Muslim identity to the forces of globalization, whose technological 
advances and increasing integration of national economies have connected Muslims in 
Southeast Asia to other Muslim communities globally. Globalization has also 
reconnected earlier ties that Indonesia and Malaysia have with Makkah, the Hijaz and 
other important centres of Islamic knowledge and Islamicate cultural production such 
as Islamabad and Istanbul.
75
 Extrapolating from Meulemann, Nasr is convinced Islam 
itself, has become at once, the medium through which governments of Muslim 
majority countries push for modernization – and a complex variable in their quest to 
achieve a “sustainable balance between Islam and modernity”.76  
 
Thus, one could argue that Suharto was aware of the changing attitudes of the 
Indonesian public in favour of articulating a more pronounced Islamic identity. With 
                                                          
73
 Ibid., p. 4. 
74
 Ibid., p. 16. 
75
 Johan Meuleman, Islam in the Era of Globalization: Muslim Attitudes towards Modernity and 
Identity (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 2-5. 
76
 Nasr, Forces of Fortune, pp. 142 and 190. 
50 
 
his offerings of ICMI, the “greening” of the Indonesian defence forces with the 
appointment of more Muslim generals, as well as Festival Istiqlal I and II Islamicate 
culture fairs and the BQMI, Suharto appeared to have abandoned his Javanist backers 
as he attempted to ride the tide of Islamization that was once again rising in 
Indonesian society.  
 
Nonetheless, there were several complex challenges that affected (and in some 
cases, still affect) the BQMI‟s curators ability to authoritatively articulate this notion 
of an Indonesian Islamicate art-producing community. Foremost amongst these 
challenges is the cultural diversity of Indonesia‟s ethnic communities spread across 
the archipelago. Further, the attitudes of 20th Century Indonesia‟s Muslim 
communities towards Islam and Muslim identity span a wide range – a continuation 
of the divergence in Muslim piety among the Javanese seen a century earlier.
77
 At one 
end of the spectrum were the more accommodative Islam of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) 
traditionalists and abangan  Muslims who Geertz had argued in his still influential 
writings of Islam on Java, were nominal Muslims still tied to animist (Javanese: 
kejawen) beliefs and Hindu-Buddhist practices. At the other end stood the orthodox 
santri Muslims who observed Islamic rituals and scriptural injunctions along with 
reformist-minded Muhammadiyah “modernists” whose interpretations of Muslim 
piety adhered rigidly to literal readings of the Qur‟an and hadith.78  
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In recent years, that spectrum has extended to include radical Islamist 
organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir and even militant groups such as the Laskar Jihad 
and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) that condone violent acts in the defence of Islam.  Such a 
historically diverse array of “Islams” practiced in Indonesia which includes Sufi 
mystics and charismatic kyai where some Islams conflicted with others, and the long-
standing presence of Hindu-Buddhists, Christians, kejawen animists, hermits and 
other non-Muslims in its midst, raise questions on the authenticity of any 
representation that claims to present a unified expression of national or even 
Indonesian Islamicate culture.  
 
Secondly, there has been a historical resistance to state-defined formulations 
of Islamic identity in Indonesia. Earlier state “betrayals” of Muslims – such as the 
exclusion of the Jakarta Charter from the national constitution in 1945, and Suharto‟s 
suppression of Islamist political organization during the New Order regime, 
undermined any Islamist political alternative for Indonesia. The memory of Suharto‟s 
many political intrigues and power plays also raised suspicions of Suharto‟s true 
political intent behind his courting of Islamic intellectuals and technocrats as well as 
the public expression of his Muslim identity in the last twelve years of his 
administration.  
 
BQMI and other state institutions‟ efficacy in shaping Indonesian Islamicate 
culture in the 1990s were seen as compromised by Suharto‟s patronage. Even the 
Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals or ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim 
Se-Indonesia), where respected Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid was based, 
was boycotted by NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid because it was seen as a political 
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ploy to co-opt the Muslim vote and shore up Suharto‟s waning influence.  Further, 
despite the co-option of respected Indonesian Muslim artists and cultural leaders in 
the successful Festival Istiqlal projects of 1991 and 1995 (which engendered the idea 
for establishing the BQMI), and the initial popularity of the museum with 
Indonesians, BQMI‟s “voice” has lost some of its authority since its patron‟s oust 
from political leadership in 1998. While intellectual debates over the nature of 
Indonesian Islam continue unabated in the country, the decline of the BQMI as an 
authoritative cultural institution shaping Indonesian attitudes towards Islam has 
implications not just domestically for Indonesian Muslims. BQMI‟s decline has also 
hampers Indonesian-Islamicate contributions to global civilizational Islamicate culture 
and art.  
 
 
Festival Istiqlal I and II and the Mushaf Al- Qur‟an Istiqlal 
 
The BQMI was established out of the resounding success of the two Festival 
Istiqlal cultural events held in 1991 and 1995, which also marked the start and the 
completion of the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal project. The first of its kind ever held in 
Indonesia, the momentum from the two cultural festivals that purportedly showcased 
the material objects and art of Indonesian Islamicate culture, led to calls for an 
Islamicate-themed museum that would serve as a permanent display of traditional as 
well as contemporary objects pertaining to “Islamic culture” and “Islamic heritage” 
from across the Indonesian archipelago.
79
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Further, the initiators behind Istiqlal I and II, who are also BQMI‟s founders, 
had envisioned their work as an attempt to “contribute to the self-awareness and self-
confidence required of Muslims” in light of the global Islamic resurgence and 
economic rise of many professedly Muslim countries since the mid-1980s. Yustiono 
claims that there was tangible government support for promoting Islamicate culture, 
as shown by the Festival Istiqlal and Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal project.  
 
The establishment of other Islamic public institutions such as ICMI  and 
Mualamat Bank Indonesia (BMI), was “proof of the disappearance of government 
suspicion of Muslims” and “the building up of their future as an integrated part of the 
Indonesian nation” after decades of being politically suppressed under the New Order 
regime.
80
 Suharto‟s enthusiastic endorsement of these “cultural expressions of Islam” 
included penning the first letter „ ب ‟ of the Basmallah (invocation of Allah‟s majesty 
and mercy) of the first passage Surah Al-Fatihah (“The Opening” in the Mushaf Al-
Qur‟an Istiqlal as well as encouraging the staging of the two international Islamicate 
cultural festivals, Festival Istiqlal I and II. His wife, Tien Suharto, made a gift (wakaf) 




The Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal was ostensibly a cultural project undertaken by 
Dr Abdul Djalil Pirous and a team of six publicly-recognised Indonesian artists and 
designers whose individual works were, by their own admission, greatly inspired by 
Islam. Pirous himself was amongst Indonesia‟s most distinguished and celebrated 
painters, a pioneer in contemporary Indonesian Muslim art best known for his style of 
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combining Qur‟anic calligraphy with modernist abstract aesthetics. He was also the 





Pirous had also gained international prominence having once been invited by 
King Hussein of Jordan to help in the restoration of mosques there and was the 
designated Southeast Asian curator for an exhibition of contemporary Muslim art at 
the 1997 Venice Biennale, a notable appointment by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture 
and the Rockefeller Foundation.
83
  According to Kenneth George, who observed the 
planning of Istiqlal II in 1995, Pirous and his Bandung Institute colleagues had “first 
envisioned the mushaf project as part of an Islamicate arts festival they were planning 
to hold in October 1991 at Jakarta‟s Istiqlal Mosque, in conjunction with Visit 
Indonesia Year events.” The initial planning stages saw the involvement of a number 
of ministries – namely, the Ministers of Tourism, of Religion and of Education and 
Culture. Both the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal and the Festival Istiqlal projects came 




“Istiqlal” in Arabic means “independence” and it was the name bestowed both 
upon Indonesia‟s largest and grandest mosque, the Islamicate cultural festivals as well 
as the mushaf Al-Qur‟an project that was supposed to reflect the dynamism and 
strength of the modern Indonesian Muslim nation, free from foreign control. It is hard 
to ignore the irony of the event‟s theme as President Suharto took such a keen interest 
in the affairs of the Istiqlal Festival Foundation (Yayasan Festival Istiqlal) that he was 
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adamant on having the final word on the festival‟s publicity campaign. Suharto 
rejected promotional materials in Bahasa Indonesia and English that proclaimed 
Festival Istiqlal as a “Festival of Islamic Art in Indonesia”, insisting instead that they 
read a “Festival of Indonesian Culture Inspired by Islam” (my own emphases) or 




Effectively, the acquiescence to Suharto‟s demands (in exchange for his 
continued endorsement of the mushaf project and festival) checked whatever lofty 
ambitions that Pirous and his team had in promoting a universal Islamicate art or 
aesthetic per se and reaffirmed the state philosophy that Islam (and all other religions) 
was subordinate to an  inherently secular Indonesian national culture. Suharto‟s 
success in “reworking the discourse” of Istiqlal I also reveals how jealously he 
guarded control over the image of the “Indonesian nation” that was projected to its 
domestic public as well as internationally.
 86
 It also undermines the argument for a 
universal Muslim ummah and reaffirms the pluralism of Islam instead. For the most of 
his government, Suharto insisted on “localizing” Islam – both domestically as 
“Indonesian” Islam unique to the nation‟s history and to downplay international 
“Muslim causes” as an internal issue that Indonesia should avoid getting involved in. 
This was done to check any internationalist pretensions on the part of Indonesian 
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Islamicate Art as Representations of Muslim Nations 
 
While any vision of an Islamic state of Indonesia was systematically 
suppressed, the Indonesia that was supposedly revealed by the illuminated pages of 
the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal was a Muslim nation that was both “united and 
peaceful in its ethnic plurality” as well as aware of the spiritual potential of „art‟.88 In 
particular, the art of mushaf writing was championed as “an expression of the most 
authentic and original Islamic art, one of the Sufistic manifestations of the realization 
of the law of God (al-Shari‟ah) through the spiritual way (al-Tariqah), and whose 
goal is to reach the Truth (al-Haqiqah)”.89 Writing out the verses of the Qur‟an in “a 
correct and beautiful way” (i.e. Arabic calligraphy), is agreed to be itself an act of 
devotion. Such devotional calligraphy has its roots in Islam‟s first Caliphate, when the 
intellectual and spiritual demands to guard the integrity of the Word of God as 
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, was the committing of the revelations (wahyu) to 
carefully-wrought script by Muhammad‟s his closest followers.90  
 
Publications by Pirous and his team of designers, and notably articles by 
Mahmud Buchari (who was himself the Planning Coordinator of  Istiqlal I and part of 
the Curatorial Board of the BQMI), extrapolated on the long history of Qur‟anic 
illumination since it first emerged in the tenth century and how the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an 
Istiqlal was created in the same tradition.
91
 Just as importantly, the publications and 
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articles also stressed how Indonesian Muslim artists were also part of an illustrious 
group of expert Qur‟anic calligraphers and inspired illuminators throughout Islam‟s 
history, the likes of Ibn Muqlah, Ibn al Bawwab and Yaqut al-Musta‟simi.92 As a 
work of art, the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal was a tangible and beautiful means to 
reveal “both the nation and the sacred”93 and its completion in August 1995 was timed 
to coincide with the fiftieth year of Indonesia‟s Independence.94      
 
Indeed, Istiqlal II‟s organizers remarked that the purpose of the festival was to 
show “how Islamic arts had a unifying function in integrating the different ethnic 
groups of the Indonesian nation, thus creating a cohesive national identity”. Further, 
at the international level, Istiqlal II aimed to show “how Islamic art and culture has 
helped Indonesia in the conduct of its international relations”.95 Coinciding with the 
fiftieth year of Indonesian independence, advances in national development, as well as 
the upward trajectory of Indonesia‟s economy since the early 1980s, the Mushaf Al-
Qur‟an Istiqlal, the Istiqlal Mosque (where the festival was held) being the biggest 
mosque in Southeast Asia, and the increasing prominence of Muslim personalities in 
Indonesia‟s public sphere, all gave the impression that Indonesia was in the middle of 
a state-sponsored Islamic renaissance and finally living  up to its potential of being the 
world‟s biggest modern Islamic democracy.  
 
Suharto‟s public support for this Islamic cultural project (as well as his recent 
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return to personally observing the faith since 1990) was seen by Islamist groups and 
several political observers as a reaffirmation of the reconciliation between Islam and 
the state. More sceptical observers dubbed the development a “honeymoon” period 




The promotion of these cultural expressions of Islam as well as the 
establishment of other public Islamic intellectual, social and economic institutions 
since the mid-1980s, can be seen as an attempt by Suharto to manage the impact of 
the current wave of Islamic revivalism amongst the Indonesian public as well as to 
court the ever-present indigenous Islamist forces latent in Indonesia‟s socio-political 
milieu. While Suharto had backed Javanist/abangan and military elements since the 
establishment of the new Order, during the decade prior to his oust from power, 
Suharto had slowly but surely lost his sway with the military faction in his regime, 
which was then led by Christians such as ABRI Commander and former Defence 
Minister, Leonardus Benjamin Moerdani.
97
 The fallout with his generals coincided 
with Suharto‟s courting of Islamist groups and saw the co-opting of moderate yet 
devout Muslims such as Dr B. J. Habibie into government.
98
   
 
There is some discussion by both political analysts and diplomatic officials on 
Suharto‟s public return to his Islamic roots and much speculation on his sincerity in 
re-asserting his Muslim identity given his uncompromising suppression of overtly 
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Islamic symbolism and political activity in Indonesia‟s public spaces in the not so 
distant past.
99
  What is undeniable is that by the 1990s, politicians, intellectuals with 
Islamist pedigree, charismatic religious teachers, Islamist groups and even artists with 
strong Islamist inspiration gained prominence and tacit patronage from Suharto in his 
bid to ameliorate his waning political power. Hence, as much as the Mushaf Al-
Qur‟an Istiqlal, Festival Istiqlal I and II and the BQMI are projects of cultural 
production and reflected popular desire for a religiously-infused national cultural 
identity, the three entities were also part of the calculated political moves of an 
authoritarian president to maintain his leadership as well as his secular-grounded 
Pancasila legacy.   
 
Nonetheless, the celebration of a national Islamicate culture also suggests an 
increasing confidence by Indonesia‟s Muslims in interpreting the religious canon and 
how the Islamic faith is expressed in indigenous terms and contexts. Though Pirous 
admitted that the inspiration for the Bayt Al-Qur‟an first came in 1982, after the 
Bahraini government who bought his calligraphy piece, “Doa Lima” (Five Prayers) 
shared with him their plans to build the world‟s inaugural Bayt Al-Qur‟an, he was 
heartened that a piece of Indonesian Islamicate art was deemed not just aesthetically 
pleasing, but also of equal value enough to be sought  by Arab Muslims (albeit 
Bahraini),  whose culture is still generally considered to be from Islamdom‟s 
heartlands.  
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Thus, Festival Istiqlal I and II, the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal as well as BQMI 
were also very deliberate and overt constructions by Indonesia‟s political, intellectual 
and artistic elites to form not only a national cultural identity but also to define which 
individual ethnic cultures were culturally significant to the Indonesian Islamicate 
nation. Similar to the miniature traditional houses in Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, the 
Mushaf Istiqlal along with the other provincial mushafs, represented only “legitimate 
ethnic cultures” as identified and promoted by the state. The privileging of the 
dominant Javanese and other pribumi ethnic groups have come at the expense of 
minority Muslim communities as well as non-Muslims, especially the ethnic Chinese 
community who were either practising Buddhism and Taoism or were Christians or 
Catholics. Interestingly, even representations of Chinese-Muslim culture have been 





Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia 
 
Significantly, though for different reasons, the process of Islamizing 
Indonesian and Malaysian societies involves the state playing a substantive role as an 
intrusive authority that modulates the presence of Islam in the public sphere. Lewis, a 
well-respected scholar of Islam, has claimed that the idea of “din wa dawla” 
(“religion and state”) governs Muslim understanding of religion in the public sphere 
and that it was “entirely different” from that of the post-Enlightenment West or liberal 
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 However, Hefner asserts that such a regard for religion‟s power to 
influence public order is neither unique to Islam nor does it exclude the various 
interpretations and combinations of din wa dawla.
102
 In the case of Malaysia, 
Islamization is “a concerted government programme of co-opting and sponsoring 
Islamic intellectuals from a strong socio-religious movement of anti-establishment 
groups into recently-founded state educational and cultural institutions”.103   
 
There are historical pressures behind the state‟s attitudes and approach to 
accommodating Islam in the formation of the Malay nation-state. Due to erstwhile 
open immigration policy during British colonial administration, Malay-Muslims only 
constitute a slight majority of Malaysia‟s multiethnic and multicultural population 
(approximately 66.7% according to the 2000 Census). However, because the symbols 
of Malay sovereignty were kept intact and Malays accorded privileged status as the 
natives of the land, the Malay elites were able to define the social and religious norms 
of Malayan (and later Malaysian) polity for the larger part. The Sultanate system, 
though diminished in real executive power, still purveyed over religious matters of the 
Malays, i.e. Islamic affairs.  
 
In the end, Islam was incorporated into the administrative and legalistic 
framework of the Malay states and two parallel juristic systems – one secular, based 
on Western law and the other religious, based on the Shari‟ah – were formalized even 
before Malayan independence. On their part, the British colonial administration was 
also careful to keep up the appearances of indirect rule. The legacy of British political 
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collaboration with the Malay Sultans, the accommodation of traditional symbols of 
Malay sovereignty as well as dual legal and jurist systems have had a lasting impact 
on contemporary Malaysian politics and inter-ethnic relations.    
 
 
Islam and “Ketuanan Melayu” in Ethnically Plural Malaysia 
 
Hence, in a country where ethnicity and religion are tightly woven historically, 
the issue of Malay sovereignty and the primacy of Malay rights came to a head after 
the British failed to secure comprehensive citizenship rights for Chinese and Indian 
Malayans in the abortive Malayan Union experiment between 1946 and1948. The 
perceived threat to “ketuanan Melayu” (Malay supremacy) directly led to the 
formation of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in 1946 whose 
defining platform was the protection of Malay rights and privileges. This political 
mobilization along ethnic lines in turn spurred Chinese and Indian activists to create 
similarly communal interest-based political parties of their own, though all parties 
also professed to promoting inter-racial harmony.  
 
Religious affiliations served as additional markers to differentiate one ethnic 
group from another. The newly-minted Malayan Federation was thus primed to adopt 
a socio-political approach that conflated ethnicity and religion, especially with the 
formation of the Alliance Party in 1951, a power-sharing national coalition of UMNO, 
the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). 
The understanding then was that UMNO would be the leading partner in the 
63 
 
communally-oriented partnership. The power-sharing dynamics were renewed with 
Barisan Nasional (BN) succeeding the dissolved Alliance in 1973.  
 
While UMNO‟s political foundations rest on its championing of Malay issues 
and upholding the principle of “ketuanan Melayu”, the very definition of “Malay” 
demands the belief and practice of Islam as part of Malay ethnic identity. However, 
due to Islam‟s claim to universality of worship and equality of men, one‟s Muslim 
identity is expected to supersede both his national and ethnic ones. Historically, to 
limit the permeability of Malay ethnic identity, the terms “Melayu jati” and 
“bumiputera” were coined in the 1920s and 1930s, to distinguish Malay Muslims 
from Indian and Chinese Muslims.
104
 The secured primacy of Malay sovereignty and 
the successful implementation of Malay as the national language in pluralist Malaysia 
reduced the ethno-political differences between Malaysian Muslims.  
 
However, the issue of Muslim non-Malays and the “muallaf” or saudara baru 
(Muslim convert), continue to make a Malaysian Islamic discourse that includes its 
different ethnic components equally at the political level, problematic. The religious 
discourse appears unable to separate itself from ethnic proclivities. Hence, in the 
definition of Malay status, Islam has historically played a pivotal role, sometimes 




Since Malaysia‟s independence, that  the Sultans and their appointed ulama in 
the respective state religious councils have jealously guard their own preserve against 
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any perceived encroachment by the federal BN (read UMNO) government. This has 
led to a seemingly paradoxical situation where Islam, “is [not only] the membrane 
which keeps the Malays and non-Malays apart… [it] is also a source of internal 
fragmentation among the Malays”.106 The pronounced and rigidly strong 
identification of Islam with Malay ethnicity is such that it complicates the relationship 
of Malay-Muslims with both non-Muslims and non-Malay Muslims alike within its 
national boundaries.  
 
Nagata views the categorical distinction as a “retreat into ethnic particularism” 
even though Malaysia professed to the universalism of Muslim brotherhood.
107
  Given 
Malaysia‟s colonial experience, Hussin Mutalib frames the contradictions in UMNO‟s 
formulation of Islam and Malay ethnicity as a dialectical relationship between Islam 
and nationalism.
108
 In contrast, Liow regards UMNO‟s inconsistencies in its 
Islamization programme as opportunistic responses to PAS challenge to UMNO‟s 





While it is nothing new for national governments as well as other political 
aspirants to use religious symbols to legitimate their platforms, Malaysia‟s peculiarity 
lies in how both the incumbent government and its main political rivals engage in 
frequent mud-slinging and besting campaigns that challenge the other‟s Islamic 
credentials and at the same time assert the authenticity of their own reading of 
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religious tenets. In both cases, Islamic modes and metaphors are invoked to each 
party‟s own political advantage. 
      
Moreover, despite, or even because of the Islamic component inherent in 
UMNO‟s political constitution, its traditional commitment to a secular nationalism 
causes UMNO to jealously guard its position as the paramount party to define the 
parameters of Islamic discourse in Malaysia against what it claims to be “deviant 
teachings” or Islam‟s “extremist” strains110.  Interestingly, rather than the repressive 
measures that Suharto employed against Islamist parties in Indonesia, the response of 
the UMNO government to political opposition from Islamists has been to co-opt the 
Islamist agenda to a significant degree and to express national policies in religious 
idioms and metaphors. Religious issues, already formalized as part of the constitution 
and legal system, were further politicized. Especially since Mahathir Mohamed‟s 
appointment as Prime Minister in 1981, there was increased proliferation of Islamic 
practices in the civil sphere to justify both the state‟s developmental programmes as 
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The Islamization of Malaysian Bureaucracy and the  
Bureaucratization of Islam 
 
Mahathir‟s assumption of the prime ministerial office in 1981 marked in 
earnest the conscious Islamization of Malaysia‟s bureaucracy following the policy of 
“Penerapan Nilai-Nilai Islam” (the inculcation of Islamic values) to create a Muslim 
work ethic that would spearhead Malaysia‟s modernization into the twenty-first 
century.
112
 This drive included policy declarations to revise the national legal system 
as well as remodel Malaysia‟s economic system to align them more closely with 
Islamic principles.
113
 Malaysians also noticed a sharp rise of Islamic-content 
programmes played over the state‟s Radio and Televisyen Malaysia (RTM) media 
channels in the same period.  
 
Islamization extended into Malaysia‟s cultural politics to shape the country‟s 
national cultural identity, despite the ethnic and religious plurality of the country. 
Inevitably, state policies to manage the public sphere intruded upon the private one. 
Islamization policies, despite them being ostensibly directed at Muslims, affected 
non-Muslims just as much, if not worse, than Muslims, especially when they 
infringed upon non-Muslims‟ freedom to practise their faith. 
 
Throughout the 1980s, Mahathir‟s government oversaw the establishment of 
Islamic economic institutions, tertiary education and think-tanks in a move Stauth has 
described as “the socialisation and the institutionalisation of Islam” in Malaysia‟s 
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 National economic institutions such as the Islamic Bank, the Islamic 
Economic Foundation as well as Tabung Haji which managed the collective savings 
of Malaysian Muslims for the performance of the holy pilgrimage to Makkah, gave 
the impression that Malaysia was indeed gradually developing the institutional 
frameworks for a modern Islamic country.  
 
The opening of the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) in 1983 
had both symbolic and functional value, following the move to make “religious 
knowledge” an examinable subject in the national school curriculum and the 
establishment of the Islamic Teachers Training College in 1982. Not only did IIUM 
strive to re-invigorate the historical education links between the Malay Peninsula and 
Cairo, it presented an internationalist face and agenda with its co-sponsorship by the 
Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC).
115
 In the same manner, the IAMM, with 
its galleries of Islamicate material culture, strives to present an internationalist face of 
Islam, with Malaysia confidently sitting on the international panel of experts on 
Islamicate knowledge and culture. As Othman Yatim from the University of Malaya 
asserts in a discussion of what constituted “Islamic art”, “Malays will continue to 
uphold and promote the culture of art, only as long as it remains in harmony with 
Islam”.116  
 
This socialization policy of embedding Islam into the socio-political 
infrastructure of Malaysia continued into Mahathir‟s Wawasan 2020 (Vision of 2020) 
campaign that he launched in 1991 in which he insisted that Malaysia‟s economic 
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development and material progress must not be at the expense of moral values and the 
“hereafter”.117 Beyond mere rhetoric, the proliferation of Islam was presented as a 
vehicle for the modernization and economic advancement of Malaysian society. 
Mahathir‟s long tenure no doubt, facilitated the bureaucratization of Islam in 
Malaysia.  
 
The 1990s saw the elevation of Pusat Islam from a dakwah agency within the 
prime minister‟s office to a full-fledged Department of Islamic Development in 
Malaysia, better known as JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia), with a 
dakwah foundation in its name and the mandate to coordinate all dakwah activities in 
the country.
118
  Joseph Liow also argues that the Malaysian Institute of Islamic 
Understanding (IKIM) was established in 1992 (led by then Deputy PM Anwar 
Ibrahim) with the explicit purpose to “propagate „progressive‟ Islamic views 
congruent with UMNO‟s version of „modern‟ Islam”.119 In fact, Mahathir reportedly 
remarked with confidence that if Prophet Muhammad was to appear in Malaysia, he 





The Student Dakwah Movement and the Discourse of “Islamic modernity” 
 
A discussion of “Islamic modernity” in the Malaysian context also has to take 
into account the role of the student dakwah movement of the 1980s. The student 
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dakwah movement was partly due to a youthful response to seminal events happening 
in the larger Muslim world, and also due to them being encouraged by Mahathir‟s call 
for a more conscientious observation of Islamic tenets at the work place and in public 
life. It marked the increasing Islamization of Malaysia‟s cultural and political 
landscape that was already firmly rooted in conflating religion with ethnicity.  
 
Various global developments in other Muslim countries of that period and 
especially the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
had a profound effect on the imagination of Muslims worldwide. The successful 
installation of an Islamic state in Iran had also struck a chord with the new Malay-
Muslim middle class in Malaysia, who, against the backdrop of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) of which Malaysia was a member, were in search of cultural 
emancipation from the Westernised cultural orientation inherited from the colonial 
vision of Malaysia. Ironically, this emerging group of “Islam-conscious” young adults 
were very much the product of UMNO‟s policy of awarding the majority of 
government scholarships to Malay-Muslim students to pursue tertiary education both 
at home and internationally as well as heavy investment in Islamic education under 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) through which UMNO tried to address the economic 




Apart from historical education links to the Middle East which saw Malaysian 
students renewing ties with alumni in Islamic universities such as Al-Azhar in Cairo 
and the Shari‟a College in Jordan (which was later incorporated into the University of 
Jordan), they formed new Muslim Students Associations and Islamic Representative 
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Councils in North American, European, Australian and even North African 
universities. The activities of many of these student movements were usually 
underwritten by well-organised and generous Muslim social networks and Islamic 
charities.
122
 Generally, these students were exposed to wider issues and dimensions of 
Islam and were tuned in to Muslim world affairs.
123
  Muslim student activists lent 
their voices to comment and debate the state of global Islamic affairs and the apparent 
plight of many Muslim societies.  
 
Locally, the dakwah student movement coalesced around the Angkatan Belia 
Islam Malaysia (ABIM) as a vociferous critic of the UMNO government, protesting 
UMNO‟s agricultural policies in rural Malaysia on the one hand, and questioning 
UMNO‟s commitment to developing Islamic principles of good governance, on the 
other. Under the charismatic leadership of Anwar Ibrahim, himself with a strong 
Islamist background, ABIM solidified its credentials as a youthful and dynamic 
Islamic group and saw itself as a modernizing Islamist force which could ostensibly 
shape Malaysia‟s national character.  
 
Unfortunately, the tone of Malaysia‟s dakwah movement also bore a strong 
mark of cultural xenophobia which was directed both inwards at Pre-Islamic, Hindu-
Buddhist culture and rituals in Malay society as well as outwards against an allegedly 
aggressive and morally-bankrupt “Western culture”.124 In the first instance, dakwah 
Malays insisted on arguments of the „debt‟ that Malay civilization owed to Islam 
because Islam had introduced a script for Malay language (Jawi) as well as new ideas 
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in religion, philosophy and literature that had no Malay precedent. In turn, the Jawi 
script led to the establishment of a rich Malay literary tradition that by Munshi 
Abdullah‟s time in the early nineteenth century, this literary and religious synthesis of 
Malay was “the only version of the language formally taught and largely as the 
medium of religious instruction rather than for its own sake”.125 The argument goes as 
far as to claim that Islam greatly facilitated the “export” of Malay beyond the region 
to the extent that Malay (in the form of the Jawi script) became the second largest 
“Muslim” language in the Middle East.126  
 
In line with that reasoning, the cultural scene on a number of university 
campuses across the country began to debate the role that literature and the arts played 
in an environment where Islam would be the organizing principle of society. Malay 
literary circles began to promote literature that was infused with religious themes and 
the search for spiritual enlightenment through Islam.
127
 Art and culture, it was argued, 
could not selfishly be created or consumed for its own sake, operating in an 
unchecked liberal public sphere. Art and culture should also be used as vehicles to 
demonstrate the majesty of Allah and the wider spiritual message of Islam. 
Ultimately, art and culture‟s true value would serve as an active medium for the 




                                                          
125
 Munsyi Abdullah, (aka Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir) wrote the Hikayat Abdullah (Abdullah‟s Story) 
between 1840-43 and his accounts on everyday happenings in Malaya were published in 1849. The 
Hikayat Abdullah was a seminal work as it was the first ever publication on Malaya by a local. The 
book was also significant in that it was written in vernacular Malay rather than courtly language. The 
popularity of the Hikayat as well as Munsyi‟s renown as an interpreter, scribe and religious teacher has 
earned him the title of “the father of Modern Malay Literature”. 
126
 Nagata, The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam, pp. 8-9. 
127
Ibid., p. 63. 
128
 Hussin Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia, p. 129. 
72 
 
IAMM‟s architecture, permanent collection, temporary exhibitions, 
publications and public educational programmes are carefully choreographed in such 
a manner that one aspect of representation complements the other and reinforces the 
sacredness of its dakwah purpose. Significantly, traditional Malay cultural 
performances such as joget ronggeng, dondang sayang (due to liberal interaction 
between the sexes) and tarian kuda kepang because of its Hindu origins and trance-
inducing qualities, came under pressure of being banned for their “un-Islamic” 
aspects.
129
 This is in strong contrast to the celebration of performance cultures 
performed at Indonesia‟s Festival Istiqlal events, where dancing and physical 
movement, were considered to augment the spiritual connection of dhikir Allah.  
 
In the second instance, the vilification of Western societies extended to the 
questioning of the value of a “morally-neutral” western science and education by 
Muslim students across a number of Malaysian university campuses. In its place 
dakwah students proposed the value of “inspirational” knowledge (wahyu) based on 
the argument that all knowledge comes from God.  Those in the middle ground 
argued that scientific advancements such as genetics and atomic theory have roots in 
the Qur‟an.130  Thus, at a macro-cultural level, the dakwah movement‟s growing 
disdain for western frameworks of knowledge and western sciences assumptions of 
universalism can be read as an “Islamic counterculture” that expresses its 
disenchantment with the of Western technology and modernity. However, there is a 
slippage in the message of Islamic alternity as the IAMM still relies on Western 
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conceptualisations of art and museum culture in realizing the institution as well as its 
parameters of Islamicate art.  
 
 
Islam‟s Position in Malaysian Society 
 
Unlike in Indonesia, Islam‟s position as the official religion of Malaysia was 
already safeguarded in the State Constitution. Thus the expression of Islam is the 
1980s was articulated as the rejection of the perceived secularist policies pursued by 
the Barisan Nasional government, disillusionment with Westernization as well as a 
rejection of materialism. The intensification of Islamization in Malaysian society also 
extended into a critique of Western conceptualizations of sociological phenomena.
131
 
In Malaysia it appears to be a case of social and cultural reconstruction of Malaysian 
society at the national level through the penetration of Islam in social institutions, the 
economy and education.  
 
The “Islamization of knowledge” was passionately advocated by Syed Naquib 
al-Attas, a prominent Muslim philosopher, and one of the founders of the University 
of Malaysia and the Islamic University. His philosophy and pedagogical approach 
was stark in its clarity – Islam was a totalizing force that would guide the individual‟s 
mind, body and soul in ordering his or her spiritual and physical environments, and 
the effects of which would benefit both the individual and collective, Muslim and 
non-Muslim alike. At the height of the campaign, Malay-Muslims were exhorted to 
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question Western frameworks of sociological analysis and the objectivity of science. 
Arguably, rather than the inner modernization of Islam to respond to modernity, 
Naquib‟s Islamization of knowledge implied that modern reality had to fit immutable 
principles of Islam because the conceptualizations of modernity were flawed by the 




 The grassroots phenomenon, which spiritedly discussed the role that Islam 
should play in nation-building, soon seeped into institutional thinking as student 
leaders the likes of Anwar Ibrahim, Fadzil Noor, Abdul Hadi Awang and Nasharuddin 
Mat Isa embarked on political, public service or academic careers. Mahathir‟s policy 
of “Islamizing the bureaucracy” moved in tandem with the general Muslim public 
sentiment of the period. As more Malay-Muslim graduates joined the ranks of the 
bureaucracy, professions, school and university faculty and administrators and think-
tanks, they were increasingly in positions to influence policy and shape public 
discourse in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
However, as Malaysia gained prosperity from its expanding economy, its 
government now had to find ways to maintain ever higher levels of economic growth. 
Critics of Mahathir‟s “Islamic modernism” argue that the notions of Islamic 
modernization and an Islamic “work ethic” have become ideological vehicles that the 
state used to instil industry discipline, encourage high levels of productivity and its 
cursory attempt to combat corruption.
133
 Nasr describes UMNO‟s success in co-
opting the outward symbols and ritual practices of Islam and wresting the 
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fundamentalist mandate from Islamist parties as “a feat of genius”.134 Thus, even 
though a number of Mahathir‟s cultural policies in the 1980s and 1990s addressed 
issues of Malay-Islamic cultural identity, they were also tied to Malaysia‟s economic 
development. In that regard, one could argue that the IAMM‟s mission is less about 
challenging traditional Arab dominance in defining global Islamicate culture, and 
more about prescribing the type of Muslim a Malaysian should aspire to be. 
 
 
Islam in Malaysia‟s foreign policy 
 
Hence,  the proliferation of Islamic principles in the Malaysian economy 
leading to the establishment of “Islamic banking”, the founding of the International 
Islamic University as well as the IAMM as part of a Malaysian project of alternative 
modernity. Mahathir‟s refusal to defer to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
requirements for international rescue packages and the imposition of capital restraints 
instead during the 1998 Asian Currency crisis, could also be understood as part of the 
rejection of a Western-dominated world order. In that regard, when one examines the 
impact of Islam on culturally diverse modern societies, it might be useful to consider 
Stauth‟s two modes of framing Islam in the modern world of cultures: 1) An 
ideologized Islam which serves as a “self-affirmation of cultural reconstruction” in 
terms of it being a counterstrategy to secular, non-believing practice; and 2) the inner 
modernization of Islamic principles and visions to be a strategy of “modulation of 
Islam into the new framework of a global civilization”.135  
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In Malaysia‟s case, the latter mode is the more likely scenario. Mahathir‟s 
Wawasan 2020 is a glossy rhetoric of modernizing Islamic tenets to fit contemporary 
times. Moreover, unlike the legacy of debate left by public intellectuals such as 
Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid and even B.J. Habibie, there is a dearth of 
vigorous philosophical discussion on Islam and the nature and direction of “Islamic 
modernity” by Malaysian intellectuals and ulama alike – most so-called religious 
reforms are driven by the state rather than as feedback from public debate. Perhaps 
due to the Islamization process as largely been state-driven, Islam has not been 
perceived as a threat to Malaysia‟s national modernity. Instead Islam is considered 
“an integral tool in constructing modern nationhood and Malay identity”.136 
 
The Islamization of Malaysia‟s public sphere is also projected outwards 
beyond the country‟s geographical boundaries in such a way that, notwithstanding its 
plural society, Malaysia presents an image of itself as an Islamic country. The 
identification with other Muslim countries began during Tunku Abdul Rahman‟s 
premiership (1957-69) as both ideological and cultural ballast to Communism which 
was encroaching upon the Southeast Asian region at the time. Despite Tunku‟s 
avowed commitment to a secular Malaysia and his fear that its non-Muslim citizens 
would “drown” if Malaysia became an Islamic state,137 Malaysia continued to 
cultivate a “special relationship” with other Muslim nations in the Middle East and 
Africa.  
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Islamic solidarity served as a sort of counterweight to relations with the West, 
as second-generation leadership within UMNO (the likes of Dr Mahathir Mohammed 
and Datuk Hitam Musa) became critical of Malaysia‟s “colonially-mired” policies.138 
To signal this new emphasis in foreign policy as well as to bolster UMNO‟s Islamic 
credentials, Malaysia played host to important international Islamic conferences in 
1959, 1964 and 1969 – the latest being the World Muslim Congress, a government-
level international Islamic conference which was the first of its kind.
139
 After 
declaring Islam as the official religion of the country in 1960, Malaysia‟s ascendance 
as a modern and internationally significant Muslim country was solidified when 




Given the domestic instability caused by the May 1969 ethnic riots, Tunku‟s 
successor, Tun Abdul Razak, took a more pragmatic approach towards Islamic 
solidarity in Malaysia‟s foreign affairs. Rather than mere political rhetoric, he 
encouraged the OIC to seize the opportunity to promote Islam “as a religion of 
modernization and progress” and to play a complementary role to other fora of 
international cooperation.  Tun Razak also called for greater economic and technical 
cooperation with the oil-rich Middle East countries, better use of the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB) as well as reforming Islamic education systems.  
 
The New Economic Policy promises made economic growth a national 
priority and the Middle East oil boom became an important source of loans and 
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 The volume of bilateral trade with Middle Eastern countries 
quadrupled between 1969 (RM172 million) and 1974 (RM654 million) and a suite of 
bilateral technical, scientific and cultural agreements were made during Tun Razak‟s 
term.
142
 Until today, Malaysia has strong economic links and economic cooperation 
with Middle Eastern and the Arabian Gulf countries. 
 
With regard to Muslim “causes”, Malaysian commitment to international 
Islamic solidarity was most consistent in its support of the Palestinians in the latter‟s 
conflict with Israel. From Tunku Abdul Rahman‟s thirteen-year administration to 
Hussein Onn‟s three, Malaysia condemned Israeli aggression that led to the exodus of 
Palestinians from their homes following the establishment of Israel in 1948. Malaysia 
was one of the first Asian states to allow the Al-Fatah movement facilities and it 
remains strongly pro-Arab in its foreign policy stand on the Middle East.
143
 Despite 
the complex nature of the issue, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continues to be 
perceived by the majority of the Malaysian public as a religious conflict, and 
successive Malaysian governments have responded to populist sentiment as such.  
 
Arguably, pan-Islamic sentiment intensified during Mahathir‟s government as 
Malaysia asserted its leadership role in the OIC and other international Islamic 
organizations. Mahathir himself did not shy away from criticising the West for their 
two-faced foreign policy in the Middle East, regularly imposing sanctions on Iran and 
Syria while mollycoddling Israel. Malaysia also sent peacekeeping forces and aid 
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during the Bosnian-Serbian ethnic conflict in the 1990s.
144
 In Chapter IV, I will 
comment on the IAMM‟s permanent exhibition of Palestine‟s political history. The 
presence of a fractious international political issue in the IAMM demonstrates how a 
museum can never be fully autonomous from the larger political leanings of its 
patrons nor the political demands of its visitors.   
 
 
Islamization and its Impact on Non-Muslim Malaysians 
 
Coupled with UMNO‟s longstanding contest with Islam-centred political 
rivals such as Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and pressure from Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia (ABIM) during the same period, the result was an increasingly pronounced 
presence of Islamic values pursued in the public sphere as well as an increasingly 
pervasive culture of Islamic images, texts, songs and narratives across Malaysian 
multimedia channels.
145
 . There were intermittent reassurances from Mahathir and his 
deputies that “the inculcation of Islamic values in government and civic society was 
not the same as the implementation of Islamic laws”. Nonetheless, the Islamization of 
Malaysia‟s public spaces usually came at the expense of its non-Muslim minorities.146  
 
As Islamic values were increasingly being promoted as the norms for the 
country, many non-Muslims felt their civil liberties and especially religious freedoms 
                                                          
144
 A peacekeeping contingent known as MALBATT Command (Malaysia Battalion) was sent initially 
under the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from 1993–1995 with deployments at 
Konjic, Jablanica and Pazarić in Hadžići. Following the Dayton Agreement, forces were redeployed as 
MALCON Command (Malaysia Contingent) under the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) in 
Operation Joint Endeavor with deployments at Livno, Glamoč and Kupres. MALCON further 
participated as part of the NATO led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) until 1998. Up to 8,000 troops were 
eventually deployed in this theater of operations. 
145
 Weintraub, “Introduction: The Study of Islam and Popular Culture in Indonesia and Malaysia”, p. 1. 
146
 See “Interview with Mahathir” in Utusan Melayu, Oct 26-27, 1984. 
80 
 
were being encroached upon. Anecdotal evidence abound and include instances when 
non-Muslim couples being harassed by the moral police for holding hands or kissing 
in public, the prohibition on the sale of pork in wet markets and the extreme difficulty 
to get licenses to operate non-Muslim places of worship.
147
 Given the marginalization 
of non-Muslim cultural and religious expressions in Malaysia‟s public sphere and the 
ambivalent attitudes towards non-Malay muallafs, the IAMM‟s function as a “temple 
of art” appears insufficient as an educational institution that can foster an acceptable 
definition of a national cultural identity that is inclusive and equally represents all 
Malaysians.   
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Objectifying the Past:  
The Representational Power of Things and “Popular Islam” 
 
As authoritative cultural and educational institutions, museums wield great 
power in shaping national identities. Their collections contribute greatly to the 
imagining of a community of people about themselves (and oft times of others as 
well). Museums also orientate outsiders and guide them on how to view and respond 
to the objects on display.
148
 In this regard, I argue that both the BQMI and the IAMM 
are sites that “speak” about Islam as an integral part of Indonesian and Malaysian 
national identity. The histories of the BQMI and the IAMM affirm contemporary 
understandings and scholarship that museums are far from neutral spaces where 
visitors learn objectively about the past or a people‟s ethnography. Through a number 
of their practices, museums reveal themselves as vested social institutions that aim to 
influence their visitors‟ understanding of the displayed subject.149 
 
  
Museum Collections and Meaning-making 
 
Museums are complex sites that stand at the intersection between academic 
scholarship, political agendas, display techniques and technological innovations – 
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 Contemporary literature on the role of museums in society and the 
varying impact they have on people of different socio-economic backgrounds, stress 
the nexus between power and discipline, as well as the transformative power of 
museums.
151
 Objects in museums cannot speak for themselves but are things which 
are “spoken about” because they are usually displayed outside of their original 
contexts, and oftentimes they are re-organised as exhibits according to some present 
objective. Some museums involve the people or cultures that they are speaking about, 




Curators, the experts who determine the meanings of these preserved objects, 
can usually exercise a high degree of autonomy in deciding what becomes part of the 
museum collection, which objects go on display and most importantly, how objects 
are displayed. However, curators also work under pressures from museum boards or 
even the general public, who feel that museums, because of the authority that they 
have in producing knowledge about the past, should serve “higher national 
interests”.153 In both museums of history and art museums, the “museum effect” that 
objects are subject to, also helps visitors re-experience the history and craftsmanship 
of the exhibited object. The “museum effect” is arguably “an apparatus of power” 
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sheathed in a velvet glove because the authority of the museum as a temple of 
knowledge lends a cloak of legitimacy to these displayed objects which already stand 




State-sanctioned museums are thus never neutral spaces that simply display 
historical objects that narrate a past reality. Indeed, the messages they convey about 
their subjects are too important to allow visitors to learn “by chance”. This is 
especially significant when the message is related to knowledge about the “nation”. 
The objects in a museum‟s collection will be carefully selected, categorized, labelled 
and displayed such that each of them will play role in affirming a particular narrative 
of the nation‟s past and its people. Thus, objects in any museum collection tend to 
have “a mendacious quality”155 because they have been organized and exhibited in 
such a way that some of its elements are highlighted while others are downplayed.
156
 
The representation of the imagined national community is therefore a controlled 
image that includes some groups while excluding others.  
 
The practice that archaeological objects can also stand as a metonymy for a 
“civilisation” or “nation”, comes from the thinking that “objects are ideas”157 and that 
as exhibits, they can be staged as “a performance”.158 Their meanings are then 
(re)inscribed and (re)contextualised by the curator in relation to the present.
159
 By 
examining the provenance of key objects within a museum‟s collection, or the 
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“cultural biography of things” as it is termed in anthropology, one can study museum 
collections “through the trajectories of specific items and the relationships they form 
with people and other objects”.160 Similar to the “social scientific” philosophy of the 
second-generation Annales School historians such as Georges Duby and Jacques Le 
Goff, this multi-disciplinary approach towards studying material culture allows for the 
convergence of interests of both historians and anthropologists to create “a set of 
common, as opposed to complementary, goals: the development of dynamic models 
that combine system with process in long-term patterns of socio-cultural change”.161  
 
While this method might not be perfect since the two disciplines also have 
differences in emphasis, such a cross-disciplinary approach would address the 
complexities of modern nation-state life. Other writers have argued that the very 
building in which the museum is housed affects the communication of the collection‟s 
philosophy. Oftentimes, the museum building is an artefact itself. Its architecture and 
how a museum should look, has often been a source of conflict between the building‟s 
designer, the collection‟s patrons and even the general public.162  
 
Museum collections and educational programmes can also be tools to 
legitimize the political authority or cultural hegemony of one group over others. 
Museums assert their influence on how visitors view the past through the themes they 
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use to organise their collections.
163
 The most obvious way that a museum can 
legitimise a particular narrative of the past, is by arranging the objects in a way that 
singularly and collectively, the objects strengthen the themes that run through the 
national narrative. Such is the case with national history museums of most erstwhile 
colonies, including Malaysia‟s Muzium Negara and Indonesia‟s Museum Nasional. In 
a similar manner to BQMI and IAMM, other kinds of national museums and heritage 
sites in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia and Brunei reflect their histories 
and rich material culture not simply for the sake of preserving antiquated objects but 
also to legitimise present political authority.  
 
National history museums which chronicle social conditions under colonial 
rule and subsequent struggles towards modern nationhood constantly reinforce a 
narrative of loyalty towards the country using objects that resonate with visitors‟ 
memories. As the BQMI and IAMM put “Islam” on display and discuss the role of 
Islam in each country‟s national culture, it is imperative that we scrutinise and debate 
their representations of the religion, especially in the context of multi-cultural and 
multi-religious society. Both museums have the ability to shape how visitors imagine 
Islam and mediate responses to competing notions of Islamicate culture, society, 
religion, art and values.  
 
Several studies have examined how museums, as repositories of history and 
memory, as well as educational institutions, have contributed to the shaping of the 
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 In the case of Indonesia and Malaysia, the respective collections 
of the BQMI and IAMM are not only a means of educating visitors about Islam, but a 
potential extension of nation-building and national identity creation.  Clifford argues 
that ethnographic museums, as well as heritage and indigenous cultural centres, “both 
play and subvert” the dominant Western-tradition defined “art-culture game”. This is 
so because the narratives staged in these institutions are also negotiated (my 
emphasis) “paths through modernity” and mediating the unrelenting forces of the 
market economy, technological advances and the ever-looming spectre of the nation-
state.
165
  The curatorial approach at the IAMM has attempted to navigate these 
treacherous waters with some degree of success. Nonetheless, even though the BQMI 
and IAMM could argue that they are “specialized museums” (museum khusus),166 
there is an urgency for these museums to create an inclusive image of the nation. Due 
to the state ethos of multiculturalism in Malaysia, and Indonesia‟s “unity in diversity”, 
their multi-ethnic citizens expect their cultural identities to be reflected in the national 
polity as well.  
 
Nonetheless, because of majority-minority politics, and political and socio-
economic policies that historically have favoured certain ethnic and/or religious 
groups while discriminating against others, some ethnic cultural groups are 
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marginalised or even “erased” from the state-endorsed “face” of the nation.167 The 
story of the unified multicultural nation, as displayed in these museums, become 
contested narratives of unequal representation. In the IAMM, the art of the Malay 
world serves for the Islamicate material culture heritage of Malaysia over that of other 
non-Malay Muslim groups. In the BQMI, the material culture of Chinese Indonesians, 
even Muslim Chinese, are not represented as an indigenous part of the Indonesian 
Islamicate nation.  
 
The political histories of Southeast Asian countries are replete with 
government campaigns that have strived to create a sense of unified national identity 
amongst such diverse ethnic populations. Whether in the form of nationally 
standardized education, military conscription or even forced resettlement, the success 
of these respective state-initiated campaigns has been mixed and directly related to the 
level of resistance from the group that has been targeted for assimilation. Malaysia 
and Indonesia, just like its other Southeast Asian neighbours who have become more 
stable and affluent nation-states in the late twentieth century, have been able to turn 
their attention towards a development of the cultural aspects of citizenship. In this 
regard, a considerable amount of money and resources have been spent to develop 
grand concert halls, public libraries and art galleries that reinforce the various forms 
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At the same time, “national” and ethnographic museums inherited from former 
colonial rulers are revamped to serve nation-building purposes. These cultural 
institutions are made easily accessible to the general public and serve as overt marks 
of educated, liberally-minded and civilised nation-states.
169
 The BQMI and IAMM are 
part of this cultural landscape of the modern Southeast Asian city where local elites 
systematically produce knowledge about the “nation” from the “top- down” and could 
be seen as extending national Islamic education by employing a Western tradition of 
museum education to create “modern Muslims”.170  
 
 
Museums and the Modernised, Economically Prosperous Country 
 
Further, I argue that the two museums reflect the increasing confidence of both 
Indonesia and Malaysia in their international standing as former colonies which have 
successfully modernised, as well as their international diplomacy, especially in 
relation to other Muslim states. As generally stable Muslim-dominant “democracies”, 
Indonesia and Malaysia have contributed to the stability of Southeast Asia as a whole, 
especially when Suharto initiated the move for closer regional cooperation which 
ultimately led to the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
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in 1967 with the initial signatories of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and 
the Philippines. The declaration of closer regional economic and cultural cooperation 
was soon followed by the signing of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN) in 1971, better known as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which asserted 
the freedom of the region “from any manner of interference by outside Powers” 




Indonesia and Malaysia‟s rapid economic development and prosperity as well 
as their strategic geo-political value during that period, also gave their elder statesmen 
clout in the international fora to pursue a more internationalist agenda and a course 
independent of the major Western powers, especially in relation to the Middle East. 
Both countries also pursued an increased presence in the international Muslim bloc of 
countries from the mid-1970s. Suharto and successive Malaysian prime ministers 
since Tunku Abdul Rahman were vocal participants in international Islamic fora such 
as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the World Islamic Economic 
Forum (WIEF). Both countries have also used their good offices and their reputation 
as “moderate” Muslim countries to mediate in diplomatically-sensitive issues 





As I have argued in Chapter I, Indonesia and Malaysia‟s increasing 
international confidence coincided with major developments in the larger Muslim 
world in the 1970s, including the rise of Middle East oil power during the Cold War 
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and the Islamic revolution in Iran. Such events gave the impression that there was a 
global Islamic renaissance. The Islamic religious revival was also felt by Indonesia 
and Malaysia‟s Muslim-majority societies, and calls grew for greater reference to 
Islam in the development of the country, the establishment of more public institutions 




In Indonesia, it rekindled a vigorous debate over the nature of the Indonesian 
state that began in earnest after WWII as indigenous Islamist freedom fighters had 
contributed significantly to win the war of occupation against the Dutch.
174
 In 
Malaysia, the Islamic resurgence was cleverly harnessed by the United Malays 
Nationalist Organisation (UMNO) in the 1970s and saw the gradual Islamization of 
Malaysian bureaucracy, especially during Mahathir‟s premiership.  Intellectually and 
culturally, there was increasing scepticism of contemporary “Western-model” of 
modernity and a renewed search for a “Muslim” identity as a counterforce to the ills 
of modern living. Rather than relying on Western philosophy and intellectual 
frameworks, public debate raged over the representation of non-Western cultures and 
knowledge as lesser “others”, there was renewed interest in studying Islamic scholars 
and philosophers and Islamic history as well as the arts, literature and cultures of 
Islamicate heartlands.
175
 The result of the popular calls for the proliferation of Islamic 
images, texts, songs, narratives, objects and even moral order, has resulted in the 
“greening” of the public spheres in both Indonesia and Malaysia with the unfortunate 
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Just as importantly, there seemed to be a collective desire to establish 
Indonesia and Malaysia‟s place in the seemingly reinvigorated Muslim world. While 
they varied in degree, the Indonesian and Malaysian responses to a novel occurrence 
in the form of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, was super-imposed onto a past “golden 
age” of Islam that was playing out again in the present. Just as Sahlins argued that the 
coincidental arrival and subsequent actions of Captain Cook and his ill-fated crew in 
Hawaii were seen initially by the indigenous tribe as the return of the god O Lono to 
fulfil the people‟s history and renew the fecundity of the islands‟ soil,177 so too did 
many Muslims in these two countries believed that the major political and social 
happenings in professedly Islamic countries as well as increased Western interest in 
Islamic political philosophy and “civilisation” since the late-1970s, showed the 





The BQMI and IAMM form part of the cultural landscape of increasing 
confidence of Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims in expressing their Muslim identity 
in the public realm. As authoritative institutions on the subject of the country‟s past, 
each object in the collection of each museum, stands as physical testimony of the 
richness of the people‟s historical past and as well as the craftsmanship of traditional 
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 That is why there are many specimens of any one particular object 
displayed in a museum.  
 
In the IAMM, the thematic approach of a number of its galleries, i.e. the 
armoury and weapons gallery, the jewelry gallery and the textiles gallery, transforms 
singular objects into replications of each form. Reproductions of similar styles, 
symbols and functions all contribute to establishing a “tradition” of material cultural 
production of the sort that Hobsbawm mentions.
180
 In some cases, the material quality 
of the object is fine enough to be considered “art” and transcends mere functionality 
to ascend into the realm of non-economic value.
181
 The copies of finely-wrought 
Qur‟ans from the different regions of Indonesia (as well as Qur‟ans from China, 
Africa and the Malay Archipelago) displayed in BQMI as “mushaf art” fall in that 
category.  
 
The invariance of the Qur‟anic text, which is the common element in each 
mushaf regardless of the regional patterns and symbols illuminating its pages– from 
the organization of each juz
182
, surah (chapter), waqaf (punctuation) and even the 
number of lines on each page – further grounds mushaf art as a “universal” Islamic art 
tradition. In this manner, and continually reinforced by the narratives of the designers 
of the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal and BQMI‟s curators, the myriad cultures and ethnic 
groups of Indonesia are objectified in the very things and buildings that they produce. 
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Kenneth George argues that collectively, these symbols, patterns and architecture 
from Indonesia‟s disparate ethnic groups are taken to represent the artistic nucleus of 
an Indonesian nation,
183
 in which Islam has not only been a guiding principle, but 
whose material and cultural abundance have also inspired indigenous expressions of 
Islam which are distinct from the faith‟s historical Arabian heartlands. I will discuss 
further in Chapter III, how the Mushaf Istiqlal has been used as a representation of 
Muslim Indonesia and the inherent problems in creating an inclusive representation of 
national identity. 
 
 One could consider Bann‟s formulation of museums as narrated and edited 
spaces in which history and geography can be “stretched”, to examine how the BQMI 
and IAMM have expanded the histories of their respective countries.  Through the 
manner objects are displayed as well as the narrative modes of the explicatory texts 
accompanying them, both museums lay claim to an Islamic past that has purportedly 
benefitted the nation.
184
 Hence I argue that the collections of the two museums are not 
objective displays of different types of “Islamicate art”. Instead, there is an 
unmistakable ideological imperative embedded in the exhibits.  
 
Further, the dovetailing of beautiful art objects with the consumerist culture of 
an expanding Indonesian and Malaysian middle-class facilitates the dissemination of 
the idea of a tangible and glorious Islamicate culture that can be relived through the 
senses of sight, sound, touch, taste, and in the case of the contemporary art pieces in 
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BQMI,  even owned. Weintraub talks about the creation of a kind of “popular Islam” 
that is mass produced, mass-mediated, more urban and cosmopolitan as well as 
globalized.
185
 On the surface, it appears as if the two museums attempt to both reflect 
and shape at least the artistic elements of “popular Islam”. However, because there is 
a diversity of Muslim experiences as well as a wide spectrum of Muslim identities, 
there are sometimes slippages between the plural realities and communities of Islam 
and what is represented in the BQMI and the IAMM.  
 
Popular Responses to the BQMI and IAMM 
Not everyone agrees with the way the BQMI and the IAMM have been 
curated. In the case of the BQMI, the static displays of the mushaf Al-Qur‟an and 
ethnographic material have been criticized by various parties for being uninspired and 
not in accordance with current museum standards. At its worse, the curation of the 
Bayt Al-Qur‟an has been described as „passive‟, (Mal. pasif) or even „lifeless‟ (Mal. 
mati). Criticisms run the gamut from the lack of thought to the way the Qur‟ans are 
displayed, the lack of “animation” (i.e. multimedia to enhance the visitor‟s 
understanding/experience of the gallery), little information on the objects‟ provenance 
or significance, the poor state of preservation and conservation of the artefacts given 
the humidity of the BQMI‟s tropical surroundings and even the insufficient level of 
security of its galleries from theft and vandalism.
186
 Further, despite the regular 
publications by the BQMI‟s co-manager, the Lajnah Pentashihan Mushaf Al-Quran, 
the BQMI has been chided for a lack of sustained museum programming to attract 
                                                          
185
 Weintraub, “Introduction: The Study of Islam and Popular Culture in Indonesia and Malaysia”, p. 2. 
186
 Uka Tjandrasasmita, “Peren Bayt Al-Qur‟an & Museum Istiqlal bagi Pembangunan Bangsa 
Indonesia”, pp. 162-163. 
95 
 
more visitors. Despite the popularity of competitive Qur‟anic recitals amongst 
Indonesian Muslims, the BQMI has yet to organize such a programme to enhance its 
profile on the local Islamicate cultural scene.   
 
It is a similar case with the IAMM, even though it has received more bouquets 
than bricks. To its credit, the publications arm of the IAMM has produced quality 
exhibition catalogues to accompany both its permanent collection as well as each 
temporary exhibition it has staged. Its programmes also strive to complement the 
themes addressed in its galleries. For instance, an art programme targeted at children 
had them selecting their favourite object in the IAMM and then reproducing it in a 
painting. Programmes for adults include both artistic workshops such as calligraphy 
as well as the broadcasting of Qur‟anic recitals during the month of Ramadhan.  Of 
significance are the prizes that the IAMM awards for participation in some of its 
programmes. The most recent which generated some excitement was one which 
offered a prize of an umrah (minor pilgrimage) to Makkah when visitors to its 
temporary exhibition, “En Route to Mecca: Pilgrims‟ Voices throughout the 
Centuries” which ran from October 2009 to January 2010, participated in a contest 
sharing their thoughts on the hajj experience.  
 
The first gripe that most local visitors (and potential visitors) claim is that 
entrance fees to the IAMM are too expensive. Fixed at RM10 for adults, RM5 for 
students and senior citizens and no charge for children under 6 years of age (RM12 
and RM6 when Special Galleries are opened), it costs more than Muzium Negara‟s 
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flat rate of RM2 with free entry for students in uniform and children under 12 years 
old.  The resistance to paying these higher charges show that visitors expect museums 
(even private ones), in their role as public institutions for education and recreation, to 
make visiting it affordable for the masses. At a time when an assortment of „Islamic 
consumer products‟ are available on the market, the IAMM‟s popularity is subject to 
the same forces of demand and supply that other Islam-related goods and services are. 
 
Interestingly, the oft-cited criticism the IAMM receives is that some visitors 
feel that it is “not international enough”. Though each display is accompanied by both 
English and Malay information panels, some visitors have remarked that the IAMM 
should take into account Arabic-speakers as well and provide sufficient text and signs 
for this group of visitors. Another feedback from visitors is for the IAMM to take a 
more active role in discussing political events in Islamic world affairs through 
displays in the museum.
187
 In Chapter IV, I show how the museum responded to calls 
for a representation of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
     
From the examples above, one can see how the representations displayed by 
the two museums become part of a larger struggle of popular culture to determine 
what counts as “Islam” in contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia. This mass mediation 
of “compromise, negotiation as well as resistance” is constantly at play and serves as 
a dynamic mechanism to check state hegemony in imposing fixed narratives about 
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In Chapters III and IV, I examine the architectural and curatorial strategies that 
the BQMI and IAMM respectively deploy to portray its interpretation of Islam, both 
as a “living‟ religion”189 and as an important identity marker for the Muslim -majority 
populations of the nation. The museums‟ curatorial approaches are of political 
significance in light of competing definitions of Islamic behavior and Muslim piety 
between the state, traditional and progressive ulama, Islamist political parties, as well 
as individual beliefs and practices of lay Muslims in both these countries. Adding to 
the volatile mix are the complexities of multi-cultural living with non-Muslims.  
 
I argue that the approach of each museum was shaped not only by the 
philosophies and artistic vision of its respective curatorial teams, but also by the 
national political agendas of Suharto‟s New Order regime and the Barisan Nasional of 
which UMNO is the leading partner. Both domestic and foreign policy considerations 
of the Suharto and Mahathir governments since the mid-1980s have found their way 
into the direction of the heritage and cultural preservation policies and have resulted 
in museums and heritage sites becoming an extension of nation-building and national 
identity creation.  
 
These concerns have directly led to the establishment of the BQMI in 1997 
and IAMM in 1999 and continue, in varying degrees to affect the shaping of the two 
museums‟ collections and exhibitions. Malaysia‟s UMNO government and the New 
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Order regime, strived to define the role of Islam in its modern, ethnically and 
religiously plural state in the face of challenges from Islamist elements while 
maintaining a secular and nationalist public space. Inevitably, however, the 
museological result is that the “Islam” that is portrayed and displayed in BQMI is a 
selective mosaic of Indonesian Muslims and the experience of Islam and Islamicate 
heritage in the Indonesian archipelago.  
 
Thus even though its founders describe the BQMI as “a mirror [for 
Indonesians] to see themselves”, it is akin to the magic mirror in the fairytale of Snow 
White as it only reflects what its creators want to see of the Indonesian nation.
190
 In 
the case of IAMM, it is an ambitious attempt to not only consolidate the authority of 
the ruling UMNO party as the guardians of Islamicate culture and Malay-Islamicate 
material heritage, but also to institute Islamicate art as a worthy equal to established 
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Revealing the Sacred and the Nation: A Study of the BQMI  
 
The BQMI is actually made up of two museums located on the same premises 
near the main entrance of Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (TMII) in East Jakarta. The 
Bayt Al-Qur‟an and Museum Istiqlal collections are jointly managed by the Lajnah 
Pentashihan Mushaf Al-Qur‟an (Committee for the Standardization of Reproductions 
of the Qur‟an) and Badan Litbang dan Diklat Agama (Agency for Islamic Research, 
Development and Training) under the offices of the Ministry of Religion). While the 
Bayt- Al-Qur‟an and Museum Istiqlal together house objects pertaining to Islamicate 
culture, the two museums are conceptually distinct.  
 
According to its Curatorial Board, the Bayt Al-Qur‟an (House of Al-Qur‟an) is 
meant only for Qur‟anic related materials, such as Qur‟anic knowledge, calligraphy 
and manuscripts, as well as research. On the other hand, Museum Istiqlal displays 
“the products of human interpretations of the Qur‟an in society” and that the 
“application of the Qur‟an in human society ultimately results in the flourishing of 
Islamic culture”.191 At the time of its establishment in 1995, the Bayt Al-Qur‟an was 
also considered the world‟s biggest museum that displayed the art and history of the 
Qur‟an with its closest counterpart in Bahrain.192 
 
The Bayt Al-Qur‟an displays an extensive collection of different kinds of 
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illuminated copies of the Qur‟an or mushaf Al-Qur‟an193 that have been produced by 
the different pesantren (Jav. traditional religious school) or religious teachers (Ar. 
ustaz, Jav. kyai) from as early as the late 16th Century.
194
 It also displays a small 
collection of contemporary Qur‟an-related publications such as translations, 
instructional software on how to recite the Qur‟an properly as well as children‟s 
Qur‟an recital and activity books.195  
 
The Bayt Al-Qur‟an has in storage and limited display a collection of rare 
kitab kuning (Mal. yellow books) which are tracts or pamphlets of religious 
instruction drawn up by local Muslim teachers and missionaries as well as a few 
specimens of Qur‟anic writing on wood in Javanese script in the traditional form of 
wooden slates (koprak).
196
 The centrepiece of the Bayt Al-Qur‟an is the Mushaf Al-
Qur‟an Istiqlal Indonesia. Presented by its creators as a “distinctly national Qur‟an”, 
the illuminated borders of its pages showcase the apparently distinct decorative arts of 
Indonesia‟s diverse ethnic groups, and thus, also evoking the variegated nature of 
Indonesia‟s Islamicate culture.197  
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Fig.3.1 Pages from the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal with illuminations representing regional symbols 
 
To overcome the difficulty of determining the cultural distinctions between 
one ethnic group and the other, especially when they overlapped within the same 
province, the Mushaf Al- Qur‟an Istiqlal team creatively re-drew the strict provincial 
administrative and ethnic lines that criss-crosses Indonesia. To create this national 
Qur‟an, Indonesia was re-cast as a Muslim nation “with forty-two Muslim cultures 
and design areas”.198 The re-imagination of Indonesia as a Muslim entity included 
provinces and territories such as North Bali, Irian Jaya and East Timor (now West 
Papua and independent Timor Leste respectively) that would not usually be 
considered culturally Muslim areas because of the predominance of Hindus and 




Both the Bayt Al-Qur‟an and the Museum Istiqlal were established out of the 
resounding success of the two “Festival Istiqlal” events held in 1991 and 1995, which 
also marked the start and the completion of the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal project. The 
unexpected popularity of the two cultural festivals that purportedly showcased 
Indonesian Islamicate culture, led to calls for an Islamicate-themed museum that 
would serve as a permanent display of traditional as well as contemporary objects 
pertaining to “Islamic culture” and “Islamic heritage” (benda-benda warisan budaya 
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 Despite the museum being described as having Islam as its guiding principle 
(museum bernuansa ke-Islaman), from its very inception, the BQMI was very clear in 
that the objects it was conserving and displaying were not just “old things” (benda 
kuno) but rather Indonesia‟s extensive contributions to a “global Islamic heritage” 
(khazanah ke-Islaman dunia).
201
 Further, BQMI‟s founders, who also were the 
initiators behind Festival Istiqlal I and II, had envisioned their work as an attempt to 
“contribute to the self-awareness and self-confidence required of Muslims” in light of 
the global Islamic resurgence and economic rise of many professedly Muslim 
countries since the mid-1980s.  Uka Tjandrasasmita saw the BQMI as a medium for 
building “a national character” (media pembinaan keperibadian bangsa).202   
 
Historically, Indonesians make up amongst the highest number of pilgrims to 
Makkah and there continues to be a substantial Javanese community residing in the 
Hijaz. The increasing affluence of Indonesia‟s Muslim middle-class, which expanded 
with Indonesia‟s oil boom and general economic prosperity during the New Order 
period, saw increasing numbers of Indonesians able to go on more religious 
pilgrimages – both domestically to the shrines of Muslim saints across the 
archipelago, and in fulfilling the fifth obligation of the Rukun Islam (the five pillars of 
Islam) – to travel to Makkah to perform the pilgrimage alongside Muslims from all 
over the world.  Purportedly, it was on Ibu Tien‟s suggestion that a particular prayer 
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be inscribed prominently on BQMI‟s façade so that Muslim pilgrims on their way to 
perform the hajj would be able to read it as their planes flew past from the Halim 
Perdanakusuma Terminal.
203
 In addition, the Lajnah Pentashihan Mushaf Al-Qur‟an, 
which co-manages the BQMI, has itself published ten volumes of commentaries on 
the Qur‟an (Ar. tafsir Al-Qur‟an) by 2008, thus being an active producer of a 





Fig. 3.2. Frontal view of BQMI with Qur‟anic verse inscribed on the wall of the main building 
 
Hence, the BQMI when examined together with the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal 
and Festival Istiqlal I and II, could be seen as first, an extended campaign of forging a 
distinct Indonesian Islamicate culture that is both locally honoured and internationally 
acknowledged as an important part of a larger global Islamicate heritage. In this 
regard, Islamicate calligraphy and the art of mushaf writing and illumination have 
been enthusiastically promoted as Indonesia‟s concerted efforts to reinvigorate “an 
important Islamicate art form that was supposedly close to being forgotten”.205 
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The Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal and the Bayt Al-Quran Collection  
 
The Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal is the centrepiece in a collection of thirty 
mushafs created by notable indigenous clerics and Muslim rulers in the last 400 years 
of the archipelago‟s history. Even before the Mushaf Al-Quran Istiqlal was created as 
an emblem of the imagined united Muslim nation of Indonesia, the Mushaf Pusaka of 
the National Palace (1950, Figure 3.3) and Mushaf Wonosobo (1992, Figure 3.4) had 
already existed as emblems of Muslim Indonesia. At the two Istiqlal festivals and later 
in the BQMI, the mushafs created by Syekh Abdul Wahab from Aceh (undated),  
Syekh Nawawi al Bantani from Banten (undated), and Prince Diponegoro of 
Yogyakarta (undated) were displayed along with other mushafs created between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, as archaeological proof of “Indonesian” 
participation in this sacred art form. However, these mushafs were more parochial in 
their provenance and did not attempt to include the plethora of ethnic traits from 
across the Indonesian peoples in the designing of the respective mushaf al-Qur‟an. To 
boost its claims that Indonesia was keeping the art of mushaf writing alive at a time 
when its popularity  was “in a decline” in the rest of the Muslim world, over the years, 
the BQMI added the Mushaf Wonosobo (1992), one of the biggest mushafs in the 
collection, Mushaf Sundawi (1997), Mushaf at-Tin (1999, a gift from Suharto‟s 
family), Mushaf Jakarta (undated)  and the Mushaf Kalimantan Barat (undated) to its 




Fig. 3.3 Mushaf Pusaka (1950) and Fig. 3.4. Mushaf Wonosobo (1992) 
 
The founding fathers of the BQMI also exhorted the Indonesian Muslim 
community to come forward and donate family heirloom Qur‟ans and other such 
heritage objects that were “inspired by Islam”.206 The BQMI was presented to the 
public as a both a gift to Indonesians as well as a collective responsibility of 
Indonesians to preserve their indigenous Islamicate culture. Pirous asserted that 
preserving this local Islamicate heritage would protect Indonesians from being 
buffeted by the cross-currents of “global culture” and that the BQMI would be a 





Pirous‟ assertions not only assume the familiar indigenous-culture-as-ballast-
against-foreign elements rhetoric, they also makes claims of a unified indigenous 
Islamicate culture amongst Indonesia‟s almost 200 million Muslims208 from two 
hundred ethnic groups speaking different dialects and spread over more than thirteen 
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thousand islands across the archipelago.
209
 In the introduction to The Invention of 
Tradition, Hobsbawm talks about “tradition” in human societies and how it is distinct 
from “custom” which is also practised in many “traditional” societies. That distinction 
is “invariance”.210 While custom does not preclude degrees of innovation and change, 
Hobsbawm argues that tradition “fixes” and formalizes a certain practice or ritual and 




In effect, what the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal team has done is to invent a new 
tradition of collective art-production for the Indonesian nation. By harking back to the 
long history of mushaf art since the Abbasid period in Iraq and associating the work 
of individual Javanese, Acehnese, Bantenese, and other indigenous Qur‟an scribes 
with famous scribes from the heartlands of the Muslim world, Pirous and his team re-
established a seemingly unbroken link to the past – as well as to a time and place in 
the Arabian heartlands that were quite different from archipelagic Indonesia in the 
1990s.  
 
Hence, by using the text of the Qur‟an, believed by all pious Muslims to be the 
Word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in Arabic script, the Indonesian 
Muslim community was embodied in a sacred object accepted as authentic and 
infallible by all Muslims throughout history. Adhering to conventions of established 
Arabic calligraphic styles, and working with respected local ulama to standardise the 
                                                          
209
 Mahmud Buchari, “Indonesia‟s Plans for Istiqlal II”, Arts of the Islamic World, Vol. 26, 1994, p. 61. 
210
 Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger 
(eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), p. 2.  
211
 Ibid., p. 2. 
107 
 
reading of the Qur‟anic text for the entire country,212 the Indonesian Muslim artists 
have maintained the religious sanctity of the Mushaf Istiqlal and manoeuvred around 
the complex intellectual and artistic debates surrounding the notion of “Islamic art”.213 
By disciplining the differences and tensions of Islamic plurality and individual 
Muslim experiences, the creators of Mushaf Istiqlal hoped to establish a firmer 
foothold in the larger corpus of art and material culture produced in historically 
Islamicate lands.  
 
The completion of the Mushaf Istiqlal, filled with symbols and patterns 
apparently distilled from the arches of rumah adat, textiles, batiks, furniture, 
ornaments and even weapons of the Muslim peoples from the forty-two “Muslim 
Culture and Design Regions”, objectified in the form of a sacred book, an imagined 
community of Nusantara Muslim (Archipelago Muslims). Hence the Indonesian 
Muslim ummah is objectified – each cultural group is represented by a physical 
“artistic” feature assigned to it by the professional artists and cultural elites in 
collaboration with the state. Thanks to the magic of the whole-is-larger-than-the-sum-
of-its-parts alchemy (and infused by the spirit of Islam), each Indonesian Muslim 
becomes part of a larger art-producing national community who collectively has 
created “a new expression of the tradition of Islamic sacred art”.214 Every Indonesian 
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Muslim was supposedly accorded “a representational space” within the pages of the 
Mushaf Istiqlal and thus stood as a sign of national inclusiveness.
215
   
 
In this re-imagined and materially tangible Indonesia, the Indonesian ummah 
was “united and peaceful in its ethnic plurality”. The problems of ethnic, tribal and 
linguistic associations and more violent histories amongst a number of ethnic groups 
were subsumed under the banner of unified Islam whereby everyone adhered to 
uniform Islamic principles, spoke (and supposedly understood) the classical Arabic 
language of the Qur‟an as well as subscribed to the same Islamic philosophy. At 
Festival Istiqlal II in 1995, which articulated a more internationalist outlook, Suharto 
marked the completion of the national icon by signing on the opening pages of the 
Mushaf Istiqlal which included the declaration that he was presenting the Mushaf Al-
Qur‟an Istiqlal to “the Indonesian People and the global Muslim ummah” and also a 
prayer that “all Muslims constantly strengthen one‟s Faith and Fidelity to Him and 
that Allah, the Glorious and the Exalted, will grant Prosperity and Wisdom 
(Guidance) to (every Muslim).”216  
 
Fig. 3.5. Suharto‟s dedication page in the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal 
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However, the unequal representation of Indonesia‟s Muslim communities in 
the Mushaf Istiqlal as  seen through its designers privileging of majority ethnic 
groups‟ cultural patterns in the Mushaf Istiqlal‟s illuminations, demonstrate that only 
officially-constructed national and local cultures are encouraged in the public sphere 
for local and international consumption.
217
 In such a context, one would soon realise 
that the apparent ethnic diversity of Indonesia is carefully managed. By and large, 
representations of Indonesia‟s ethnic diversity in the Indonesian public sphere 
privilege pribumi ethnic groups, while they usually exclude the country‟s ethnic 
Chinese population.  
 
Despite the existence of Chinese Muslims in Indonesian society and their 
historical role in spreading Islam in Indonesia, they are not represented in the Mushaf 
Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal, ostensibly because the ethnic group does not neatly fall into a 
specific “Muslim Cultural and Design region”. However, due to the persisting 
perception that the ethnic Chinese were foreign elements within local Indonesian 
society, decades of state discrimination of and aggressive assimilation policies 
towards Indonesians of Chinese descent, resulted in public expressions of Chinese 
culture being considerably limited during Suharto‟s government.218 
 
 Interestingly, while conversion to Islam by Chinese individuals is perceived 
by the Indonesian majority as a very “noble act of assimilation and nationalism”, 
Heryanto claims that there have been “serious attempts to repress any historical 
evidence suggesting the pioneering work of ethnic Chinese in spreading Islam on the 
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archipelago”. In this case, becoming Muslim did not dispel suspicions about the 
loyalty of Chinese Indonesians to the Indonesian nation, and ethnic Chinese culture is 
still considered alien to the amalgam of “indigenous” cultures that make up the 
“national culture” of Indonesia.219 Thus, the exclusion of ethnic Chinese Muslims 
from the representational space of the Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal and the absence of 
Sini-calligraphy examples amongst the mushaf collection of the BQMI undermines 
the idea of national inclusiveness in the imagination of Indonesia‟s Muslim 
community.     
    
 
The Museum Istiqlal Collection 
 
The BQMI opened in 1997 with pomp, buoyed by the overwhelming success 
of Festival Istiqlal I and II and the seemingly enthusiastic patronage of an erstwhile 
opponent to overt expressions of Islam in Indonesia‟s public space. The BQMI was 
considered such a cultural achievement for Indonesia that in 1997 US President Bill 
Clinton was taken on a visit to the museum by then Minister for Religion Dr Tarmizi 
Taher. On average, the BQMI is said to receive three thousand visitors a month with 




The Bayt Al-Qur‟an collection showcases the various types of mushafs both 
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antique and contemporary, Qur‟anic manuscripts and accompanying text panels 
explain the art of mushaf writing and the editing and publication processes of each 
locally-published Al-Quran. The Museum Istiqlal collection on the other hand, spans 
an entire body of material artefacts “inspired by Islam” that have been produced by 
Indonesians.
221
 The collection encompasses religious treatises and manuscripts from 
all corners of the archipelago, architectural features and models of regional mosques, 
“archaeological objects” (benda arkeologis), “heritage objects” (benda tradisi) and 
contemporary visual arts (seni rupa kontemporer) (Figures 3.6 and 3.7).  
 
  
Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7. (L-R) Benda Tradisi and the Seni Rupa Kontemporer sections of the MI   
 
The bulk of objects in the MI collection were gathered from the exhibits 
during Festival Istiqlal I and II, which themselves were donations from prominent and 
ordinary Indonesians alike, including the Suharto family. The BQMI had also 
received offers of monetary donations as well as artefacts on extended loan from 
international sponsors due to the resounding success of Festival Istiqlal I and II. 
However, Suharto had purportedly decided that the BQMI collections would remain 
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“Indonesian” in form, content as well as patronage and outreach, and declined these 
offers from abroad.
222
 Thus, the nationalist orientation of the BQMI cannot be over-
emphasized. The BQMI is not only a place where objects of Indonesia‟s Islamicate 
heritage would be protected for posterity – it was also seen to represent Indonesia‟s 
importance as a centre of Islamicate cultural production rather than merely the 





Islamic Manuscripts and the Contemporary Qur‟anic Calligraphy Section 
 
When one takes a tour of the main floor of the MI, one would notice that the 
amount of attention paid to displaying contemporary visual art, such as modern 
paintings and abstract sculptures, was equal to that paid to archaeological artefacts 
such as 14th Century Muslim tombstones from Aceh, and heritage objects ranging 
from pilgrimage souvenirs, batik cloths, gamelan musical instruments and medieval 
weapons from across the archipelago. In the section of the gallery displaying 18th  
and 19th  Century Islamicate manuscripts and contemporary calligraphic works, 
several wall panels have been set aside to display the calligraphic pieces submitted for 
a nation-wide Qur‟anic calligraphy competition that was held during Festival Istiqlal 
II. Competition entries were differentiated according to age groups – children, 
teenagers and an adult-open category – and demonstrated different styles of 
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calligraphic script, implying that the contestants had some technical knowledge on the 
art form. All the pieces looked beautifully executed to the untrained eye (Figure 3.8). 
Fig. 3.8. Calligraphy section of MI 
 The winners are identified with a picture, their date of birth and the region of 
birth (Figures 3.9 and 3.10). A series of panels showing examples of different 
calligraphic styles and some explanatory text are also available for visitors‟ perusal. 
While this section of the gallery is unadorned, it is the most direct extension of the 
spirit of the Mushaf Istiqlal in creating the image of an art-producing Indonesian 
Muslim nation. It is also the most inclusive approach to fashioning a new “national” 
tradition for Indonesian Muslims. While the Mushaf Istiqlal is, for all purposes, the 
work of a small group of political, intellectual and artistic elites superimposing their 
own imagined Indonesia on the rest of the national population, the calligraphy 
competition, open to all levels of Indonesian society, provided the momentum and 
critical mass for a cultural practice to embed itself into the public imagination.  
  




More importantly, as the element of competition combined with the notion 
that reciting and writing Qur‟anic verses is also a form of remembrance of Allah 
(dhikir Allah) and gains His favour,
224
 it pushes the practice to be continually re-
produced at quality levels. The lasting impression that this and other Islamic-themed 
competitions, such as the nationally popular Qur‟anic recitals (tilāwat Al-Qur‟an) at 
which Indonesian competitors are amongst the world‟s best, leaves, is that all pious 
Indonesian Muslims are continually involved in various  “projects of piety”.225       
 
 
The Contemporary Visual Arts Section 
 
 Arguably, the contemporary visual arts exhibits could be considered the 
highlight of Museum Istiqlal simply because they are situated closer in the present 
and suggest both a reflective and progressive trajectory of Islam in modern Indonesia. 
This strand of “Islamic modernism” sits well with the emerging middle-class 
Indonesian Muslims who want to observe the spiritual tenets and rituals of the faith 
but are more receptive to the practice of ijtihad (interpretation of divine law 
independent of the four established mazhab or Islamic schools of thought) so that 




Many of the temporary exhibitions that the BQMI stages also highlight the 
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dynamism of contemporary Indonesian Islamicate art and showcase the work of 
established painters and sculptors as well as younger emerging designers. The most 
recent temporary exhibition, from 22 April - 9 May 2010, displayed a series of 
commissioned paintings by some of Indonesia‟s most renowned artists in memory of 
the late former President Abdurrahman Wahid (affectionately called Gus Dur), who 
was known for his strong Islamic credentials, and loved because he advocated an 
Islam that accommodated traditional Javanese customs and all the peculiarities of 
being “Indonesian”.227  
  
Fig. 3.11 and Fig. 3.12. Paintings in the Seni Rupa Kontemporer Section of the MI 
 
Along the corridors of the contemporary visual arts section, paintings of 
mythical battles between good and evil (Figure 3.11) vie for attention with abstract art 
and Arabic calligraphy morphed into musical instruments (Figure 3.12). There are 
also sculptures inspired by Islamic themes such as the Eternal Paradise and key 
Qur‟anic verses (Figures 3.13 – 3.16), smartly standing on pedestals like prophecies 
patiently waiting to be realised in the foreseeable future. In fact, the exhibits in the 
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contemporary visual arts section are so accessible to the visitor that those rich enough 
and thus inclined,  could actually purchase the art pieces from the museum, thus 
owning a piece of Indonesian Islamicate art to help in their own private dhikir Allah.  
 
Figs. 3.13-3.16. Model sculptures inspired by various Qur‟anic verses  
 
 
The Architecture Section 
 
The other section of note in the Museum Istiqlal is the architecture section. 
Here, the museum decided on a straightforward approach to interpreting Islamicate 
architecture by focusing on historically significant and architecturally iconic mosques 
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found in the different regions of Indonesia. A total of eleven mosques are featured in 
this section together with a model of the Pusat Studi Islam (Islamic Studies Centre) in 
Yogyakarta and Kampung Naga (Dragon Village), in Tasikmalaya, Western Java.
228
 
While most of the text panels explaining the provenance and architectural significance 
of these mosques are sometimes sketchy, the common threads that run through them 
are firstly, the genius that inspired the use of local natural resources, such as the hardy 
teakwood (kayu jati), ironwood (sirap) and bamboo that grow abundantly in 
Indonesia‟s tropical forests; and secondly, the adaptation of the pre-existing Hindu-
Buddhist architectural tradition to new Islamic contexts.  
 
In the first case, photographs of Masjid Bayan (Figures  3.17 and 3.18), 
believed to have been built in the sixteenth century, show a distinctly indigenous 
building with a double-tiered pitched roof made of ironwood and low bamboo walls. 
The layout of the floor of the mosque is a simple four-columned space following the 
style of buildings in Joglo Jawa. The size and shape of the roof or tajug follows the 
Balinese-style of architecture. A beduk or prayer drum hangs in the corner of the main 
building “just like in Javanese mosques”. The mosque has only one door similar to the 
style of a Sasak traditional house, and the mihrab which indicates the direction of the 
qiblah for prayer, is a low wooden wall embellished with the likeness of a bird – an 
ornamental style symbolising prosperity.
229
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Fig. 3.17 and Fig. 3.18. Text panels showing deteriorating prints of Masjid Bayan 
 
The text panel accompanying the photographs of Masjid Bayan claims that its 
architecture is “a blend of Islam and Hindusim, and Java and Bali”. The fact that the 
syncretic features of the mosque are highlighted, reveals the preference of the BQMI‟s 
curators for the “traditionalist Islam” that is associated with Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) 
and popular with abangan Muslims. No longer used for communal prayer, the 
mosque is considered a local shrine and has been marked for conservation.  
 
That the Bayan Mosque has transformed from its original function as a place 
to worship Allah into a shrine worthy of its own devotees, is something quite unique 
to the Indonesian practice of Islam. Such veneration for a place draws from a blend of 
Sufistic elements that “Allah is everywhere and in everything” and indigenous animist 
beliefs of the inherent energies that emanate from “a sacred place”. This is yet another 
example of the “mystic synthesis” that Ricklefs attributed to the life-world of 
Javanese society prior to the mid-19
th
 Century. That the shrine is represented is a nod 
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to a popular cultural practice performed by a significant proportion of Indonesian 
Muslims. However, since the mid-19th Century Islamic reformation movement, the 
practice of shrine veneration has become a highly-contested issue between 
traditionalist and modernist Islamist groups.   
 
In a similar way, other ancient mosques symbolise the deep-rooted presence of 
Islam in Indonesian society and how the religion itself adapted to local conditions and 
its older histories and cultures. Masjid Agung Demak (est. 1506, Figure 3.19), 
considered to be the oldest mosque in Java,
230
 clearly features the tiered roof suited to 
tropical conditions which had existed prior to the arrival of Islam. However, each tier 
of the sirap-thatched roof took on new Islamic meanings – “Islam”, “Iman” (Faith) 
and “Ikhsan” (sic) (Ar. Ihsan, i.e. Perfection or Excellence). To further imbue the pre-
Islamic architecture with new meanings, according to local legend, the mosque was 
built in just one night, by the Wali Songo Muslim mystics credited with spreading 
Islam across the then-Hindu kingdoms.
231
 That the seven-tiered roof of Masjid Sultan 
Ternate (est. 1606, Figure 3.20) symbolized the seven levels of Syurga ,
232
 shows how 
this Sanskrit word for Heaven was still in popular usage despite the introduction of 
the Arabic “Al-Jannah”.  
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 Fig.3.19-3.20 (L-R). Model of Masjid Agung Demak and Prints of Masid Sultan Ternate 
 
Fig. 3.21. Prints of the Masjid Agung Yogyakarta  
 
Masjid Agung Yogyakarta (Figure 3.21) was built to the west of the northern 
wall alongside the former Hindu kraton Ngayogyakarta in Hadiningrat as an 
affirmation of the establishment of the new Islamic kingdom.
233
 However, the 
message that the curatorial team is conveying is that despite the adoption of the new 
monotheistic religion by the royal family, the kraton was not destroyed, ostensibly 
because the ruler had decided that the two religions could co-exist in a syncretic 
manner in the same way that Buddhism, Hinduism and animist practices had for 
generations before. Similarly, it implied that the Islam that is practiced in 
contemporary Indonesia was accommodating of traditional practices and co-existed in 
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harmony with other religions. In effect however, such a placid narrative of Islam‟s 
development in Indonesia glosses over the historical contestations since the late 19th 
Century, between the traditionalist, NU-based Muslims and the strident calls by the 
reformist Muslims who want stricter adherence to Islamic practices based on 
Scripture. In the museums, the tensions between traditionalist and more conservative 
modernist interpretations of Islamic practices are dissolved into a narrative of a 
continuity of Islamicate traditions.   
 
Thirdly, Museum Istiqlal‟s narrative highlight innovations that sea trade and 
the flow of foreigners brought to the Archipelago since the thirteenth century, 
including the impact of formal Dutch colonialism from the 19th century. Specifically, 
the “onion-shaped” dome of West Asian and Persian origins that featured in 
indigenous mosques, such as Masjid Kesultanan Riau on Pulau Panyengat (est. 1832), 
Tanjung Pinang with its thirteen domes (Figure 3.22), Masjid Baiturrahman, Aceh 
(est., 1614, rebuilt 1877) and Masjid Al-Mashun in Medan (est. 1906), were 
introduced by Dutch architects during the reconstruction phase after their military 
conquests of various provinces (Figures 3.23 and 3.24).
234
 The narrative here shows 
Islamicate architecture to be dynamic and open to a multitude of external cultural 
influences which could be harmonized in one structure. Such innovations were 
supposed to reflect the dynamism of Islamicate culture as well.  
 
While these iconic mosques across Indonesia support the narrative of a 
creatively expressed yet unified experience of Muslim worship, what goes 
unmentioned however, are the anti-Islamic tracts that had also emerged in the same 
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period in response to the imposition of narrower religious identity of orthodox 
Muslims. Among the most recognizable texts was the Babad Kêdhiri (The Chronicle 
of Kêdhiri) which asserted that Java was compelled to convert to Islam when Sultan 
Agung of Demak, the son of Majapahit king, Brawijaya, betrayed his father by 
attacking his kingdom and forced Brawijaya into exile when he refused to convert to 
Islam.
235
 Hence the history of how Islam was once a threat to Javanese identity and 
cultural heritage (especially among the nobility) is left untold.  
 
 
Fig. 3.22-3.24 (L-R). Prints of Masjid Panyengat, Masjid Baiturrahman and Masjid Al-Mashun 
 
The “modern” mosques such as Masjid Syuhadah Yogyakarta (est. 1952) and 
Masjid Istiqlal (est. 1978, Figure. 3.25) – deemed the biggest mosque in Southeast 
Asia, and which took twenty-three years to complete – are purportedly part of a 
continuous indigenous enterprise of architectural innovations that are sensitive to their 
environments and are objectified expressions of Indonesian maturing nationhood. 
Indeed, in the early months of 1998, 999 mosques dubbed “Masjid Yayasan 
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According to the accompanying text panel, each of these “national mosques” 
would follow the exact same architectural blueprint. While its three-tiered roof 
represents the Islamic tenets of “Islam, Iman and Ikhsan” (sic), a hexagon-shaped 
symbol at the apex of the roof embodies the commitment of all Indonesian Muslims to 
the state‟s Pancasila ideology (“pencerminan dari Muslim Indonesia yang berjiwa 
Pancasila”).237 These standardised YAMP mosques with their cookie-cutter 
architectural features, – even more so than the mushafs from the different regions of 




Fig. 3.25 (L). Model of Masjid Istiqlal (est 1978) and Fig. 3.26 (R). Model of YAMP mosque 
 
Arguably, the YAMP mosques have even reached beyond traditional 
Islamicate symbolism and used national, secular symbols in establishing a new 
Islamicate architectural tradition. Through the reproduction of each YAMP mosque 
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with the image of the Pancasila at the apex of the structure where traditionally a 
crescent moon and star would stand, the mosques have subsumed Islam under its 
nationalist agenda. By incorporating Islam into the first principle (sila) of the state‟s 
five-point ideology, the YAMP mosques become the most overt symbols of 
Indonesian patriotism.  This peculiarity proves that Suharto was still jealously 
guarding the primacy of the Pancasila as the guiding principle of Indonesian society, 
notwithstanding his accommodation of Islamist groups and his „reconciliation‟ with 





Despite the slow decline of the BQMI over the years,
238
 on the whole, the 
collection of objects in the BQMI is focussed towards rendering the past, present and 
future of Indonesia into very tangible and familiar things that, in some cases, could 
even be owned by Indonesians. Just like the cultural dances and other performance 
arts that were staged during Festival Istiqlal I and II, the various objects ranging from 
benda pusaka donated by many Indonesian families, the contemporary art pieces 
created by both established and budding Indonesian artists, to the stoic mosques 
which have witnessed the ebb and tide of their region‟s history, continue to perform 
their roles in narrating the story of Indonesia‟s nationhood.  
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In that regard, Suharto‟s attempts in the 1990s, to reroute Islamist political 
opposition towards the state by creating and celebrating national cultural expressions 
of Islam was a success, albeit a short-lived one. The Mushaf Al-Quran Istiqlal, the 
exhibits and cultural performances at Festival Istiqlal I and II, and the BQMI 
collection are examples of religious expressions directed towards realising a 
nationalist vision. In Indonesia‟s case, it could even be argued that the national 
cultural rhetoric is quite sophisticated: not only is Indonesia Islamic, because Islam 
has been internalized as part of the paramount tenet of the state‟s Pancasila ideology, 
but Islam is Indonesia
239
 by virtue of Indonesian Muslims forming the world‟s largest 
Muslim population who are collectively making contributions in defining a global 
Islamicate culture.  
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Defining the Treasures of Islamicate Art: A Study of the IAMM 
 
 
The opening of the IAMM in January 1999 to great fanfare marked the birth of 
the first public institution in Southeast Asia that dealt exclusively with “Islamic art”. 
The motivation behind the IAMM was to signal Malaysia‟s achievement as an 
economically successful, technologically-advanced and modern nation-state that still 
had “Islamic values” as its guiding principle. It now had the economic resources and 
relative social stability of a developed economy to spend on major “cultural” projects. 
By the late 1980s, Malaysia also had a critical mass of middle-class Muslim citizens 
who desired the material and social emblems of capitalist society at the same time 
they were becoming more overtly pious. Thus at the urging of then Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamed, the IAMM was established with private funding from the 
Albukhary Foundation.   
 
In 2009, in conjunction with its tenth anniversary and the selection of Kuala 
Lumpur as an Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO) 
Capital City of Islamic Culture, the IAMM launched a celebratory exhibition titled “A 
Decade of Dedication at the Islamic Arts Museum Malaysia” along with a lavish 
commemorative book about the museum and its collection as “a lasting testimonial to 
the IAMM‟s role” in introducing visitors to “the countless wonders of Islamic art”.240 
Nonetheless, despite the accolades, the museum reveals a complex set of issues 
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regarding the place of Islam in Malaysian public space as well as its influence on the 
nation-building campaign. This chapter discusses the background to the IAMM‟s 
establishment as well as the mission of the museum.  
 
 
The Establishment, Vision and Mission of the IAMM 
 
The idea for the IAMM emerged from a meeting between the future director of 
the IAMM and then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed during which the latter 
“shared...his vision of establishing a museum of international standards that would 
achieve worldwide recognition”. Mahathir also expressed a belief that “the Malaysian 
private sector should be more proactive in the development of such a museum with 
full support coming from the Malaysian government”. The Albukhary Foundation 
“without hesitation” undertook the responsibility of building and developing the 
museum for the government as “a gift to the Malaysian people and as a legacy to 
future generations”.241 
 
 Fig 4.1. Aerial view of IAMM building 
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The mission of the IAMM as described by its manager and chairman of the 
Albukhary Foundation, Tan Sri Syed Mokhtar Albukhary, is “to collect, preserve, 
display and educate others on Islamic art and civilisation”.242 To that extent, the 
director of the IAMM, Syed Mohamad AlBukhary, embarked on a series of study 
visits that spanned North America, Europe and the Middle East to meet with museum 
professionals and study museum structures and management systems of renowned 
museums, including the Guggenheim Museum and the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
in the USA, the British Museum in London and the Louvre and the Institut du Monde 




The result of that international search for an architecture befitting the treasures 
of the IAMM was a building that is very much based on “modern architectural 
principles” and finished with details in a range of Islamicate styles rather than 
replicating a site that is closely associated with the religion.
244
 Thus, despite its 
religious-themed contents, the architecture of the building is executed in such a 
manner as to convey a “secular” building rather than “an institution of religious 
dogma”.245  
 
According to the IAMM souvenir book, the great front portal or iwan through 
which visitors walk enter the museum lobby, is associated with the mihrab of a 
mosque. It has been recreated in abstract form such that, 
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a quietly restrained facade for a building devoted to the 
preservation of Islamic art and culture that is inextricably bound 
to religion, yet is preserved and presented in an ultimately 
aesthetic approach that reinforces the museum‟s position as a 




 Fig 4.2. Frontal view of IAMM iwan 
 
By the welding together of a contemporary building with distinct styles from 
different Islamicate periods, the artistic aspects of Islamicate culture are highlighted 
rather than its religious associations.   Significantly, the IAMM does not use 
architectural features that would overtly showcase a “Malay” aesthetic as is the case 
with the national museum in Kuala Lumpur, the Muzium Negara, which was built in 
the 1960s with a different approach to visual culture to reflect its purpose.  
 
The deliberate decision to downplay local style in favour of architectural 
features that were still easily recognizable by a wider audience as “Islamic”, 
underscores the museum‟s mission of being “international” institution of art rather 
than a “local” museum with a more parochial approach. In the case of the IAMM, 
only the main dome of the museum (fashioned after the dome of the Lutfallah Mosque 
in Isfahan) incorporates the image of small sprays of hibiscus, Malaysia‟s national 
flower into the typical Persian Khati motif of intricate coils repeated all over the 
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turquoise coloured dome to “reinforce the identity of the IAMM as a Malaysian 
institution”.247  
 Fig. 4.3. Main dome of IAMM 
 
Despite its claims to creating a secular art museum, there are several 
architectural strategies that the IAMM employs to evoke the sense that the museum is 
also a sacred space that houses art pertaining to Islamicate “culture” with all its 
religious associations. The first is the inscription of Qur‟anic verses on the rims of 
domes of the building, including the main one which is inscribed with verse 35 from 
the Surah An-Nur (Chapter 24) inscribed in white Thuluth script which reads:   
 
Allah is the light of the heavens and the earth. The similitude of 
His light is as if it were a niche wherein is a luminary, the 
luminary within a crystal; the crystal as if it were a planet 
glittering like a pearl, lit from a blessed olive tree, neither of the 
East nor of the West, whose oil is almost luminous, though no 
fire touched it. Light upon light; Allah guides to His light whom 
he pleases. Allah sets similitude for people, and Allah is all-




Hence, the IAMM positions itself as a repository that showcases the 
magnificence of art forms inspired by the worship of Allah. In turn, the IAMM also 
attains a level of magnificence and perhaps to a lesser degree, a sense of sacredness as 
                                                          
247
 Ibid., p. 41. 
248
 Ibid., p. 41. See Figure 4.3. 
131 
 
a preserver of Islam‟s material heritage. The fountained gardens that surround the 
IAMM are reminiscent of “the courtyards of Islamic palaces and imperial grounds”.249 
As one walks across the immaculately-kept grounds, the well-appointed open 
galleries, as well as the intimate Middle Eastern-Mediterranean themed restaurant 
located in the lowest sub-level of the IAMM, one is enveloped in a multi-sensorial 
“museum experience”. The visitor‟s eyes have been sensitised to the beauty of the 
“Islamic aesthetic”, his ears to the melodic strains of Qur‟anic recitals and his 





The Architecture Gallery 
 
The first gallery the visitor sees when he or she steps out of the elevator is the 
Architecture Gallery. Nineteen scaled miniature models of mosques “significant to 
Islamic history” are displayed around a life-sized architectural feature from a 
Mamluk-period fountain while detailed information panels on the basic features of 
Islamicate architecture and regional styles adorn the walls. The miniature models of 
the Masjid-il Harram in Makkah where the Ka‟bah is situated, the “First” Mosque in 
Quba‟, Prophet Muhammad‟s Mosque in Madinah (all three in Saudi Arabia) as well 
as Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem are explained by their labels as historically and 
spiritually significant to Muslims.  
 
Subsequent additions and alterations to the original structures over the years 
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are explained in terms of technological innovations to preserve existing material while 
enhancing the experience of worship within their compounds.  The Ibnu Tulun 
Mosque in Cairo, Egypt, the Great Umayyad Mosque in Syria, the Selimiye Mosque 
in Turkey, the Bak Shahir Mosque in Pakistan and several lesser known Central Asian 
mosques are displayed as regional examples of Islamicate architecture whose share 
basic fundamental structures in their prayer halls but which decorative features 
reflected local tastes which were not in conflict with Islam.  
 
A miniature model of the Tang Dynasty Mosque in Xian, China, built in 648 
AD, is also exhibited to show the diversity of Islamic “practice”, demonstrating how 
many traditional Chinese elements are retained in the mosque‟s architecture such that, 
other than the Arabic script of “Allah”, “Muhammad” and selected Qur‟anic verses, it 
looked like any other Chinese temple in China. The manner in which the gallery is 
curated focuses on the technicalities of structure and decorative features of the 
mosque rather than the builders who built them and the diverse communities of 
Muslims who worship in these monuments. 
 
Curiously, three Southeast Asian miniature models of mosques in Malaysia 
and Southern Thailand are displayed apart from the other miniatures. Standing in a 
row in a corridor that links the Architectural Gallery to the Qur‟ans and Manuscripts 
Gallery, the Kampung Laut Mosque in Kelantan, the Tengkera Mosque in Melaka and 
the Wadi Hussein Mosque in Pattani, Thailand, are preserved as Southeast Asian 
examples of Islamicate architecture. The tropical building materials used for the 
respective mosques are highlighted along with their highly-sloped roofs to counter the 
heavy tropical rainfall.  
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The senior curator who guided my group also mentioned that following extant 
indigenous practice, the entire structure of the Kampung Laut Mosque could be 
moved and that it had been relocated from an earlier site nearer to the sea. She also 
informed the group that the Tengkera Mosque, built in Melaka in 1728, had been 
declared a UNESCO World Heritage site.
251
 The architecture of the Wadi Hussein in 
Pattani, built in 1621, hints at (though never addresses) the historical links that the 
Malay sultanate had with ancient Siam and Pattani Muslims before the British 
territorial arrangement that removed the area from Malay sphere of influence.    
 
Fig. 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. Models of  Masjid Kampung Laut, Kelantan, Masjid Tengkera, Melaka and Wadi 
Hussin Mosque, Pattani (Thailand). 
 
The thrust of the gallery‟s narrative was that there is great diversity in 
Islamicate material culture and architecture rather than the Islamicate societies who 
built them. The accompanying text panels on the walls of the Architectural Gallery 
also emphasises the differences in regional architecture and demonstrate that Islam 
was accommodative of local cultural influences. Interestingly, a miniature model of 
the Masjid Agung Demak in central Java, Indonesia, considered as the oldest example 
of indigenous Islamicate architecture in Southeast Asia, reputedly built in 1401 
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  is not displayed. No satisfactory answer was given for this omission, 
especially given that the Demak Sultanate was the oldest Muslim kingdom in 
Southeast Asia.  
 
Thus, it opens the suggestion that the IAMM‟s main priority is to focus the 
limelight on distinctly Malay Peninsula examples of Islamicate art and architecture 
rather than share it with the more complex forms found on the Indonesian 
archipelago, whose Islamicate material culture  has had  a longer history of interaction 
and adaptation of earlier Hindu-Buddhist traditions. The Masjid Agung Demak has 
been on UNESCO‟s World Heritage Tentative List since 1995 and its omission also 
suggests an unspoken rivalry between Malaysia and Indonesia as both a producer of 
Islamic knowledge as well as the guardians of the region‟s indigenous Islamicate 
heritage.  
 
 In a recessed corner at the back of the gallery, stands a recreated prayer hall 
cast in soft low lights. Through the spaces created by the geometric patterns on a 
wooden mashrabayya screen, the visitor‟s eye is drawn in by the details in the richly-
carpeted room. His eye is directed to a wooden rekhal (Qur‟an bookstand) in front of 
a mihrab which stands for the qiblah in the direction of Makkah. On an adjacent wall, 
one can see an image of a minbar (a raised platform from where a sermon in a mosque 
is delivered) while a replica of the minbar from the Jame‟ Mosque in Isfahan stands 
tall in the left-hand corner outside the prayer hall.  
 
                                                          
252
 According to the accompanying label of the replica of the Masjid Agung Demak in the Istiqlal 
Museum, popular legend has it that the mosque was built by the mythical Wali Songo (a band of nine 
religious mystics credited with spreading Islam across the Indonesian archipelago) in one night. 
135 
 
The installation effectively “expands the ethnographic object” by broadening 
its boundaries to include more of its original context, albeit with a high degree of 
staging involved. 
253
  However, while the architectural beauty of the prayer hall is 
highlighted for contemplation and appreciation, this staged environment, 
accompanied by soft strains of a recorded recitation of Qur‟anic verses, produces a 
hyper-real effect that can either engage the visitor further or distance him or her.
254
  
 Fig. 4.7. Recreated prayer hall 
 
With respect to imparting knowledge about Islamicate architecture and the 
significance mosques in Muslim life, it appears that most of the exhibits in this gallery 
are targeted towards visitors who are unfamiliar with Islamicate architecture. The 
recreated prayer hall allows non-Muslims a glimpse into the heart of a mosque since 
convention in Malaysia does not encourage non-Muslims to enter areas of prayer.  
 
Nonetheless, by highlighting the physical beauty and architectural innovations 
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 Jan N. Pieterse, Ethnicities and Global Multiculture: Pants for an Octopus, (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers), 2007, pp. 132-153. See Fig. 4.7. 
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of significant mosques around the world, the IAMM downplays the specific religious 
function of mosques and focuses instead on presumably universal artistic qualities of 
the buildings. Hence, it is implied that even a non-Muslim visitor would be able to 
appreciate the beauty of Islamicate architectural styles since they are predicated on 
universal laws of architectural science and reflected the local environments in which 
they were built. Unfortunately, there is little sense of the histories and considerations 
of the communities that built and lived among these imposing structures.  
 
 
The Qur‟ans and Manuscripts Gallery 
 
The Qur‟an and Manuscripts gallery houses displays of beautifully illuminated 
Qur‟ans, produced in different centuries by skilled illuminators in various palaces 
around the world for respective royal families. These handcrafted illuminated Qur‟ans 
from China, Iran, Ottoman Turkey, Mughal India and the Malay Archipelago were 
presented as souvenirs to foreign dignitaries. The Qur‟ans also show to visitors that 
the content as well as the arrangement of the Surahs (chapters) in the Qur‟an were 
exactly the same regardless of where it was produced. The variations are in the style 
of the illuminations, which were influenced by regional tastes and decorative 
traditions.  
 
To reinforce the primacy of the Qur‟an in Islamic practice, a huge piece of an 
original door panel of the richly embroidered heavy velvet cloth covering the Ka‟bah, 
donated by the Saudi royalty to the Malaysian government in 1964, stands 
prominently against one wall. The accompanying text explains that the verses 
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embroidered in heavy gold thread onto the velvet were exactly the same as the ones 
written in the Qur‟an.  
 
One can see clearly here that only well-preserved vellum manuscripts and 
pristine copies of finely-illuminated Qur‟ans are displayed (Fig. 4.8 and 4.9). There 
are also few examples of Southeast Asian-Islamicate manuscripts. The IAMM‟s head 
curator himself had remarked that Malay copies of the Qur‟an were “among the least 
appreciated of Southeast Asian contributions to Islamic art” because they were plainer 
to the eye and neither withstood the test of time nor the region‟s humid climates due 
to the use of iron-gall ink which ate through paper.
255
 Hence, the choice of displaying 
only mint well-crafted objects highlights the IAMM‟s focus on only the “beautiful” in 
Islamicate art, even when it sometimes undermines its other mission to promote the 
Islamicate arts of Southeast Asia. 
 
Fig. 4.8. Kufic script on vellum, North Africa, 9-10
th
 Century 
Fig. 4.9. Ink on vellum, Andalusia, Spain, early 13
th
 Century  
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There is also a selection of displayed manuscripts containing “secular 
subjects” such as the sciences (e.g. astronomy and botany), history and official palace 
documents and royal genealogies of Mughal and Ottoman royalty. According to a 
senior curator, the inclusion of such manuscripts, genealogies and official documents 
is intended “to show visitors, especially non-Muslims, that Arabic script was also 
used in secular contexts”. In this instance, the curator revealed the museum‟s 
awareness of a non-Muslim audience and the inclusion of these objects were a 
conscious effort to disabuse visitors, both Muslims and non-Muslims, of preconceived 
notions of Islam and to “enlighten” them about the diversity of Islamicate civilization 
and the significance of Arabic script as a medium of learning.  
 
Thus, what the IAMM hoped to impart to the visitor is that the language of the 
Qur‟an is neither a “dead” language nor exclusive to a clerical elite or religious 
ceremonies, but also a “living” language used in secular public life. However, despite 
the diversity of objects that is displayed, the collection in the IAMM is less 
ethnographic and more about exquisite craftsmanship. Hence it only represents a 
specific (and by and large, elite) section of Islamicate material production. 
 
Befitting the Islamicate convention that considers calligraphy to be the highest 
form of art, the gallery displays an extensive array of calligraphic objects. There is a 
wall panel detailing the different styles of Arabic script that are used in classical 
Arabic calligraphy. The IAMM logo itself is in Arabic and written in the clean, 




Fig. 4.10. IAMM logo in Kufic script 
 
The museum also holds calligraphy workshops for beginners and amateurs and 
they are quite popular with foreign visitors. The calligraphy workshops are a 
permanent feature in a suite of Islam-related programming geared to visitors and 
enthusiasts. Educational programmes are also catered for children with a Children‟s 
Library and art education workshop on the premises. In late 2010, in conjunction with 
the Islamic month of Ramadhan, during which Muslims fast from dawn till sunset, the 
IAMM (in collaboration with TV9) organised the Tadarus Al-Qur‟an where 
participants recite Qur‟anic verses for two hours daily on museum premises. 2010 is 
the fifth Al-Qur‟an recitation organized by the IAMM since the first such event was 
held back in 2005.
256
 The event is yet another project of piety meant to shape a 
cultural norm of Malaysian society. 
 
These museum activities are part of the IAMM‟s strategy to engage visitors 
not only while they are in the galleries but even after the initial museum visit. Part 
education, part entertainment and always geared towards sensitising the visitor to 
Islamic principles in art, philosophy and quotidian life, the IAMM‟s varied activities, 
programmes and library facilities (which include a Scholar‟s Library for professional 
research), seek to establish the museum as a prominent producer of knowledge on 
Islam and Islamicate civilisation, perhaps even an artistic and cultural counterpart to  
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the Malaysian Islamic Development Department (JAKIM),  the Malaysian Institute of 
Islamic Understanding (IKIM) or even the National Fatwa Council, which has the 
authority to rule on how Malaysian Muslims conduct their faith.  
 
However, the fervour of the student dakwah movement in the 1980s that had 
called for a greater Islamization and the “purification” of Malay-Muslim culture of its 
Hindu-Buddhist and folk superstition elements, never quite affected the organization 
of the IAMM. Despite the majority of its curatorial team being UM graduates in either 
Islamic or Malay studies, Art History and are also literate in Arabic, the orientation of 
the AIMM is no different from any respectable art museum found in the West. The 
head curator is a Londoner who made Malaysia his home in the 1990s. Lucien de 
Guise has an academic background in Islamic studies and has actively pushed for the 




Little is known about the IAMM‟s benefactor Tan Sri Syed Mokhtar 
Albukhary other than that he is a committed businessman-philanthropist and well-
regarded by Mahathir himself. The Albukhary Foundation has an international 
presence and is famous for being a generous donor towards social welfare initiatives 
as well as awarding scholarships to advance the education of disadvantaged Muslims. 
Founded in 1996, the Albukhary Foundation has underwritten a multitude of 
scholarships, bursaries and supported both social welfare and intellectual initiatives 
for a greater understanding of Islam. In January 2011, classes opened at its fully-
funded charitable university, the Albukhary International University. The 
Foundation‟s vision of forging “a more equitable and tolerant world through social 
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welfare, education and cultural initiatives that bridge tha gap between the haves and 
the have-nots, and between Muslims and non-Muslim worlds” are realized through its 
philanthropy, the Pusat Ilmu Sharifah Rokiah (Sharifah Rokiah Centre for 





The India, China and Malay World Galleries   
 
With regard to these three galleries, the IAMM has organised them in such a 
way as to draw attention to the spread of Islam across the globe. The chronological 
narrative begins with an “early Islamic period” on the Arabian Peninsula (c. 632 
A.D.) and spans a medieval period that saw the establishment of Persian and Central 
Asian dynasties, which had intense interactions with Europe. The narrative ends with 
a “late Islamic period” when Islam arrived in China and Southeast Asia around the 
eleventh to twelfth century.
259
 The myriad artefacts on display in these three major 
galleries of the IAMM focus on the artistic developments of each cultural group 
which has been inspired by Islam.  
 
Similar to the BQMI, the IAMM‟s curatorial approach emphasises how 
Islamicate aesthetics and religious principles interacted and merged with earlier 
artistic traditions and indigenous cultures in each region to produce local “Islamized” 
art. However, to a larger extent than the BQMI, the IAMM exhibits Islam in such a 
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way that the aesthetic appeal of craftsmanship of each artefact is highlighted over its 
functional contexts. Three geographically-organised main galleries (the other nine 
galleries follow a typological theme) reiterate the notion of the craftsmanship of these 
artefacts as Islam spread outwards from the Arabian Peninsula and was adopted by 
ethnically and culturally diverse entities including those in Central Asia, India, China 
and Southeast Asia.  
 
The India Gallery features ornate metalwork from the Mughal period and other 
fine objects and jewellery that would have been used in palaces or found in the homes 
of wealthy, prominent Muslims rather than objects used by commoners. Royal 
genealogies written in Urdu revealing royal lineages that often traced their ancestries 
back to great religious personalities are also found in this gallery. The strong 
historical links between China and the Middle East are highlighted by the exhibits in 
the China Gallery. Displays of fine china represent the thriving trade along the Silk 
Road route. The cross-cultural decorative styles of the porcelain objects suggest that 
the wares were produced for both a Chinese and Iranian market.  
 
A 17th Century Chinese-produced Qur‟an, bound as thirty separate books, 
each containing one section or „juz‟ of the Qur‟an serves as an example of the Chinese 
style of Arabic script called „Sini‟.260 Nonetheless, the overall curatorial approach to 
this gallery does not stray from conventions of displaying objects on this subject. All 
Qur‟ans and manuscripts are described as „completed works‟ and the focus is on the 
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perfected object rather than the history or process of putting the mushaf Al-Qur‟an 
together.   
 
  
Fig. 4.11. Al-Qur‟an, China, 17th Century; IAMM‟s first acquisition. 
 
The IAMM had in mind a larger Asian audience in its curation of the China 
Gallery. Mandarin-speaking volunteer docents guide Chinese visitors from China and 
Taiwan.  Chinese Premier Hu Jintao and his entourage visited the IAMM in 
December 2009 and were very impressed by the fact that the museum had obtained a 
complete set of the Sini script -Quran and that it was in such good condition.
261
 An 
extended display case of Arabic calligraphy exhibits showcased the different styles of 
Islamic calligraphic art from across the world. One could see (and the explanatory 
panels stress) that Islamicate art in this category is defined by its Islamic 
content/subject/themes as the artefacts from China retained Chinese calligraphic and 
aesthetic styles. Chinese symbolic images such as the lotus, pomegranate and peach 
are commonly used in Chinese Muslim calligraphic art.   
 
At the same time, the IAMM consciously promotes the material culture of the 
Malay world as “Islamic”, by showing the impact that the religion has had on the 
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artistic production in the Malay Archipelago in particular and island Southeast Asia in 
general. The focus of the Malay World gallery is the keris display as well as the 
myriad textiles from the region. The different types of keris, all marked by exquisite 
craftsmanship, holds pride of place in the Malay Gallery as a potent talisman and oft-
used symbol of royalty, male virility and most importantly Malay political supremacy 
vis-à-vis other ethnic groups on the peninsula.  
 
Interestingly, the pre-Islamic origins of the keris are not mentioned at all and 
the IAMM has carefully sanitized any elements that might offend contemporary 
Malaysian Islamic practice, which still tends towards conservative interpretations of 
Islam. The mystical elements traditionally associated with the keris and other types of 
talismanic objects have been downplayed and in most cases, erased from the object‟s 
provenance. In contrast, wall-to-wall glass cases display series of elaborate songket, 
batik and lima used for various life occasions such as royal coronations, marriage and 
death, showing the importance of textiles in the Malay-Muslim societies. Some 
examples of Southeast Asian fine woodwork and metalwork are displayed as well 
(Fig. 4.12).  





While it might be coincidental, it could be argued that the Malay-Islamicate art 
displayed in the IAMM celebrates the majesty and opulence of the Malay sultanates 
through objects of state regalia. Royal seals, keris and gold and silver coins minted in 
the reigning Sultan‟s name are prominently displayed alongside finely-wrought royal 
silverware, admired for their aesthetic beauty as well as their intrinsic value. A 
chronology of the Malay World Sultanates spanning the Perlak Sultanate in Sumatra 
(which ended in 1292 C.E.) to the current Johor Sultanate established in 1540 C.E., is 
also detailed on a wall of the gallery.  
 
One does not find any commoner‟s earthenware or trinkets in the galleries of 
the IAMM. Each artefact displayed has been designed to elicit a sense of awe, 
aesthetic appreciation, even meditative contemplation, rather than a mere 
ethnographic panorama. Further in the gallery, a sizeable map on a wall depicting the 
directions of the monsoon winds illustrate to visitors how traders travelled on sea 
routes and monsoon winds that linked China, India and southern Arabia to the Malay 
Archipelago, and hence part of an extended Islamdom. Again, if the intent is to show 
an ethnographic range of Islamicate material culture, it is at best only of the finest and 
most ceremonial value, thereby limiting the view that visitors have of Islamicate 
material cultural production. 
 
In the separation of the galleries by region, it can be argued that the 
particularities of each artefact are better maintained for the most part. The grouping of 
the artefacts according to their specific region also allows the visitor to view the 
similarities of styles or themes within a particular cultural landscape. Hence the visitor 
becomes sensitised to specific archetypes and styles specific to each region and 
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historical or dynastic period. Since the three galleries seem to have taken into account 
both the absolute and relative times of the displayed objects, it could be argued that 
the visual splendour of Islam has literally been “provincialized” because the particular 
aesthetic of Mughal India, Qing China and Malay Southeast Asia are kept spatially 
separate despite Islam being the common thread inspiring each object.  
 
This approach effectively expands the conventional geographical boundaries 
of “Islamic art” and material culture to include regions and Muslim societies 
considered to be at the peripheries of the Islamic world. The inclusion of Chinese and 
Southeast Asian material culture and art inspired by Islam can be seen as the 
reclamation of these regions‟ material and artistic productions from the margins of the 
Darul Islam.  By creating a gallery dedicated solely to the material culture of the 
“Malay World” and demonstrating historical links between the Malay archipelago and 
larger Southeast Asia to older Sino-Muslim and Indo-Muslim societies, the curators of 
the IAMM are attempting to include the Malay and Javanese kingdoms from at least 
the twelfth century onwards, in an epic narrative of a splendid Islamicate 
“civilisation”.262 In this regard, Islamicate art is inclusive and Malay art is “an aspect 
of Islam‟s international heritage” – in some sense “other than and in addition to 
Islamic art”.263   
 
The IAMM positions itself as a repository of material culture that augments 
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the magnificence of art that has been inspired by the worship of Allah. Given the 
professional research and world-class conservation facilities that it houses, the IAMM 
has positioned itself to be an international training and educational institute for the 
preservation of Islam‟s material and cultural heritage.264  
 
One of the questions to be raised here is the extent to which this chronology of 
Islamicate art is intended to be understood as an uninterrupted development of an 
“Islamic aesthetic” across time and space in spite of pre-existing Christian (in 
Byzantine Near East and Spain), Hindu, Buddhist influences and local folk-beliefs (in 
China and Southeast Asia) which were present in these regions. The keris especially, 
despite it being the most powerful symbol of authority and mystical power in the 
Malay world, has Hindu-Buddhist origins, and the keris‟ hilt was usually carved to 
represent the deities from the Hindu pantheon. That the keris gradually lost most of its 
anthropomorphic designs in favour of more abstract iconoclastic representations, 
reveals how an Islamic aesthetic was strongly shaping the material culture of the 




However, the IAMM‟s ambivalent treatment of more mystical examples of 
Islamic artefacts appear to reflect Malaysia‟s religious and political elites‟ preference 
for a more orthodox representation of Islam and Islamicate civilisation. In this case, 
the complexities of the object‟s history and symbolic meanings are simply excluded 
from representation. 
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Of great significance is how the IAMM‟s curatorial approach has expanded 
the conventional geographical boundaries where “Islamic art” is produced to include 
regions and Muslim societies at the peripheries of the Islamic world. The inclusion of 
Chinese and Southeast Asian material culture and art inspired by Islam can be 
considered as a genuine attempt to present these regions as equally authentic 
producers of Islamicate art and material culture as the Arabian heartlands (See Fig. 
4.13).  Similarly, the IAMM consciously promotes the material culture of the Malay 
world as Islamic, by showing the impact that the religion has on the artistic 
production in the Malay Archipelago in particular and island Southeast Asia in 
general.  
Fig. 4.13. (L-R) Display of bottles from Wanli China,  
Mughal India and Seljuk Iran  
 
Another question that the IAMM collection raises is that it appears to privilege 
the definition of Islamicate art as a body of work that is produced by Muslims 
globally with the specific aim of venerating Allah. IAMM‟s emphasis on art that is 
produced by Muslims is peculiar, given the existing contentions that suggest both 
broader interpretations of the art in terms of its form and content, and narrower 
definitions in terms of the types and period in which Islamicate art was produced..  
 
It also becomes problematic when one considers the tenuous links objects such 
149 
 
as jewellery and finely-wrought silverware have to do with dhikir Allah. De Guise 
counters this dilemma by arguing that unlike Christian, Buddhist and Hindu art which 
are rich in religious iconography, Islam has “few objects that are specifically 
religious”. Hence there is room for more objects to take on a spiritual dimension 
because Islam does not make sharp distinctions between the sacred and secular.
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The Islamicate Jewellery, Textiles, Arms and Armoury and  
“Lifestyles” Galleries   
 
These four galleries are situated on the third level of the IAMM. The 
Islamicate Jewellery Gallery displays the elaborate and magnificent jewellery from 
different Islamicate societies, the Textiles Gallery showcases the myriad textiles 
produced in Central Asia, India and Iran. The cross-cultural pollination of techniques 
and prints is clearly seen on the textiles and would have risen from trading activities 
and meeting market demands for the latest fashion.
267
 The Arms and Armoury 
Gallery, as the name suggests, details the evolution of weaponry technology through a 
chronology of significant wars in Islamic history from the 7th to13th centuries. At the 
further end of the top floor, there is a section of recreated scenes, a series of mise-en-
scenes which I have dubbed the “Lifestyles” gallery, of objects as they would have 
been used in their original contexts and environments. Each display case is 




 See also Lucien de Guise, Beyond Orientalism: How the West was Won over by Islamic Art (Kuala 
Lumpur: Islamic Arts Museum Malaysia, 2008). The catalogue was published in conjunction with the 
25 July - 25 October 2008 IAMM exhibition of the same name, which displayed artefacts from the 
IAMM‟s collection alongside the works they inspired in the Western world. 
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accompanied by a title and narrative explaining the context of the scene and the 
Muslim region and period where the objects are produced.  
 
Here again, relying on the blurred lines between the sacred and the secular, the 
IAMM displays the historical and artistic development of crafts in different areas of 
Muslim life in different Islamicate regions.  However, because of the very diversity of 
styles and types of objects, there is also a slippage when one contemplates the 
traditional headdress of a central Asian ethnic group, the bejewelled trousseau of a 
Mughal prince and attempts to look for a common “Islamic” aesthetic that runs 





In a small section at the end of the gallery, just before the elevators, a wall 
display announcing “Palestine: The Forgotten History and Culture” seems to almost 
jump out of nowhere and demand one‟s attention. Quite apart from the objects of art 
on display, the Palestine wall (no pun intended) had a timeline of milestones in 
Palestinian history mounted on it. Beginning in 63 A.D. when Palestine was part of 
the Roman Empire, it significantly stops at 1948 with the establishment of the state of 
Israel. The information on the panel reads “1948: Exodus of Palestinians from Israel”, 
without mentioning the creation of Israel that same year (Fig. 4.14). In between these 
two end points, the timeline marks “1882-1903: Eastern Europe Jewish immigration”, 
“1947: United Nations‟ General Assembly (UNGA)” where by a two-thirds vote, 
56.5% of the territories under the former British Mandate was allocated for the 
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establishment of a Jewish state, 43% of land to Arab Palestinians and that Jerusalem 




The Palestine permanent exhibit was installed two years ago in 2007. It was 
set up in response to requests from both local and foreign visitors who suggested that 
the museum‟s educating mission would be more comprehensive if it generated 
awareness of contemporary issues that affected Muslims. A number of local and 
foreign visitors felt that the museum should also address “the Palestinian issue” 
because it should be considered part of a “larger” Islamic history.269 Thus it can be 
seen that despite the complex nature of the issue, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
continues to be perceived by the majority of the Malaysian public (as well as many 
other casual observers) as religious conflict. In Malaysia, each successive BN-UMNO 
government and PAS opposition have responded to populist sentiment as such, 
making declarations of Muslim solidarity whenever the Palestinian territories have 
come under attack whilst downplaying any belligerent acts by Hamas and other 
Palestinian individuals. 
Fig. 4.14. Palestine exhibit in the IAMM 
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Understandably, displaying such an overtly political and sensitive topic in an 
art museum placed the IAMM in an awkward situation. It is widely known that 
Malaysia has not shied away from showing its support to the Palestinian cause and it 
remains strongly pro-Arab in its foreign policy stand on the Middle East. This pan-
Islamic solidarity with the plight of the Palestinians intensified during Mahathir‟s 
government as Malaysia asserted its leadership role in the OIC and other international 
Islamic organizations, Mahathir himself did not shy away from criticising the West 





The IAMM however, has tried to downplay the tensions and emotions that the 
subject evokes with its art surroundings while simultaneously downplaying the 
politically explosive content of the subject. As such, the exhibit includes a section 
concerning the threat that the Dome of the Rock – a UNESCO World Heritage site 
since 1967 because of the magnificence of its architecture and its religious 
significance to Judaism, Christianity and Islam – is under, due to the ongoing 
hostilities in the region. This awkward instance demonstrates how the curating of the 
IAMM is not distanced from the larger politics of Malaysia and especially its relations 
with the wider Muslim world. Similar to the problems of autonomy facing some 
archaeological museums in Israel that were highlighted by Azoulay,
271
 the inclusion 
of the Palestinian exhibit challenges the notion that a museum is free to be an 
impartial and objective producer of knowledge.  
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In the earlier Architecture Gallery, the Dome of the Rock‟s architecture played 
centre stage and its significance to Islam was secondary.
272
 However in both instances 
when the Dome of the Rock is exhibited, its significance to Jewish history as the site 
of the Foundation Stone and Second Jewish Temple as well as its importance to 
Christian history goes unmentioned. Notwithstanding the unpredictability of learning 
in museums, the museum environment “codifies and conditions the visitor‟s 
expectations” and the way he or she interprets the exhibits.273 In this instance, the 
knowledge of the Dome of the Rock and Palestine history that a visitor acquires is 
likely skewed towards a pro-Palestinian perspective.
274
 Visitors who have already 
formed their own opinions or taken sides on the issue would have their “allegiances” 
confirmed. Pro-Palestinian/pan-Islamic visitors would have their sentiments 
reinforced, while pro-Israeli/pan-Jewish visitors would have felt that the exhibition 
was not a fair representation of Israeli-Jewish history and left thinking that Islam was 
robbing the Jews of their heritage.     
 
  Hence it is not a stretch to suggest that the IAMM collection and activities 
reflect a larger process of Islamization of Malaysian society that began in earnest in 
the 1980s and which has become increasingly entrenched in the national culture. The 
success of many of the IAMM‟s exhibitions, especially with international visitors,275 
as well as the encouraging response to its travelling exhibitions, also demonstrates 
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Malaysia‟s art and political elites‟ efforts to expand the discourse on Islamicate 
civilization and Islamicate cultures. Paramount to these efforts is the desire to position 
Malaysia as both an important producer of Islamicate culture and knowledge as well 
as a trustworthy and competent guardian of an Islamicate world heritage. Further, as I 
have argued in an earlier chapter, beyond the politics of identity, the IAMM is also a 
testament to Mahathir‟s aim to project present-day Malaysia – with its Muslim 





Constructed Revelations: Representing the Nation-state 
 
When something as contentious as the “nation” or “religion” is exhibited in a 
museum, it is subject to scrutiny and debate as the museum is a public site and has the 
authority to influence visitors‟ perceptions of the subjects on display. Through their 
collections, display methods, narratives, educational activities and even the buildings 
themselves, museums have the ability to influence the world around them just as 
much as they aim to represent aspects of it. The BQMI and the IAMM share a 
common rhetoric in that they present themselves as both “a gift to the world” and as 
“a mirror” for indigenous Muslims to view themselves. Thus, the two institutions aim 
to respectively define Indonesia and Malaysia‟s Muslim communities through the 
various narratives that are woven around their collections.  
 
While their collections generally suggest that the “national” and “universal” 
Muslim identity is inclusive and cuts across ethnic and regional lines, a closer 
examination of key objects and curatorial strategies reveal a high degree of selection 
involved in creating an Islamicate image of Indonesia and Malaysia.  For various 
reasons, in the process of selection, some ethnic groups are promoted as genuine 
contributors to traditions of local Islamicate art, material culture and cultural 






State-defined Islam and National Contributions to a Global Islamicate Culture  
 
The BQMI collection, I have argued, ultimately erased Chinese Muslims from 
the public representations of the Indonesian nation despite a long history of 
propagating Islam in the archipelago while recasting traditionally non-Muslim areas 
such as North Bali, Irian Jaya and East Timor as part of an “Indonesian Darul 
Islam”.276 The lack of representation of Chinese Muslims in the illumination of the 
Mushaf Al-Qur‟an Istiqlal is compounded by the lack of benda kuno belonging to 
Chinese Muslims or contemporary art produced by this community in the BQMI.
277
 
The dearth of Chinese Muslim representations reflects the marginalisation of the 
Chinese ethnic group as a whole in the Indonesian public sphere that began during 
Dutch colonial rule and intensified under the New Order regime when expressions of 




The “cultural subordination” of Chinese-Indonesians lies at odds with public 
perceptions of the Javanese-Muslim majority that the wealthy Chinese (and usually 
Christian) as dominating Indonesia‟s economy and politically favoured by the Suharto 
government. It also complicates the notion of a “brotherhood” of Indonesian Muslims 
and fractures the image of a universal Islamic community when some Muslims are 
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excluded from it due to their ethnic identity. In addition, while the presence of more 
contemporary mushafs and the visual arts section in the BQMI suggest an ongoing 
dialogue that contemporary Indonesian-Muslim artists have with earlier Indonesian 
calligraphers, artists and artisans, the museum‟s narrative of Indonesian Islamicate art 
or even Indonesian-Islamicate culture, seems to be self-contained – defined by what 
could be experienced within the archipelago rather than an earlier Islamicate discourse 
during the period of Dutch colonialism, that was referencing the larger Muslim world.  
 
The opposite case seems true with the IAMM collection. The museum 
systematically displays in its galleries objets d‟art from the different Islamicate 
dynasties throughout history, apportioning roughly the same amount of space to the 
“India” and “China” galleries as it does to its “Malay World” gallery. Thus, the 
IAMM collection more successfully mirrors the state‟s rhetoric of a harmonious 
multi-racial, multi-cultural Malaysian society, albeit one that submits to a Malay-
Islamist cultural hegemony. Through the art objects, the IAMM‟s curators assert that 
Chinese, Indian, Malay and Central Asian Muslims have enriched the production of 
Islamicate art and material culture in the same way that the Arabian, Persian and 
Turkish Muslims did in their times.  
 
However, though they are present, the representations of Chinese and Indian 
artistic expressions in the IAMM are arguably state-endorsed ones that use Islam as 
that “special overlay” that renders Chinese and Indian cultural expressions more 
acceptable to the Malay-Muslim majority. The inclusiveness of the IAMM collection 
also belies the historical marginalisation of Chinese and Indians in Malaysian society, 
first as alien non-bumiputra with no ancestral claims to the land, and secondly as 
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opportunistic capitalists dominating the national economy.
279
 As a point for 
comparison, while the Muzium Negara contains a permanent gallery devoted to 
displaying the ethnic and cultural diversity of Malaysia, in recent years, an exhibition 
titled “The Islamic Frontiers of China” was staged in the Central Hall of the 
museum.
280
 Other than yet another sign of the proliferation of Islam in the public 
sphere, the popularity of the exhibition suggests that there might be increasing 
cultural distance between the Malay-Muslim majority and its non-Malay-Muslim 
counterparts such that the former is more comfortable assimilating the latter group 
into an Islamicate framework to “authenticate” them as part of the “national” culture.  
 
Ironically, while Islam acts as a prism through which non-Malay cultures can 
be accommodated in Malaysia‟s public domain, Malay dominance of it also 
complicates the status of Muslim converts as discussed in Chapter I. As Nagata 
explained, Islam became the last identity marker separating Malays from other ethnic 
groups after the institutionalisation of Malay political dominance and Bahasa Melayu 
as the national language of Malaysia.
281
 Thus, Muslim universality still takes a 
backseat to Malay ethnic exclusivity. The definitions of “Malay-ness” are alternately 
tightened and relaxed as barriers to equal political and social representation.   
 
 
Curating the Nation-state 
 
Another element that should be considered with regard to the IAMM is that, 
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despite its establishment as a privately-run museum, it is very much an institution that 
promotes the state‟s version of Islamicate history, art and culture over rival definitions 
by other non-state actors. One should know that there are other notable Islamicate –
themed museums in Malaysia. Besides Kuala Lumpur,
282
 there is a museum about 
Islam in Kelantan, a conservative Malay-Muslim area, recognised for its role as an 
early centre of Islamic education on the peninsula. Syura Hall itself was formerly the 
first school for Islamic education in the Malay states.  
 
The Melaka Islamic Museum (MIM) on the other hand, is located in the 
former Melaka Islamic Council Building (Majlis Agama Islam Melaka). Melaka 
being the historical seat of royal Malay-Muslim power, the MIM has fashioned itself 
as both “a display centre of documents and artefacts pertaining to Islam [and] also to 
be a centre for research into the coming of Islam into Melaka and its subsequent 
spread to the rest of Malaysia.”283 The Al-Azim State Mosque in Melaka also houses 
a Qur‟an Museum similar to the Bayt al-Quran in Jakarta. The museum which 
exhibits different types of mushaf Al-Qur‟an along with relics and artefacts on the 
development of Islam, considers itself a knowledge centre on the Qur‟an as well as on 
Islamicate arts and heritage, where visitors can learn about the spread of Islam to 
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  Of significance is that the other three Islamicate-themed museums in 
Malaysia are found in Sabah, Sarawak and Penang – states which are traditionally 
considered non-Malay-Muslim areas. The Sabah Islamic Civilisation Museum was 
officially opened in April 2002 in a state that is demographically predominantly 
Chinese, Kadazan-Dusun and other indigenous stock, who practice either Christianity, 





The museum‟s six galleries focus on educating its visitors about “Islamic 
Civilisation”, “Islam in Nusantara”, “Islam in Malaysia”, “Islam in Sabah”, the 
history of Prophet Muhammad, as well the five Islamic commandments.
286
 Given 
Sabah‟s disputed history as a former kingdom of Sulu and hence part of modern day 
Philippines,
287
 one could argue that that the establishment of the Islamic Civilisation 
Museum is an attempt by the Malaysian state to “ground” Sabah‟s history and 
development firmly in the narrative of the Malaysian “nation”.  
 
Similarly, the Sarawak Islamic Museum was established in May 1992 to 
“present to the people of Sarawak and other visitors of the splendour and the beauty of 
Islamic Civilization” so that “the public will have greater appreciation and 
understanding on the contribution of Islam to human civilization”.288 Its seven 
galleries also mirror its Sabah counterpart with a gallery depicting the spread of Islam 
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in Sarawak.  
 
Galleries devoted to Islamicate architecture, decorative arts and domestic 
utensils, music, costumes and personal ornaments and weaponry closely resemble the 
IAMM with its focus on Islamicate artistic production. As a nod to the museum 
building‟s history as the James Brook Malay College and subsequently as Madrasah 
Melayu Sarawak, there is a gallery on “Science, Technology, Economics, Education 
and Literature” that displays objects representing the development of education and 
technology in Sarawak since the establishment of British presence there.  
 
Last, and by no means least, the Penang Islamic Museum completes the 
“Islamic Heritage Trail” across the Malay Peninsula.289 The objectives of the Penang 
Islamic Museum include enshrining “for posterity, the role and contributions of Malay 
leaders in the development and propagation of Islam in Pulau Pinang” as well as to 
preserve “Malay historical heritage” amidst the rapid physical development taking 
place there.
290
 Whether by design or happy accident, the sum effect of all these state-
funded and private Islamicate-themed museums reinforce the image (and imagination) 
of Malaysia as a Muslim nation. It also locates Malaysia as being a significant 
component of global Islamicate culture. 
 
It seems to be less the case in Indonesia, despite Suharto‟s earlier efforts to 
replicate national mosques across the archipelago. Visitorship has fallen at BQMI 
even though it no longer charged a separate entrance fee from TMII admission. 
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Further, Islamicate-themed museums are few in Indonesia and are not as popular with 
visitors as the country‟s other museums and art galleries. The persistence of earlier 
Hindu-Buddhist cultural arts and monumental architecture remains paramount in the 
tourist imagination through the hawking of Bali, Yogyakarta and other exotic tourist 
locales. Indonesia‟s Islamicate heritage is downplayed to attract the tourist dollar.  
 
Interestingly though, when current US President Barack Obama‟s early 
childhood in Jakarta was made known and he received a warm reception during his 
first presidential visit there in November 2010, some rumours began to circulate that 
he was raised Muslim in Indonesia.
291
 It suggests that even without a sustained state 
effort to represent Indonesia as a Muslim nation, its international image is still 
coloured by the fact that 90% of its population profess to be Muslim.   
 
Hence curating the Indonesian nation is a complex and gargantuan task for any 
one museum to undertake and perhaps to attempt to do so might not be in the best 
interest of any party. Forcing a mould over such a multitude of ethnic, cultural and 
religious variants such as Indonesia will inevitably lead to the glossing over of 
troublesome contradictions as well as the exclusion of minorities. Ultimately what is 
then displayed would be a skewed representation of Indonesian reality.  
 
The cue that museum practitioners could take is that more transparency and 
dialogue are imperative when they seek to represent the history and culture of a group 
or groups of people within the museum. Curators also need to be careful that they do 
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not present „closed‟ definitions of a culture, an art form and especially not religion as 
it is lived and practised by its adherents because of the extant varied interpretations of 
individual beliefs and idiosyncratic practices.         
  
 
Creating an “Islamic” History 
 
The concept of an “Islamic Heritage Trail” as a new “tourism product” is 
fascinating in its own right and deserves its own research. It suffices here to say that 
similar to the Yayasan Amalbakti Muslim Pancasila (YAMP) mosques that are being 
built across Indonesia, the IAMM along with the other Islamicate-themed museums 
mentioned above, are themselves copies of one another as they project the idea of an 
Islamic Malay past with their collections. Thus, the Islamicate-themed museums 
themselves become part of an Islamicate tradition for Malaysia.  
 
The presence of such authoritative educational and cultural institutions, of 
which the IAMM is considered the jewel in the crown, went some way in helping 
Kuala Lumpur being selected as an Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (ISESCO) Capital City of Islamic Culture in 2009. Malaysia‟s selection 
coincided with the tenth anniversary of IAMM‟s establishment and the museum 
celebrated the milestone by staging an exhibition titled “A Decade of Dedication at 
the Islamic Arts Museum Malaysia” which feted the achievements of the museum in 
educating the public about the splendour of Islamic art.
292
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Collectively, these museums establish a trail of “Islamic heritage” across 
Malaysia‟s geography and history, transforming earlier functions and meanings of the 
buildings in which they now inhabit – and laying an Islamic patina even over areas 
which have resisted an “Islamized” identity. The presence of state-funded Islamic 
museums in Penang, Sabah and Sarawak, which display objects that claim to 
represent the Islamicate histories of these areas, recalls the way in which the Mushaf 
Al-Quran Istiqlal served as a means to incorporate traditionally non-Muslim areas 
such as West Papua, Timor Leste and North Bali into an embodiment of a re-
imagined “Islamic nation”.  
 
 
The Museum as a Contested Space for Discussions of Culture  
and National Identity 
 
Increasing numbers of contemporary museums are moving towards staging 
exhibitions that challenge visitors‟ preconceived notions on any given issue. They 
experiment with the exhibition spaces and stage objects in ways that elicit diverse and 
sometimes conflicting responses from their viewers. The displayed objects serve as 
launch-pads to generate further discussion beyond the museum. However, museums, 
especially those run by or linked to the state, are less likely to be politically-neutral 
spaces of learning where visitors “draw their own conclusions” about the subject 
being exhibited. More often than not, these museums must adhere to and disseminate 
whatever information and values that state authorities or community leaders have 
deemed important for visitors to learnt.   
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My examination of the IAMM and its collection reveals that the objects 
associated with Islamic history and Islamicate art have been organized in such a way 
that despite the diverse richness of its material culture and the apparent inclusiveness 
of its representation, the exhibits tend to represent Islam as a monolithic religious 
culture with universalizing aesthetics and religious practices which appear relatively 
unchanged over time.  
 
Rather than presenting Islamicate art as the products of parallel and sometimes 
crisscrossing currents of Islamicate cultures that continually borrow, adapt and rejects 
elements from their diverse and overlapping cultural and religious environments the 
IAMM prefers a conservative interpretation of Islamicate art which centres on the 
“spiritual” basis of its production. No awkward questions are raised about the Malays‟ 
pre-Islamic past – Islam appears to have absorbed and transformed all earlier animist 
and Hindu-Buddhist practices. Whatever that does not fit into the IAMM‟s grand 
narrative is simply not displayed. In the IAMM, the splendour of modern and 
traditional architecture harmoniously blended and finely-rendered calligraphy, 
porcelain, coins and jewellery from various Islamicate civilizations all combine to 
present a mesmerizing face of Islam to visitors.  
 
Especially in the wake of the New York World Trade Centre attack in 2001, 
the IAMM‟s curators were keen to present the benign face of Islam amidst worldwide 
news coverage of Islamist terrorists and extremist Muslim clerics. The IAMM has had 
to reconcile the representation of Islam as a civilization that produced great works of 
166 
 
art and made significant contributions to early scientific knowledge with more recent 
images of prolonged warfare, and acts of terror and violence of Islam in the 
international media.  
 
The attempt to address the violent memories associated with Islam especially 
with regard to warfare, has led to an interesting treatment of the arms and armoury 
artefacts in the IAMM collection. Artefacts such as swords, daggers, body armour and 
war banners and other paraphernalia would have their material provenance displayed 
but rarely the historical context in which they were used. Instead, what visitors see is a 
timeline that traces the development of Islamicate-styled arms technology, punctuated 
with important battles in Islamic history displayed on a wall in the Arms and Armoury 
Gallery. The decorations embellished on the weapon that is brought to the fore and 
highlighted as “a cultural charm” that is specific to a style.  
 
In this instance, similar to the problems associated with commemorating the 
French Revolution that Ozouf analyzes, there is a tension between exhibiting such 
artefacts along the conventional framework of what constitutes a “civilisation” or 
“art” and avoiding the evocation of memories of violence that accompany such 
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The Muslim ummah as displayed in the IAMM is a global community of art 
producers. Differences in religious doctrine and practices are downplayed in order to 
present a commonality of the experience of Islam amongst believers, especially in the 
performance of the hajj. In addition, the display of Malay art and material culture as 
Islamicate art forms have stretched the historical socio-geographical entity of Dar-al 
Islam
294
 such that it expands  the discussion of non-Arabian knowledge and cultural 
productions about Islam being just as “valuable” and “authentic” as its Arabian 
origins. Similarly, BQMI‟s rendition of Indonesian Islamicate culture and art as 
representing „a Muslim nation‟ also transforms its earlier history of more fluid 
identities as well as the societal tolerance for such ambiguities of self into a narrative 
of a linear development of Indonesian Islamicate society. An uneasy tension exists in 
the museum space between celebrating national unity while disciplining the diversity 
of its constituent parts.   
 
In this regard, one could say that the state‟s attempt to “rehabilitate” 
Malaysia‟s place from the periphery of the Islamic world to being recognized as an 
important centre of Islamicate cultural, artistic and intellectual production has been a 
success. Not only does such an enterprise consolidate Malaysia‟s presence in 
international Muslim forum, it also increases Malaysia‟s stature as a modern country 
which has managed to harness religious authority to some degree of success and 
which better serves its nation-building programme. However, in the long term, the 
IAMM‟s permanent collection is likely to “fix” the contributions made by Islamicate 
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artists firmly in the past of Islam‟s “golden age” with little mention of how these 




Unlike the BQMI which showcases the diversity and currency of 
contemporary Indonesian Islamicate art, there is a conspicuous absence of 
contemporary examples of Islamicate art, both foreign and indigenous, in the 
IAMM‟s permanent galleries. Its comprehensive collection reinforces the impression 
of an expansive and majestic history of global Islamicate civilisation but the lack of 
contemporary art pieces in its permanent exhibition unwittingly suggests that “Islamic 
art” belongs to the past in much the same way that Renaissance art is a closed corpus 
of work.  
 
Such a curatorial approach to the objects in the IAMM is likely to situate not 
just Islamicate art but also other forms of Islamic knowledge in the past rather than 
ongoing projects that are imperfect, unfinished, dynamic and open to revisions and 
contemporary imaginations. It seems to be a more forward-looking trajectory for 
Indonesian Muslims. Contemporary art produced by Indonesian Muslim artists enjoy 
a widespread following locally and the BQMI has been a supportive convenor of such 
exhibitions. Such a modern attitude towards Islamicate art and other forms of material 
cultural as well as intellectual production situates Indonesian Muslims confidently in 
the present and with an optimistic eye towards the future in terms of maintaining 
traditions of and creating new forms of indigenous Islamicate art.  
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Ultimately, the question of “who” is included in the representation of 
Islamicate traditions or an Islamic nation lies at the heart of the BQMI and IAMM 
collections and museum activities. The BQMI and IAMM‟s respective interpretations 
of Islam as a historical phenomenon, a prism refracting artistic and architectural 
production and an actively practised faith are never done in a rarefied manner for 
esoteric purposes. The collections, exhibitions, outreach activities and publications are 
organized always with an eye to fashioning the tastes, attitudes and behaviour of their 
domestic publics such that a national culture can be ultimately realised.  
 
The BQMI and IAMM‟s different approaches to exhibiting their respective 
Islamicate collections bring to mind Sahlins‟ argument that not only do cultural 
structures import historical significance to an event, but culture and cultural contexts 
themselves are created by the actions of the individuals within a society. These 
individual (and collective) actions in turn, transforms existing cultural schemes 
(meanings) and ultimately are “re-valued” with each subsequent action or even in its 
own reproduction.
296
 Thus, Islam is such an important identity marker and component 
of national identity that these two iconic museums were established as mega cultural 
projects to strengthen national identity by re-imagining the Indonesian and Malaysian 
nation with Islam as its overarching reference point. To different degrees, Islam itself 
was also transformed into both a “moral compass” that would ensure the harmony of 
each country‟s multi-ethnic nation and also a “modernizing tool” for their economic 
and social development.  
 
Nonetheless, the BQMI and IAMM can also complicate the creation of a more 
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inclusive national culture, especially when there is a dearth of museums that celebrate 
the history and the material culture of other faiths. Partly because of the Indonesian 
and Malaysian governments‟ commitment to “multiracialism” and the de jure 
subordination of religion to the state‟s prerogatives, there continues to be tensions in 
both societies as to the extent to which Islam can play a role in defining the respective 
national cultures.  
 
Sukarno had courted and then betrayed the Islamists who had fought for 
Indonesia‟s independence from the Dutch after World War II. Later in the New Order 
era, Suharto jealously guarded the secular and pluralist ethos of the Pancasila against 
Islamist pressures that were just as passionate to create an Islamic state out of the 
modern nation-state that emerged after generations of Dutch colonialism. His 
sensitivity to the increasing religiosity of Indonesians in the 1980s spurred him to 
channel the Islamic revivalism towards cultural rather than political expressions of 
Islam in Indonesia‟s public sphere. His political manoeuvrings effectively curtailed 
Islamist political activity but led to stronger cultural assertions by Indonesian 
Muslims in the country‟s public sphere, which in turn encroached upon the rights and 
liberties of non-Muslims and other ethnic minorities.  
 
Suharto‟s oust from power in 1998 and the subsequent merry-go-round of 
interim and short-lived Presidents, meant that the BQMI lost its most powerful patron. 
Since then, the BQMI has suffered from numerous departmental changeovers within 
the Ministry of Religion. It was moved from its original Ditjen Bimas Islam dan 
Urusan Haji (Directorate-General for the Guidance of Islamic Society and Hajj 
Affairs) overseers, to the Ditjen Kelembagaan Agama Islam (Directorate-General for 
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the Institutionalization of Islam) in 2002. In 2005, the BQMI came under the purview 
of Ditjen Bimbingan Masyarakat Islam (Directorate-General for the Guidance of 
Islamic Society).  
 
Currently however, it is under the management of the Lajnah Pentashihan 
Mushaf Al- Qur‟an, Badan Litbang, dan Diklat Departemen Agama Republik 
Indonesia.
297
 The museum is currently in the process of yet another departmental 
reorganization and there is talk of an increase in museum funding, especially since 
2010 has been designated as “Visit Museum Year” in Indonesia.298 Nonetheless, the 
lack of both organizational transparency and permanency has resulted in much 
bureaucratic and creative inertia which affects the operations and maintenance of the 
BQMI‟s collection and galleries.    
 
In Malaysia, on the other hand, successive UMNO prime ministers saw 
engagement with the Muslim world as a counterbalancing force to the hegemony of 
the West and their international diplomacy frameworks. Nonetheless, they were 
careful not to lose sight of the domestic implications of Malaysia‟s associations with 
international Islamic organisations. Especially during Mahathir‟s stewardship, the 
UMNO government balanced support for international Muslim causes abroad with 
suppressing the activities of non-state Islamist groups like the Al Arqam movement 
and Wahabism at home. Further, while Mahathir spearheaded the Islamization of 
Malaysia‟s bureaucracy, facilitated the development of Islamic finance and 
encouraged Islamic modes of knowledge production in academic and scientific 
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circles, he was just as zealous at discrediting PAS opposition and other Islamist-
credentialed rivals such as Anwar Ibrahim.  
 
State-endorsed cultural expressions of Islam are part of Mahathir‟s ambitious 
“Wawasan 2020” vision for the development of Malaysia into a modern Islamicate 
country without having it transformed into an Islamic theocratic state. The challenge 
for Malaysia is that the state has to manage the expectations of its increasingly 
religious Malay-Muslim majority while ensuring that the (already limited) rights of its 
minority groups are not even more severely compromised. The IAMM, along with 
other Islamicate-themed museums in Malaysia, have an important part to play in 
creating narratives about Malaysian Islam that are inclusive and not unnecessarily 
diametrically opposed to the belief systems and cultures of its non-Malay/ non-





From the perspective of vested political interests, both the BQMI and the 
IAMM attempt to be authoritative „true‟ mirrors reflecting the “national heritage” of 
the majority of its citizens. The museums‟ collections also project an image of each 
country‟s “national identity” to international visitors and the domestic public alike.  I 
have argued that in the case of the BQMI, the localized nature of its collection is 
designed “inwards” and addresses all Indonesian Muslims as a community of art-
producing citizens informed by Muslim sensibilities. The BQMI extends the 
discussion of Islam‟s legacy and role in Indonesia through the examination of material 
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culture produced by the peoples of the Nusantara across time and space.  In contrast, 
the IAMM‟s extended collection of objects across the different Islamicate dynastic 
periods and its well-respected research and conservation facilities attest to its 
international outlook. Arguably, the IAMM also reflects Malaysia‟s internationalist 
aspirations to be regarded as both an expert guardian of Islamicate material culture 
heritage as well as an important centre of Islamicate culture. Separately, the BQMI 
and IAMM have mixed the discourses of art, culture, religion, politics, and history in 
“specific, hierarchical ways” to evoke a modern, Muslim image of the nation. 
 
Ultimately, given the socio-political circumstances in Indonesia and Malaysia 
in the last three decades of the twentieth century, the museums‟ considerations and the 
approaches they chose to respond to their environment, go beyond the politics of 
cultural identity. The BQMI is a project of national unity for Indonesia in the reality 
of disparate ethnic and religious identities, while the IAMM serves as a showcase of 
civilizational progress in which Malaysia should be considered not just an important 
producer of Islamicate culture, but also a model modern Muslim society.  
 
The museum is a contested site of cultural and aesthetic expressions of Islam 
and bears great significance in advancing the nation-building campaign. In this regard, 
the BQMI and IAMM are important social institutions due to the educating mission 
that they profess as well as the different forms of “capital” that their visitors can 
accrue from successive visits.
299
 In the process, the state was able to add a layer of 
religious legitimacy to strengthen its overall authority and keep any religious 
opposition in check.  
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The two museums face further challenges to their educating and socialising 
mission in terms of reaching their intended audiences (e.g. few domestic visitors (vis-
à-vis foreign tourists) as well as unpredictable visitor responses to the exhibitions.
300
 
In the first case, to shape a truly inclusive cultural ethos, the museums have to reach 
beyond its traditional patronage by a small group of educated middle- and upper-class 
adults to the bigger working class base and youth.
301
 In the second case, I am arguing 
that despite any underlying state agenda and funding, the museums‟ curators cannot 
remain aloof from the reality and the resultant expectations of its intended audience, 
especially the latter‟s capacity as consumers of knowledge and spectacles.  
 
The museums must go beyond the reach of their galleries in educating and 
entertaining their visitors.  Museum programming, publications, souvenirs, outreach 
activities and even food increasingly dovetail with museum exhibitions to meet 
visitors‟ demand to be educated, entertained and to consume „culture‟, whether it be 
their own or others. The generally favourable reviews that visitors have given the 
BQMI and IAMM demonstrate how important museums are in knowledge production 
and how the appropriate curatorial approach and visitor engagement can contribute a 




In the final analysis, just as any other modern museums that want to succeed, 
both the BQMI and IAMM must walk a fine line between education, legitimization, 
authenticity, entertainment and profitability if they are to be effective and lasting tools 
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of nation building. This is why the IAMM was able to celebrate its tenth anniversary 
with great aplomb in 2009, while the BQMI on the other hand, has become a pale 





abangan  (Jav.) A Javanese who is considered a nominal Muslim 
as he still observes some Hindu-Buddhist rituals 
Basmallah  (Ar.) An invocation of Allah‟s majesty and mercy 
usually recited at the start of a Surah  
batik  (Jav.) A type of printed cloth, either drawn or stamped 
indigenous to Indonesia and Malaysia 
benda kuno (Mal.) old objects 
benda tradisi  (Mal.) heritage objects 
bumiputera  (Mal.) A political term coined in Malaysia in 1957 to 
protect the political interests of the Malays to 
differentiate them from first and second-generation non-
Malay immigrants.  
dakwah  (Mal.) To proselytize – from Ar. da‟a meaning “to 
call”) 
dhikir Allah  (Ar.) The remembrance of Allah 
dondang sayang  (Mal.) A type of traditional Malay music in which 
poems are sung 
al-Haqiqah (Ar.) The Truth  
ihram  (Ar.) The two lengths of white cloth that Muslims wear 
during the hajj that symbolizes the equality of all 
Muslims before Allah 
ijtihad  (Ar.) The scholarly interpretation of divine law 




Iman  (Ar.) Faith 
Istiqlal (Ar.) Independence 
Javanist (Eng.)A term used by Robert Hefner to describe 
Javanese Muslims who strongly identify with their 
earlier Hindu-Buddhist and mystical Javanese beliefs 
despite professing to be Muslim. Similar to abangan 
Jawi  (Ar.) The Arabic script that was adopted to put the 
Malay language into written form 
joget ronggeng  (Mal.) A traditional Malay dance with an upbeat tempo 
juz (Ar.) Each section of the Qur‟an that can be read during 
the Muslim month of Ramadhan 
Ka‟bah  (Ar.) The cuboid structure in Makkah built by the 
Prophet Abraham in which direction Muslims face in 
prayer 
kejawen  (Jav.) A local spiritualistic system of Indonesia that 
encompasses all the customs, beliefs and practices of 
Java and or the Javanese 
ketuanan Melayu  (Mal.) Malay supremacy 
kraton (Jav.) From “keratunan”, meaning the place where the 
queen or king lives   
Kun Fayaakun  (Ar.) “Be! And it is” (Al-Qur‟an, Surah Al-Baqarah, 
Verse 116-117 
kyai or kiai (Jav.) A term of respect for an expert in Islam or 




madrasah (Ar.) A modern religious school usually in an urban 
centre 
masjid (Ar.) mosque 
mazhab  (Ar.) A school of thought on Islamic divine law and 
jurisprudence  
Melayu jati  (Mal.) A “true” Malay of local Malay parentage to 
distinguish from those from mixed unions who 
observed Malay customs and spoke Malay 
mihrab (Ar.) A semi-circular niche in the wall of a mosque that 
indicates the direction of prayer (qiblah) 
minbar (Ar.) A raised platform from where a sermon in a 
mosque is delivered 
muallaf  
or saudara baru  (Ar. and Mal.) A  convert to Islam 
mushaf (Ar.) A reproduction of the Qur‟an 
Pancasila  (Mal.) The five principles of the Indonesian 
Constitution 
pesantren  (Jav.) A traditional Islamic school in Indonesia 
pribumi  (Jav.) An indigenous person in Indonesian usage 
prijayi (Jav.) The traditional Javanese nobility and landowners 
class of pre-colonial Java 
pusaka  (Mal.) inheritance 
qiblah (Ar.) The direction of prayer, i.e. the Ka‟bah in Makkah 




santri  (Jav.) Referring to observant Javanese Muslims in the 
mid-19th Century 
al-Shari‟ah  (Ar.) The Law of God 
sheikh or shaykh (Ar.) An honorific title for a religious leader 
songket (Mal.) A type of cloth with gold or silver thread woven 
through in decorative patterns 
surah  (Ar.) A chapter in the Qur‟an 
tarian kuda kepang  (Jav.) A hypnotic dance that portrays warriors on horses 
Taqwa  (Ar.) Fidelity 
al-Tariqah  (Ar.) The Spiritual Way 
tilāwat Al-Qur‟an  (Ar.) A melodious recital of the Qur‟an  
ulama  (Ar.) plural for alim, meaning “man of knowledge”, 
usually refers to a body of Muslim scholars trained in 
Islamic law  
ummah  (Ar.) A Muslim community  
ustaz (Ar.) A religious teacher in a madrasah 
wahyu  (Ar.) A divine revelation conveyed to the Muslim 
Prophets 
wakaf (Ar.) A donation, usually of land or property towards a 
Muslim cause   
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